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Por: Global Initiative
Diciembre 2021

Global Organized Crime Index
2021

 

Global Organized Crime Index
2021
GL BAL
INITIATIVE
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME

The global illicit economy in 2020: a year of upheaval 7
Key findings 12
20
Index composition 22
26
Model 27
Index scoring process 28
Limitations 31
32
National, regional and continental context 33
Criminality 36
Resilience 44
50
Regional insights 51
Asia 58
Africa 64
Americas 72
Europe 80
Oceanía 88
94
Low criminality—high resilience 98
Low criminality—low resilience 100
High criminality—high resilience 102
High criminality—low resilience 104

 

 

 

108
Complex relationship between criminality and resilience 109
Crime convergence 112
Who is doing what? 114
Multifaceted response required 115
116
Economic, geographic and political vulnerabilities 117
Democracy, development, fragility, corruption 123
128
132

 

 

138
Information availability 139
Diversity in the Index components 139
Limitations 140
142
Defining organized crime 143
Criminal market definitions 144
Criminal actor definitions 146
Resilience indicator definitions 146
150
180
184

4 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

About the GÍobaÍ Organized Crime Index
The Global Organized Crime Index is the first tool of its kind designed to assess levels of
organized crime and resilience toorganized criminal activity. lt includes in its rankings all the
UN member states — 193 countries.

The results, which draw from a comprehensive dataset informed by experto worldwide, paint a
worrying picture ofthe reach, scale and impact of organized crime. lt is a sobering thought, for
instance, Chat nearly 80% of the world's population today live in countries with high levels of
criminality. lt is equally alarming to consider that the exploitation of people, in the form of
human trafficking, has become the most pervasive criminal economy in the world —a development that
serves as a dark reminder ofthe dehumanizing impact of organized crime. Meanwhile, the Index
highlights how state involvement in crimi- nality is a deeply embedded phenomenon around the world:
state officials and clientelist networks who hold influence over state authorities are nowthe most
dominant brokers of organized crime, and not cartel leaders or mala bosses, as one might be
forgiven for thinking. And these are but a lew stand-out examples of the findings ofthis Index.

This report introduces the Global Organized Crime Index and sets out the results and implications
of the 2020 data, the year in which a new
pandemic began to ravage the world. Of course, organized crime is not a new phenomenon, but it is
now a more urgent issue than ever. Criminal networks and their impact have spread across the globe
in the last two decades, driven by geopolitical, economic and technological forces. The analysis in
this report conclusively demonstrates Chat organized crime is the most pernicious threat to human
security, development and justice in the world today.

As a unique data-driven analytical tool, the Index provides the most com- prehensive assessment to
date of the pervasiveness of criminal markets, the dynamics of criminal actors, and of countries'
effectiveness in establishing the defence mechanisms and responses needed to ensure operational
resilience to organized crime. The Index metrics are based on three constituent parts: the scope,
scale and impact of specific criminal markets; the structure and influence of criminal actors; and
the extent and effectiveness of countries’ resilience measures — the antibodies that protect
against the threat of organized crime.
These three domains are used to assign each country a criminality score and a

Foreword: About the Global Organized Crime Index

 

 

 

 

 

 

resilience score using a scale of I to 10. The rich data, however, allows users to do more than
just compare rankings, but to examine more closely the indicators affecting a country's criminality
and resilience. lt illustrates patterns and trends in criminality and resilience that prompt deeper
investigation and analysis. The Index therefore allows for a nuanced assessment of countries'
criminality, juxta- posed against their institutional and non-state reservoirs of resilience.

This is the first iteration of the Global Index. lt will be updated every two years, providing
longitudinal measurement and analysis to track criminality and resilience over time. lt aims
therefore to provide a global baseline assessment, with the intention that it will become a
consistent and comprehensive resource that contextualizes and interprets evolving organized crime
dynamics. The results of the Index point to a number of implications that will contribute to better
policymaking and building effective, systematic responses to organized crime at national, regional
and international levels. In brief, these necessary alternatives include the following:
› The scale of the problem must be acknowledged before it can be addressed effectively.
› Organized crime is a truly transnational phenomenon.
› Ending the impunity of state-embedded actors will enhance global resilience to criminality.
› Continuing to bolster democracy, especially in fragile states, is a viable and useful response.
› Working towards peace is crucial in reducing the opportunities for criminality to thrive.

 

 

Mark Shaw Director, Global Initiative Against Transnational OrganiZed Crime.

 

 

 

Overview
Measuring the gÍobaÍ
iÍlicit economy

SEC*ION Overview: measuring the global illicit economy 7

 

The global illicit economy in 2020: a year of upheaval
The year 2020 shaped organized crime in many different ways. COVI D-19 threw the world into
disarray. From the confines of our homes and screens, we tracked the virus spreading from continent
to continent, the cases mounting up, the death toll rising to reach almost 2 million in 2020 alone.
But while the global licit economy ground to a halt under lockdowns and travel restrictions,
criminals were working out how to circumvent obstacles and exploit the situation. New opportunities
soon became evident in the illicit trade in personal protective equipment, counterfeit medicines
and lake vaccines, and in possibilities for corruption around public procurement.' Cybercriminal
activity exploded, preying on the countless millions forced online for work, entertainment and
commerce. Drug traffickers found novel ways of transporting their contraband, inserting their
illicit goods into shipments of essential pandemic supplies Chat sailed through understaffed ports,
while the loss of livelihoods caused by the anti-contagion measures increased the susceptibility of
some of the world s most vulnerable people to human trafficking and other forms of exploitation.
Later in the vear, the price of oil collapsed, due in large part to decline in demand. This left
ships carrying oil cargo vulnerable to piracy.'

But although the pandemic may have dominated headlines, it wasn't the only event in 2020to have an
impact on the illicit economy. lt was a threshold year in many othec respects. At the start of the
year, authocities uncovered a lacge- scale subsidies fraud, whereby clans of the Sicilian mafia
were found to have siphoned off millions of euros of agricultural funds from the European Union,
highlighting a notable progression towards less risky, but more rewarding, profit- generating
activities bv one ofthe most notorious criminal groups in the world

In Asia, US officials negotiated an agreement with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan — a
deal criticized by many. As this report was being finalized, the ramiflcations of that deal had
become clear, with the Taliban taking advantage of the troop withdrawal and seizing control of the
country again. The Taliban are known to be involved in extracting revenue from the heroin trade
(taxing opium producers), but the greater risk is arguablv the heightened insecurity Chat will
result from the group's resumption of power, which may create opportunities for trafficking groups
to consolidate their operations in the world's Reading opium poppy-pcoducing country.

From May 2020, the Black Lives Matter movement reverberated across the globe, sparking a debate on
issues of power, race and inequality, and the
relationship between law enforcement and marginalized communities. These broader societal issues
also provide a criminological lens through which to examine responses to transnational organized
crime, in particular where there is a disconnect between police and citizens, leasing communities
vulnerable to criminal groups,° and in countries afflicted by gang violence.’

Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Several developments occurred in fragile states and conflict zones known to be key hubs in the
global illicit economy. For example, in August, Mali s president, Ibrahim Boubacar Ke”ita, was
overthrown in a military coup, but the patronage networks and structural conditions that allow a
whole host of illicit economies to thrive in Mali remained intact, and arguably even strengthened.
The ongoing political crisis in VeneZuela iO 2020 also strengthened regional criminal groups,
including those allegedly linked to the president,
and expanded the country's role as a key entrepot for illicit flows of arms and people. Venezuela's
instability also risks having a knock-on destabilizing effect on other fragile states in the
region. This report sheds light on the inter-relationships between fragile countries and regions,
and their organized crime levels and resilience. As we discuss later, ending conflict is an
important step
in mitigating the impacts of organized crime and preventing it in the first place, but other than
the Sudanese interim government and rebel groups reaching a peace agreement in October following
the ousting of President Omar al- Bashir, there were not many examples of conflict resolution that
2020 can be remembered for.

Environmental crime issues also carne to the fore in 2020. Illicit wildlife trafflcking in
particular became a major concern due to the theory that a trafficked wild animal, perhaps a
pangolin, was the vector for the coronavirus making the species leap to humans. Meanwhile, swathes
of the Amazon rainforest were destroyed by illegal loggers. The data in the Index points to a
number of countries and regions that are hotspots in transnational environmental crime, such as
wildlife trafflcking, illegal logging and natural-resource smuggling.

The involvement of state actors in corrupt and illegal practices was also evident in 2020, serving
to highlight the kinds of svstemic corruption embedded in state structures and high political
office worldwide that enables and leeds off global illicit flows, while undermining resilience. I n
manv ways, the August Beirut explosion was seen as emblematic of the deep-rooted corruption within
Lebanon's disintegrating state apparatus.
The robe of state actors as vectors of organized crime by facilitating or taking part in illicit
economies is underscored emphatically by the findings of this report.

In Brazil, attacks on politicians escalated during municipal elections in November 2020. Linked to
political competition and organized crime, some killings were attributed to so-called militia
groups — organized crime syndicates most prominent in Rio de Janeiro — and drug trafficking
groups.^

Mexico, a country racked by violence and organized crime, was declared the most dangerous country
in the world for journalists, with a rise in killings in 2020.7 Journalists in Mexico are
reportedly at greater risk of being killed than those in war Zones.8

There were some small crumbs of good news in 2020. In Julv, law enforcement agencies
in Europe dismantled an encrypted phone network widely used by criminal actors called EncroChat,
resulting in some 800 initial arrests and seizures of substantial amounts of cash, drugs and
weapons. A few months later, documents revealing the astronomical sums of money laundered in the
global financial system were leaked — the so-called FinCEN files — shining
a spotlight on the use of the international banking system bv oligarchs and criminals across the
globe. And in December 2020, the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted to remove cannabis from
Schedule IV of the 19ó1 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.* While the move is unlikely to have
any material impact on illicit markets, it does represent a shift in attitudes toward the
substance, paving the way for further debate and reform.

However, the gains made by those perpetrating criminal activity were arguably much greater. In many
respects, the global illicit economv simply continued along the upward trajectory it has followed
over the past 20 years, posing an ever- increasing threat to security, development and justice —
the pillars of democracy. The incidents such as those described above are therefore not

SEC*ION Overview: measuring the global illicit economy

 

just isolated political-economic occurrences, but arguably part of a pattern of the ongoing
devastating impact that organized crime leaves in its wake.'"

Fundamentally, although the pandemic changed our perception of things, and affected some aspects of
organized crime's logistical supply chains, nothing much reallv changed in 2020. Yes, COVID-19 was
new, but arguably not different from other major shifts and disruptions felt by humankind.
And, as with previous disruptions, organized crime adapted. Crises like the pandemic have occurred
in the past, and there will be more major disruptors to come. Perhaps more than anything, COVID-19
allowed us to see the basic laws of organized crime in stark relief, against a new, radicallv
different backdrop- and potentially pointed towards the best means of response. The pandemic shone
a spotlight on the inequalities, vulnerabilities and systemic risk around the
world, but it also showed us the need for global collaboration. The same can be said for organized
crime a trulv global phenomenon that requires a collaborative global response.

Organized crime is a common denominador in many of the societal challenges outlined in this report:
inequality; conflict; political instability; climate change; unregulated technology and financial
markets; corruption; and forced migration. But because of its inherently clandestine nature, often
little is known about how organized crime dynamics operate in each country, let alone their impact
transnationally. Understanding therefore how crime
behaves and charges is the crucial first step to formulating any meaningful global response. So it
is essential to be able to measure it, which is where the core value of this Index, as an
analytical tool, can be found.

Similarly, measures to combat organized eri me are often inadequate or too slow to keep up with its
fast-changing tactics, and often lack the appropriate mechanisms
to evaluate their effectiveness. This inaugural Global Organized Crime Index is the first step
towards rectifying this deficit by providing the evidence base designed
to enable governments and practitioners to assess, measure and evaluate illicit markets and
organized crime, and to think globallv about how to address them. lt aims to capture, to the
fullest extent possible, the criminal dynamics and responses occurring amid a world undergoing
profound upheaval. In this way, future iterations of the index will be able to inform analysis of
global criminality and its impact for years to come.

ii

 

 

Global shopers

JANUARY

 

15

 

 

FEBRUARY

 

US Senate acquits Donald Trump in first impeachment trial on charges of abuse of power and
obstruction of Congress
Anti-government protesters barricade key streets in Haiti's capital city, Port-au-Prince
5

 

24

29
US and Taliban sign deal to end 18-year war in Afghanistan

MARCH

 

 

 

APRIL

 

 

MAY

 

 

 

JUNE

 

 

 

 

 

JULY

 

 

 

AUGUST

 

 

 

 

SEPTEMBER
15

United Arab Emirates and Bahrain sign Abraham Accords, a US-sponsored deal to establish diplomatic
relations with Israel
Trump administration imposes economic sanctions on I ran

Global COVID-19 death toll hits 1million mark

20
21

27
Fighting erupts between Azerbaijan and Armenia over disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory

OCTOBER

 

 

 

NOVEMBER

 

 

 

 

DECE BER

12 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Key findings
The Global Organized Crime Index allows users to analyze, compara and contrast a range of
indicators by country, region and continent. In compiling these indicators, several key findings
emerged that shed light on the number of people affected by criminalitv,the scale and reach of
criminal markets and the levels of resilience present in countries facing criminal threads.

 

 

More than three-quarters ofthe world's population live in countries with high levels of
criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime.

lt is well known that crime has devastating consequences for those affected by it, but in many
places the thinking remains that crime is limited a lew run-down urban centres in various hotspots.
But as the Index reveals, this is drastically off the mark. Crime is not a problem of the lew: in
assessing every country across the globe, we found that the vast majority of the world's population
(79.2%) live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience
(79.4%). Although countries with particularly acute criminality problems mal not necessacily be the
same as those with low levels of resilience, this strong population margin underscores both the
ubiquity of

 

 

organized crime and the urgent need to implement
MüóSUKüS tO COMÓót it. \/\/Ú él ü OK@ü n izüd CKi MC’ SO

its impact u timately raises the vu!nerabiIity
of societies overall. The sheer scale and depth of elimina! activity in our societies may have

FIGURE 1.2
Vulnerability classifications
E‘ Overview: measuring the global illicit economy 13

 

profound and long las ting consequences fo
SOCiRt$ óS ü WhOlQ, Mó Éi Ü@ thQ WO RIÓ IC'SS SECU MQ
dIÓ Ó *iVi Ü@ ÓóCk Ó QVü lO@Mü PI, dS WEI I dS @OSi N@ d 0
existential threat to our natural environment. (For more detail, see the section Economic,
geographic
dIÓ DOI ”t iCó I VU I 0RKó Ói I it”RS .)

 

Law CRIMINALITY High

14 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

finOfdalil
nthee@on2tinents, Asia
has the highest levels of criminality.
Asia exhibits the highest levels of criminality overall (scoring 5.30 on the criminality scale),
closely followed by Africa (5.17) and the Americas (5.0ó). To an extent, this is not surprising:
Asia is the most populous continent, is rich with natural resources and home to some of the world's
largest economic
powerhouses. Western Asia (incorporating the Middle East for the purposes of this Index) in
particular is a notoriously fragile region in which several countries have experienced or are
experiencing either conflict or its immediate impact over the past decade, highlighting how
important the combination of conflict, natural resources and weak democratic traditions are in
creating vectors for organized crime. With a score of 5.78, it is the only region in Asia Chat
ranks
in the top Ave globally for criminality, underscoring the importante of delving beyond macro-level
analysis. (See ’Continental overviews and results’.)

FIGURE 1.3
Criminality by continent

 

 

 

 

C loboí ctiminolit/ overage

SEC*ION 1 Overview: measuring the global illicit economy

 

 

 

Human t fficking is
the most pervasive of all criminal markets globally.

in Central America. While the pandemic may have presented some initial challenges to traffickers,
it also allowed them to charge higher prices to overcome travel bans and movement restrictions,
while in
Across the 10 criminal markets that the Index cases where movement evaluates, human
trafficking is the most pervasive was impossible, COVID-19 gave traffickers the criminal market
globally, followed by the cannabis opportunity to exploit their victims, who had trade, arms
trafficking, human smuggling and wildlife no chance of escape. Trafficking also exploits crimes.
The human trafficking market has been non-displaced populations through practices fuelled by
mass displacement, often overlapping such as forced labour, forced begging and organ with human
smuggling, and caused by, among trafficking, among other forms. (See 'National, other factors,
conflict, desperate socio-economic regional and continental context’.)
conditions and — not least of all — crime, especially

FIGURE 1.4
Criminal markets, global averages

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

be e e b b e
m e
eO b O

e

G/ óo/ criminal markets average

16 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

finDedmoicnraeVíes4have higher levels of resilience to criminality than authoritarian states.
FIGURE 1.5
Resilience by regime type

Full democracy (22 countries)

 

Flawed democracy (52 countries)

 

Hybrid regime (34 countries)

 

 

Authoritarian (5ó countries)

,y y z y y

 

RESILIENCE

 

 

The Index results show that countries categorized as full democracies on average exhibit higher
levels of resilience than authoritarian states.
Good governance exhibited by states that are participatory, accountable, effective and
founded on the rule of law — sets the foundation on which to build and strengthen institutional and
non-state frameworks to better society
and counter organized crime. The Index results support this: four out of the top live countries
with the highest resilience — Finland, New Zealand, Denmark and Iceland- are also in the top 10
countries of the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2020. (See 'Democracy, development,
fragility, corruption'.)

SEC*ION 1 Overview: measuring the global illicit economy 17

 

nStdateianctebfs are the most dominant agents in facilitating illicit economies and inhibiting
resilience toorganized crime.

 

State-embedded actors are the most dominant criminal actor type in the world. The degree to which
criminality permeates state institutions varies, from low-level corruption to full state capture,
but across the spectrum this involvement has implications for countries’ capacity to respond to
organized crime. One of the strongest
correlations emerging from the Index was found to be between the presente of state-embedded
criminal actors and poor resilience which suggests that those actors may be undermining the
capacity and resilience of the state to present illicit flows. (See ‘Criminality, markets, actors
and resilience: Understanding the relationships’.)

FIGURE 1.6
Resilience vs state-embedded actors
)0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

STATE-EI IBEDDED ACTORS
8 9 40

M A(rica M AmeriCOS M Asia M Europe M Oceanía

18 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

 

Many countries in conflict and fragile states experience acute vulnerability
to organized crime.
FIGURE 1.7
Highest-scoring countries, criminality

 

 

 

#1
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
7.75

 

#4
MEXICO
isb

#2
COLOMBIA
7.ó6

 

 

#5
NIGERIA
7.1S

#j
MYANMAR
759

 

 

#6
IRAN
7.10

 

As the Index results show, the countries with the highest criminality levels are those experiencing
conflict or fragility. The Democratic Republic of Congo was identified as the countrv most affected
by organized crime, followed
by Colombia, Myanmar, Mexico and Nigeria. Other high-scoring countries include Afghanistan, Iraq
and Syria, where conflicts countries have decimated the formal economies, led to mass displacement
and an influx of weapons. In conflict settings, states’ attention and capacities may be diverted to
war efforts, leaving social, economic and security institutions weakened, while resilience to
organized crime declines. (See ’Continental overviews and Results — Africa’.)

 

20Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

SECTION 2
About the Index

SEC*!ON 2 About the Index 21

 

 

Based on the 2019 ENACT1' Organised Crime Index for Africa, the tool comprises two composite
metrics, evaluating 193 UN member state countries both according to their levels of criminality on
a score from 1 to 10 (lowest to highest organized crime levels) and according to their resilience
to organized crime from 1 to 10 (lowest to highest resilience levels). The Index is designed to
provide metrics-based information that allows policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders to
be better informed in terms of developing strategies to counter organized crime in their countries
and/or regions, as the Index is continually updated.

THE KEY OBJECTIVES OF THE INDEX ARE TO:

Provide constructive guidance to policymakers and regional bodies, so that they can prioritize
interventions based on a multifaceted assessment of vulnerabilities.
Catalyze attention to the growing threat presented by transnational crime.
Guide responses to organized crime that are not solely criminal justice- or security-driven, but
that also address the phenomenon from a socio-economic perspective.
Provide stakeholders with the means to measure the efficacy of their interventions.
Promote evidence-based research and analysis to those working directly on policy, with the aim of
enhancing national, regional and global cooperation, and thereby mitigating the impact of organized
crime.
Provide insight into trends nationally, regionally and continentally, with future iterations
offering a predictive function of organized- crime environments.

lt draws upon a multi-year effort to develop the tool, and outlines the structure, process,
methodology and results. Over 350 experts worldwide, as well as the Global lnitiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime's regional observatories, served as the information conduits through
which the Index is established, and subsequently built upon.

 

 

 

 

Criminality under the Index

i) PP*CO>O*SS*/ **?'@€i?LúV7 R

 

 

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SEC*ION 2 About the Index 23

 

Together with these criminal markets, the Global OF@aDÍZed Crime Index also assesses the structure
and influence of four types of criminal actors: mafia-
St\lC @FOU §S; CFiMinü I nCtWOFkS; StdfC-
embedded actors; and foreign criminal actors. Although it is impossible to fit each of the myriad
of different types of criminal actors around the world neatly under
a specific definition, these four criminal actor types assessed by the Index have certain broad,
defining characteristics.

Mata-style groups are clearlv defined, organized criminal groups. This typology also includes
militia and guerrilla groups
that are primacily íunded by illicit activities. There are tour debning, although not exclusive,
features of a mala-style group: a known name, a defined leadership, territorial control and
identifiable membership. Criminal networks, on the other hand, are loose networks of criminal
associates engaging in criminal activities. This also includes relatively small groups that do not
control territory and are not widely known by a name or with a known leader. networks are
involved in illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have territorial control or any
of the other defining features of mala-style groups. State-embedded actors are those criminal
actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state's apparatus, including officials from
state institutions, such as law enforcement bodies and the judiciary. Finally, foreign actors
encompass criminal actors of all types, both state and non state, operating outside their home
country.

Resilience under the Index
A focus on criminality alone limits the perspective of the organized crime landscape, therefore
necessitating a balanced approach by also looking at the quality and efficacv of countries'
resilience — their defence mechanisms. Countries mav have similar scores for criminality, but it is
how they approach this problem that arguably matters most. Like criminality, there is no
‘one-size-its-all' approach to resilience, and no assumptions can be made about what makes a
country resilient. Just as conflict-ridden nations mav not have the capacity to respond to a
growing crime problem, stable and large economies attract organized crime, undermining their
resilience efforts. Because criminality includes a wide range of illicit activities
and actors, resilience measures to address these problems should be lar-reaching and
multi-sectoral.

24 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Definition of
resilience

 

FIGURE 2.2
Resilience indicators
One important consideration when it comes
NO N 'SOI i CXCC IS fh ' Wü'y' Í Ü WC i CX FCSDO USD'S IO
o ganized criminal activities are implemented.

thatresiIienceieasuresiustbeinIinevMth internatiOnaIhuian hghtsstandardsandprincoles.
Although the precise relationship between
c iminaIity and re si! ience cannot yet be se en, it
iS hO@üÓ UCI, OVeF li MM, UN lOÓd I F@d 0iZüÓ Crime Index will offer a means by which to
systematica!Iy ü Üd I\ZC ónd better understand these resilience dynamics, and help policymakers
É IÓ Müd PS IO JOSUÉ UTM.

 

I R2. Govenment transarency
and accountability
B R3. International cooDeration B R4. National poI›cies and !aws
B R5. Judicial system and detention
B Ró. Law enforcement
B R7. Territorial integ ity
B R8. Anti money laundering
B R9. Economic egulatory capacity B R10. Victim and witness support B R11.. Prevention
B R12. Non-state actors

 

R 5

R2 R4
R1 R3
R6 R7

RB
R9
R10

 

R11

 

 

R1 2

SEC*!ON 2 About the Index 25

How to read the representations ofthis report

 

Pyramid width and height
The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is
represented by the pyramid height on a scale ranging from 1to 10.
SEVERE

 

 

Panel height
The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the
panel.

 

 

Global average score 1 0
The pyramid shape represents ₈
the criminality score, the simple average of the criminal markets and criminal actors scores. The
global criminality score is 4.87, composed of the global criminal market score of 4.65 and the
global criminal actor score of 5.09. The global resilience score is 4.82.
10 8 6 4 2 0
4.65

26Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

SECTION 3
Methodology

SEC*ION Methodology 27

 

 

This is an abridged version of the methodology applied in the research to compile the Index. To
read the methodology in full, it is downloadable from the website (ocindex.net), as are the guiding
questions that were used to assign and justify scores.

 

Model
The Global Organized Crime Index is modelled on three constituent elements:
¥ Scope, scale and impact of 10 criminal markets
7 Structure and influence of four types of criminal actors
7 Countries’ resilience to organized crime

These are used to assign each country a criminality score and a resilience score.

In the absence of a universal method to measure each organized crime type across the globe (e.g.
through volume of commodities, value of commodities or actors involved), and in the face of data
gaps and misinformation, the Index
uses an alternative, commodity-driven assessment framework to measure illicit markets by a
combination of scope and scale, value and impact. In this way, the Index aims to reconcile the
information gaps other frameworks pose.

Criminality score
All countries in the Index are assigned a criminality score, which comprises two subcomponents:

 

Prevalence of criminal markets
(including the value and reach
of each market)
7 Value considerations
7 Reach considerations (i.e. the non-monetary impact of each market)
Structure and influence of criminal actors. Four typologies of criminal actors have been
determined:
› Mafia-style groups
› Criminal networks
› State-embedded actors
› Foreign actors

While the delineation between these criminal actor categories may be obvious in some cases, often
the nature of different criminal groups is less clear in certain contexts. For example, a range of
actors may fall under ’mafia-style

28 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

groups', including street gangs, militias and terrorist organizations participating in illicit
activities for profit. These actors may be involved in illicit activities across a criminal market
supply chain and engage with other criminal groups, but are unique in their characteristics Chat
prirnari\y feature patron— client relationships, coercion, territorial control
and more hierarchical structures. By contrast, looser style ‘criminal networks’ are characterized
by the absence of the traits Chat form mafia-style groups and may include mobile gangs and local
tribes or clans engaged in unsystematic smuggling activities, among others. Mafia-style groups and
criminal networks can be thought of as operating along a spectrum and in some cases the differences
between these typologies are minimal. As such, the Index draws expert knowledge of specific
contents
to determine the designation of criminal actor types in every country so as to avoid double
counting.

 

 

Index scoring process
FIGURE 3.1
Index scoring process
Resilience score
While the criminality score allows users to identifv the problem and its scale, the resilience
score reflects the existente, capacitv and effectiveness of country responses to organized crime.
Resilience capacity and effectiveness are evaluated in an effort to assess the level at which
states have established the appropriate legal, political and strategic frameworks to address
orgaDlZed crime. Under the resilience score,
12 ‘building blocks’ (or indicators) of country resilience to organized crime are identified.

Inmesuringeahresilenceindcato,thendex askstvvoquestions:

Does the resilience measure or framework exist?
Is the resilience measure or framework effective in combating the organized crime conditions in the
country?

 

LITERATURE
W REVIEW ROUND 1 SCORING (COUNTRY SCORING)

 

REGIONAL EXPERT GROUP VERIFICATION

 

 

 

 

 

 

DOLAECTlON

ROUND 2 SCORING (PARALLEL COUNTRY AND THEMATIC SCORING)
INTERNAL CALIBRACION

SEC*ION Methodology 29

 

In scoring the different components ofeach country, experts were asked to treat countries
representing source, transit and destination points for illicit flows equally. Recognizing the
integral role of every stage of illicit supply chains, the Index refrains from giving too much
weight to a particular stage in the illicit supply chain.

Data collection
A process of literature review, analysis and verification was undertaken to determine criminality
and resilience scores for each country. Data collection encountered a number of challenges,
including availability, reliability, uniformitv and compatibility. The GI -TOC Index team
endeavoured to overcome such challenges by cross-checking data sources where available and
identifying proxy indicators, as needed.

Scoring thresholds - criminality

 

Index scores for both components are based on a scale of 1 to 10. For criminality, a score of 1
signifies the best possible scenario, in which a market or actor type is either non-existent or
negligible in their impact, or there is no
evidence or information available to suggest that it exists; a score of 10 signifies the worst
case, in which no aspect of society goes untouched by criminality. For resilience, the inverse
applies: highly resilient countries have high scores, and vice versa. All parts of the Index are
weighted equally.

Scoring thresholds - resilience

NON-EXISTENT OR EXTREM ELY INEFFECTIVE

 

Thefirstround ofscoresvvasgenerated byagroupofexpertslargelydravvn from the GI -TOC and its Network
of Experto, based upon their own relevant expertise and the data provided from the data collection
stage. The resultant

30 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

scores and justifications were then verified by a second, separate, set of experts with extensive
knowledge in organized crime at a country Level. I n parallel to this second round of country
scoring, a third set of experts — thematic experts with expertise in specific criminal markets for
Expert selection
The input provided bv over 350 independent technical, thematic and geographic expert groups ensures
credibility, accountability and transparency ofthe Index. The experts who were consulted

a particular region-1* also verified the scores
throughout the various stages of producing the

and justifications derived from the first rounds. A subsequent round of verification took place in
a series of regional meetings to ensure that
scores were accurate in geographic contexts and for regional comparisons. A final stage of score
calibrations for global comparisons were guided by expert input from previous rounds and reviewed
a final time by the GI-TOC regional observatories. Experts at all stages were provided with an
overview of the structure and methodology of the Index, the country scores, justifications and the
rigin data sets, and were asked to justify and substantiate any proposed score changes. The same
guiding questions and scoring thresholds were provided to standardize the assessment process.
(These documents are available on the website, ocindex.net.)
Index were selected as representatives from numerous areas of expertise. Broadly speaking, they can
be divided into four general groups:
A technical reference group, who were convened to advise on the practical steps to undertake in the
expansion ofthe Index tool into its current global scope.
Experts specializing in the study of organized crime in specific countries and/or regions.
Thematic experts specializing in the study or understanding of specific forms of organized crime
were consulted during the scoring and verification phases.
A group of external regional experts with expertise in countries and/or regions beyond organized
crime provided a final review and verification mechanism for the Index scores and justifications.

SEC*ION Methodology

 

Limitations
While acknowledging the wide range of various organized criminal activities that occur, the Index
has restricted its scope to the aforementioned criminal markets in an effort to ensure data avail-
ability, minimize information gaps and accurately reflect real world conditions. However, in future
iterations of the Index, an expansion in number of criminal markets is envisaged. Notably,
corruption is not included in the Index as a standalone criminal market, but rather is captured as
an aggravating factor when determining the scores for each of the 10 criminal markets. Furthermore,
corruption is also reflected in the criminal actors and resilience components of the Index as a
cross-cutting theme.

The Index currently does not consider organized crime activities that pose jurisdictional problems
and/or cross-cutting illicit activities, inclu financial flows, maritime piracy and cybercrime,
among others. Such stateless crimes do not fall
neatly into a state-based tool. lt is clear, therefore, that there are numerous criminal markets
that pose inherent problems when developing an index.

 

 

 

GJobal ovewiew
na

SEC*ION | Global overview and analysis 33

 

 

National, regional and continental context
The year 2020 was marked by several major challenges and stressors worldwide, while the global
illicit economy has continued to accelerate, as it has over the last two decades, posing a threat
to global security, development and democracy. The impact of organized crime has also become more
far- reaching across the world in recent vears, driven by geopolitical, economic and technological
forces.“ While the Global Organized Crime Index assigns a
criminalitvand resilience score for every country, it is important to look beyond numbers when
assessing organized crime in a given location. Contextual differences within and between countries
inevitably shape how organized crime arises, how it is sustained and how it can be eliminated. lt
has been well documented for example, that organized crime groups exploit certain state conditions
in order to carry out their activities.'“ Features such as conflict,
lack of trust in state institutions, porous borders, and social and economic inequalities may all
contribute to an environment in which organized crime flourishes. Similarly, economic growth and
’positive’ development may also provide opportunities for organized crime.

The Index provides a standardized way to evaluate criminality and resilience across a spectrum of
factors and environments, but it does so with a staunch understanding that countries start out on
unequal footing, often through
no fault of their own. For example, countries that are host to higher levels of biodiversity may
find themselves more susceptible to environmental crimes, while those that neighbour countries in
conflict may be more vulnerable to increased illicit cross-border flows.

There are no strict rules when it comes to vulnerability to organized crime, and what might make
one country susceptible to criminality, may be immaterial to another. Larger countries may be more
vulnerable to illicit flows because it is harder to patrol their borders, while on the other hand,
the impact of organized crime may be greater on smaller nations. Under the Index, countries mav be
assigned the same scores, but for distinctly different seasons and therefore
it is important to use scores as a starting point in which to delve into specific
country and regional contexts.

Criminal markets, criminal actors and resilience are inextricably interlinked. Traditionally,
organized crime activities have been described as being carried out by irregular actors operating
outside of the state apparatus, serving as
a corrosive force to state institutions and society at large. While this is often true, more
recently there has been a growing acknowledgement of the role of the state itself perpetuating or
directlv engaging in organized criminal activities. As with other criminal actor tvpes under the
Index, the degree of

34 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

S\á\C i OVOI VCMCTO Í Ü Í I I iCiS áCN i V i Í iC S OCCU FS OK S§CC FUM, ÍFOM IOW—
level corruption to full state capture in which the state apparatus is the predominant, and
sometimes sole, perpetrator of illegitimate violence, while able to exert a monopoly on illicit
flows with impunity. For example, in authoritarian contexts, organized crime as a state function
may leave little room for other criminal groups to operate, while in other instances, a state may
franchise out its monopoly over resources or criminal markets to other criminal
groupsvvho actonitsbehaf Underthe Index,thedegreetovvhich organized crime has permeated the state
is not only captured by the criminal actors’ scores but may be red ected in the assessment of a
country's resilience.

In a range of authoritarian contexts, the institutional environment Chat criminality has
inflltrated has marked implications for a country's resilience to organized crime. From one
perspective,
a state s monopoly on political, economic and/or military power can imply that a country has high
resilience to organized crime
because of its capacita to defeat criminal groups. On the other hand, where the state itself
perpetrates illicit activities, it can be argued that a country loses its resilience to organized
crime because its engagement in criminal activities undermines its role as a primary provider of
the fundamental building blocks of resilience, including the rule of law, and social, economic and
political protections.
Likewise, the way in which a country responds to organized crime can affect its overall resilience.
Measures that aim to combat organized crime, but that do not meet internationally accepted human
rights norms, standards and principles may in turn contribute to conditions that further embed
criminality.

In response, the Index addresses these differences in country contexts through a breakdown of its
criminality and resilience components. While some countries may feature a dominant criminal
MdFk€'f OF dCtOF t'y'§C, OthCFS Md'y' hOSf d Fó n@C OK CFi Mi ió I MdFÉ€'tS
or groups that operate with one another in complex environments. Similarly, resilience comprises a
range of factors that touch on a country‘s political, legal, economic, securitv and social
frameworks. In this way, the Index allows for a more nuanced assessment of criminality and
resilience dynamics in countries where such differences are not always clear. For more information
about each criminal market, actor typologvand the resilience indicators that are used, see the
appendix or the Index website (ocindex.net). The next sections provide a snapshot of global trends
by theme, criminal market and actor type, followed by a geographic breakdown and analysis of the
Index results.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Under the Index, countries may be assigned the same scores, but for distinctly different reasons
and therefore it is important to use scores as a starting point in which to delve into specific
country and regional contexts.

56 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

FIGURE 4.1
Criminality map

 

 

 

 

 

 

Criminality
Although the Index is country-centric in the approach it takes to assessment and scoring, looking
at an individual country and/or region offers a limited view of broader criminal dynamics and
resilience capacity. When looking at the Index's results from a global perspective, users can pull
out larger trends, particularly when organized crime is transnational in nature. Under the
criminality component of the Index for example, the global average across all Ave continents was
4.87 out of 10, when averaging criminal markets and actors scores. While this middle-of-the-ground
global score speaks to the range of criminality levels across the world, it does little to offer
insights into the drivers behind criminality.

SEC*ION | Global overview and analysis 37

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Global score for
Criminality

CRIMINALITY SCORES

10 NODATA

38 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

FIGURE 4.2

Highest-scoring countries Lowest-scoring countries

 

 

 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

 

 

 

MYAN MAR

 

 

 

#5
NIGERIA

 

 

 

#7
AFGHANISTAN
Z08

 

#9
CENTRAL AFRCAN REPUBLIC
704
#2
COLOMBIA
766

 

 

#4
MEXICO

 

 

 

#6
IRAN
710

 

 

#8
IRAQ
7.05

 

 

#1 0
HONDURAS
198
#193
TUVALU

 

 

 

#191
SAO TOME AND
PRINCIPE
178

 

 

#1 89
SAMOA
2.04

 

#187
MARSHALL ISLANDS
2.31

 

 

#18 5
LU XEMBOURG
2.36
#19 2
NAURU
1.76

 

 

#190
LIECH TEN STEIN
Ü88

 

#188
VANUATU
2.20

 

 

#18ó KIRIBATI
2 35

 

 

#184
MONACO
2.43

SEC*ION | Global overview and analysis 39

Criminal markets
In breaking down criminality and looking at the 10 criminal markets covered, the global average was
slightly lower at 4.ó3, with human trafficking determined to be the most pervasive wor ldwide {with
a global average of 5.58). Indeed, human trafficking features in the Top Ave criminal markets of
every continent in the world. Alter the trafficking of people, the illicit cannabis trade
and arms trafficking were assessed to be the second and third most pervasive markets worldwide,
with global averages of 3.10 and 4.92, respectively.

FIGURE 4.3
Criminal markets, global averages

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Human trafficking

Human smuggling

Arms trafficking

Flora
crimes

Fauna cr imes

Non-renewable resource crimes

Heroin trade

Cocaine trade

Cannabis
trade

Synthetic drug trade
5.58

4.77

 

4.92

]88

4.63

4.51

3.97

4.52

 

5.10

 

4.62

 

4.65

40 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

The failure on the part of states to provide sale environments and stable economic livelihoods Por
millions of vulnerable populations in many countries creates conditions conducive to exploitation,
as human traffickers exploit victims
for proht both within national borders and abroad through sexual exploitation, forced labour/modern
slavery, forced begging, organ trafficking and
child soldier recruitment. The vast majority of victims are women and girls. Opportunities for
human trafficking have increased with internet technology, which provides both a ready online
market and, simultaneously, the means to exploit people with greater anonymity.*’

The prevalence of human trafficking (5.KB) is perhaps therefore unsurprising. The activities that
fall under human trafficking mean that this
market is present in a wide range of contexts, from both stable countries to those in conflict,
often overlapping with other criminal markets, such as human smuggling. Likewise, the barriers to
market entrv are law, while the impact is high, as humans are the subject of exploitation.

In 2020, there were ao estimated 281 million international migrants globally. Human mobility has
continued to be a major driver of organized crime, driven largely bv instability, conflict,
inequality and cáimate change. At the outbreak of the pandemic, many countries increased border
controla but this has not deterred migration. If anything, the economic constcaints brought on by
the pandemic have most likely added to the pre- existing structural push factors that impel people
to move elsewhere, often aided by smugglers
and despite the risks of exploitation. Increased militarization of borders is also an opportunity
Por traffickers and smugglers, who probé irorn
arranging cross-border movement. Rapid rates of rural-to-urban migration in many regions have also
provided opportunities for traffickers seeking to exploit infernal human displacement.
Although there is often an exploitative overlap in the people-focused markets of human trafficking
and human smuggling, the disparity in global
pervasiveness between the two (human smuggling ranks fourth worldwide, with an average of4.77) may
be explained bythe limited circumstances in which human smuggling can occur. While human
trafficking occurs both within a country and transnationally, smuggling by definition necessitates
the use of smugglers to bring individuals across a border in contravention of a countrv's laws.

As the second most pervasive criminal market globally, the cannabis trade (5.10) is a worldwide
phenomenon. Although a small number of countries have approved legal, regulated recreational- and
medicinal-use markets for cannabis since 2018 — and even in these cases a black market exists to
some degree — in the vast
MójoKit$ it iS SUI I Cl óSSiÉ C'd dS d n II I iCÍt ió rCOt iC.
This continuos to drive the black cannabis market, much of which is controlled by transnational
criminal networks. Cannabis cultivation/ production affects all regions of the globe, and the
estimated number of users in 2019 was
200 miIIion.*^ Although the number of cannabis seizures over recent years has been in decline, the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime finds that there has been however an upward trend in trafficking of
the drug.‘7

Notably, the other three drug markets rank significantly lower, with synthetic drugs at4.ó2,
cocaine at 4.52 and heroin at 3.97 globally. Unlike cannabis, which can be grown anywhere with ease
and is comparably cheap, other drug markets entail higher costs and limited production sites,
restricting their pervasiveness.

Despite the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty, arms trafficking is on the rise worldwide. The UN High
Representative for Disarmament Affairs said
in 2020 Chat there were 1 billion small arms in circulation. While conflict zones attract stocks of
weapons, these markets are not contained, and many of the weapons End their wav into the
hands of criminal groups. This is the case in places like Central America, the Balkans and parts of
Africa, where weapons from earlier civil wars
and independence conflicts are still in circulation

 

 

among criminal groups. M eanwhile, drug gangs in South Africa illicitly acquired guns sourced from
the country's police armoury over a number of years — weapons that had been due for destruction
and this has helped fuel the abnormallv high murder rate in the country.

The widespread nature and impact of arms trafficking (4.92) may also come as no surprise. Whether
illegally produced, recycled from past conflicts, or diverted from government stockpiles, the
circulation of arms not only fuels violence and conflict, but also contributes to furthering other
illicit markets. Criminal actors use arms to exert or threaten violence to further their illicit
businesses in the form of extortion and illicit taxation, while citizens may seek to arm themselves
for protection, leading to increasinglv weaponized communities.
Countries where owning weapons is legal but poorly regulated have caused large spillovers into more
vulnerable neighbouring countries and regions. The illicit arms trade also increases
SEC*ION | Global overview and analysis 41

 

The lowest scoring criminal markets globally were flora crimes (3.88), the heroin trade (3.97), and
non-renewable resource crimes, with a global average of 4.51. Flora and heroin markets do not
feature in the top five markets in any continent.
The lower prevalence of these markets mav be because of environmental constraints over the sourcing
of these products. For heroin, while dominant in some source economies, the drug's high cost, as
well as a preferente for other narcotics in certain destination markets, may explain its limited
prevalence globally. Moreover, the very nature of commodities that fall under the trade in
non-renewable resources and hora species means that their depletion or extinction may reduce the
supply of these commodities and thus overall markets. Notably, another environmental criminal
market, illicit trade in fauna, ranked higher worldwide (4.ó3), which may be a function of the
diversity of animals and
animal products —as well as illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishin-g and of the wide variety

the power of armed groups over the state, and
Í n SOME' CdSCS CFiMÍndl óCtOFS d Od COMO ICE dCtOFS
become blurred, with armed non-state actors often controlling illicit markets.'8

Criminal actors
FIGURE 4.4
Criminal actors, global averages
of uses of fauna commodities, such as traditional medicines, food supplies and exotic pets.

42 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

As the second element of criminality under the
I ndex, the average criminal actors score globally was 5.09, with state-embedded actors being
identified as the foremost criminal actor tvpe perpetuating criminality (S.7ó), followed by
criminal networks (5.45), foreign criminal actors (5.27) and mala-style groups (3.89).
Although mafia groups and organized crime are often thought of synonymously and as the dominant,
almost definitional, form of criminal
group, these findings show that it is not territorially based groups that are seen to have the
greatest impact. Instead, it is actors and networks with reach and influence over the state and
state institutions Chat have drawn the highest scores. In recent
times, clientelist links between criminal actors, big capital and civil servants risk becoming
increasingly difflcult to disentangle, and the distinctions between legal and illegal become murky
over the last decade —a trend that continued to be evident through to 2020. Such profit-seeking
connections compromise the state's abilitv to act coherently against organized crime while eroding
democracv and citizens'security.'*

I n 112 out of the 193 countries, state-embedded actors were described as having a significant or
SüVCFC i OÉ UCICC 00 SOCiC’f\ üUd StátC StFUCtU FCS,
while 34 countries were rated as having moderate
levels of influence. Put another wav, le ss than a quarter of countries worldwide are states in
which state-embedded actors have no to little infl uence. While the degree of state actor
involvement in organized crime mav range from Iow-level corruption to high-level engagement by the
state apparatus, generally the prominence of this actor type worldwide poses a significant problem.
The involvement of state institutions
in enabling illicit activity inevitably weakens countries’ capacity to combat organized crime. Of
the 1ó countries in the world that scored a 9 or higher for state-embedded actors, 13 were
identified as authoritarian under the Economist Intelligence Unit s Democracy Index 2020.'"
M oreover, of the 50 countries assessed to have state-embedded actors with a 'severe infl uence
(i.e. scoring 8 or higher), 33 (Óó%) are classified as ‘authoritarian', eight are hybrid regimes,
and eight are flawed democracies.

Criminal networks, as the second most pervasive criminal actor type worldwide, represent a common
denominador in all regions as the conduits for illicit flows — both within countries and
transnationally. This category's comparatively similar average to foreign criminal actors (which
represents a composite of networks, mafia-style groups and state-embedded actors operating outside
of their home country) reveals the

 

 

interconnectedness between domestic and foreign criminal groups as they work together along supply
chains to move goods illicitly across source, transit and destination markets.

Finally, mala-style groups, while traditionally most often associated with organized crime,
SEC*ION | Global overview and analysis 43

 

ranked the lowest globally among criminal actor types. One explanation could be that the need for
territorial control and concomitant hierarchical structures may be in decline in an increasingly
globalized criminal economy, where criminal actors are turning to farther-reaching network
structures to undertake illicit activities.

FIGURE 4.5
Criminal actors distribution by score range

 

minal networks

 

State-embedded
actors

 

Foreign actors

44 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

FIGURE 4.6
Resilience map

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resilience
In assessing the 12 indicators, or building blocks, of resilience to organized crime collectively,
the global average isjust4.82. When looking at the averages for each resilience indicador, none
scored higher than ó. These numbers strongly suggest that to develop a sustainable solution to the
impacts of organized crime, there needs to be greater focus on and investment in increasing
resilience measures. Encouraging resilience at the community level also needs to be considered as a
core element within an overall global strategy against organized crime, and not as a peripheral
intervention.2'

’\ I Global overview and analysis 45

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Global score for
Resilience
4.82
RESILIENCE SCORES

i O NO DATA

46 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

FIGURE 4.7

Highest-scoring countries Lowest-scoring countries

 

 

 

 

FIN LAND
8.42

 

 

#3
N EW ZEAL AND
838

 

 

ICELAND
8.04

 

#7
NORWAY
Z92

 

 

ESTONIA
783

LIE CH T ENSTE IN
8.42

 

 

#4
DENMARK
8.21

 

 

AUSTRALIA

 

 

 

#8
UNITED KINGDOM
/88

 

# 1 0
ANDORRA
#193
LIBYA

 

 

 

4 191
SOUTH SUDAN
183

 

 

#18 8
VEN EZUELA
1 92

 

# 187
NORTH KOREA

 

 

 

5
BURUNDI
208

SOMALIA

 

 

 

#19 0
SYRIA
Ü88

 

 

#188
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
192

 

#186
Y EMEN
200

 

 

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

SEC*ION | Global overview and analysis 47

 

FIGURE 4.8
Resilience summary by indicator

Political leadership and governance
Government transparency
and accountability
International cooperation National policies and laws Judicial system and detention
Law enforcement Territorial integrity

Anti-money laundering Economic regulatory capacity Victim and witness support
Prevention Non-state actors

 

 

 

4.82

 

 

Leodei“ship Criminal justice Economic
Civil socfety Global /“esi//ence
and ¿overnonce and security and hnonc iol and social protection average

 

While each resilience indicator is evaluated independently, natural groupings of resilience
categories allow for trends analysis. For example, the 'leadership and governance' group of
indicators (see Figure 4.8), when averaged together, scored higher (5 0ó) than the other
groups, such as ‘criminal justice and security' (4.87);'economic and financial systems (4.ó8); and
’civil society and social protection (4.53). The results therefore show an overall emphasis on
political and governance measures being used globally to combat organized crime, at the expense of
others. Given the widespread impact of organized crime on all areas of society, a more balanced
approach to implementing response measures to combat organized crime would ultimately be the most
effective.
Governments direct a state's stance on organized crime, supporting its role in combating the
phenomenon by laying the foundation to implement action. Factors such as the presence of organized
crime issues on the political agenda, state fragility, the presence of appropriate
legal frameworks to tackle organized crirne
and a country's role in the global community (among others) can reflect states’ will to combat
organized crime. Nevertheless, when looking at individual indicators, while an expressed desire to
combat organized crime may be present, it is the effective implementation of response measures that
ultimately raises or lowers resilience scores.

To illustrate this, ‘international cooperation’ was the highest scoring indicador globallv, at
5.ó8,

48 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

while the ’government transparency and accountability' indicador represented the second lowest
average (4.41). Ratifying international treaties and participation in global forums are important
steps to building robust resilience frameworks against organized crime, but if shortcomings in the
transparency and accountability of governance functions are present, these pose challenges to
effective implementation of response measures.

Institutional based indicators such as ‘judicial system and detention’ (4 59),’law enforcement'
(4.91), and territorial integrity' (5.12) collectively averaged the second highest for resilience,
reflecting a global emphasis on criminal justice and security measures to combat organized crime.
Having such structures in place is crucial in combating criminalitv, as border security, law
enforcement agencies and a well-functioning judiciary and prison system can be thought of as the
‘first response’ to illicit activities and criminal actors. Nevertheless, they form a one-sided
approach to criminality, and lack of funding, training and/or corruption in these institutions not
only pose barriers to curbing criminality, but in manv cases drive it.

Economic focused resilience indicators, including'anti-money laundering’ and ‘economic regulatory
capacitv’ scored lower, both averaging 4.ó8. The nature of organized crime as a proflt-driven
endeavour means that even when criminal markets are not present
in a country, its abilitv to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat the
proceeds of crime can ultimately contribute to or bar criminality. Similarly, when sound economic
regulations are in place, opportunities are made for legitimate businesses to expand and operate in
fair way, free from distortion.
On the other hand, in some cases, where such policies are too burdensome, this may incentivize
individuals to turn to informal or illegitimate profit-making activities.
With the exception of the non-state actor indicator, the ‘civil society and social protection’
group of resilience indicators, including ‘victim and witness support’ and ‘prevention’, scored
among the lowest of the resilience indicators, with global averages
of 4.24 and 4.47, respectively. These results suggest that while there is a general tendency by
countries to focus on criminal activities and perpetrators, little attention is given
to those directly affected by criminality. Deficiencies in the safeguards that protect victims and
the public at large can have untold, long term effects on social cohesion and state fragility —
conditions that criminal
dCtOKS Cd 0 üX§ lOit.

‘Non-state actors’, which encompass civil society and the media, was found to be a standout social
indicador, averaging relatively high among the resilience indicators (4.88). Despide an emphasis
globally on criminal justice and institutional responses to organized crime, such non state actors
play an instrumental role in supplementing government interventions, holding state institutions to
account and driving more sustainable response measures to organized crime through local community
engagement. Notably, in several countries around the world, non-state actors were assessed to be
the strongest or only responders to organized crime, often operating in highly restricted contexts
and where state institutions engage in or propagate criminal activities. However, as the indicador
captures not only the strength of civil society actors themselves, but also the degree of freedom
afforded to them by state actors in which to operate, there is an inverse correlation between
sta\e- embedded actors and non state actors.2‘ I n other words, where actors embedded within the
state are among the chief perpetrators
Of CKiMi Oü I dCt iVit$, CiVil SOCi 't/ dCtOrS
routinelv find themselves in the crosshairs of repressive government action.

SEC*ION | Global overview and analysis 49
BOX 1
Non-UN member states

Although the Global Organized Crime Index covers almost 99% ofthe global population, non-UN member
states are not officially included in the Index. Non-member observer states, such as the Holy See
and Palestine, aswell as other partially recognized territories, such as the Republic of
Kosovo'"and
the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara), are not included in the rankings.

However, it is clear that illicit economies and organized criminal actors do not respect the
world's political borders, and any community can be afflicted by the scourge of organized crime. In
lact, there may be reasons why territories not globally recognized as sovereign states may be even
more susceptible to heightened levels of criminality. A defining characteristic of non-sovereign
states is some form of territorial dispute and the negative ramifications Chat often accompany it,
notably
a fractured society, unstable politics and a fragile state. And given that conflict, fragility and
organized crime often 'fit together in an uneasy
triumvirate',2“it is easy to see why organized crime
permeates a number of non-UN member states.

Furthermore, a territory's isolation from the world stage, both politically and with regard to
global
trade flows, can be detrimental to its economic prosperity, creating a fertile breeding ground for
the shadow economy to thrive. In addition to the potential drivers of criminality stemming for
these territories’ status, not being recognized by most ofthe international community makes access
to international cooperation tools lar more difficult,
which are crucial in the fight against organized crime.

The reasons behind what determines the extent to which organized crime can gain a foothold in any
particular country are complex. However, what
is clear is that non-UN member states do have particular geopolitical characteristics that may
impact not only the scale of illicit flows entering and exiting the country, but also their
governing authorities' abilities to mount an effective response to transnational organized crime.
Of course, just as the characteristics of disputed territories can make
them more susceptible to the influence of organized crime, often it is organized crime groups that
are key determinants of the suCcess or failure of separatist movements." Therefore, it would be
unwise to study the phenomenon of malas, illicit flows and organized criminality without
considering the political context
— including crucially the political history — of the
territories that allows these to flourish.

50Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

SECTION 5
Continental overviews and results

SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 51

Regional insights
As illicit flows moveacross borders, how they impact and shape continental and regional criminal
economies and society at large varies depending on whether areas serve
as source, transit or destination markets, or a combination thereof. One key factor to consider
with the continental analyses that follow is that countries with very high
criminality and low resilience scores pull down regional and continental averages, just as stronger
states raise them. While it is true that general continental and regional analysis is useful to
understanding overall patterns of criminality and resilience, and contribute to policymaking at a
larger scale, thev serve as only one side of the coin. The more users disaggregate information, the
more detailed and focused the analysis can be, which can serve strategic policymaking at a more
operational Level.

FIGURE 5.1
Criminality scores by continent

 

 

 

#1
ASIA

 

CONTINENT ASIA
AFRICA AMERICAS EUROPE OCEANIA
#2
AFRICA

 

CRIMINALITY

550

 

506
4.48
307

#3
ANIERICAS

 

CRIMINAL MARKETS
521
4.94
4J0
*.24
298
#4
EUROPE

 

CRIMINAL ACTORS
558

 

545

OCEANIA

 

RESILIENCE
4.4ó
3,80
4.83 ó.23 5.46
GLOBAL AVERAGE 4.87 4.65 5.09 4.82

When looking at the five continents, the Index offers insight into regional dvnamics.
Asia was found to exhibit the highest levels of criminality (5.30), followed by Africa (5.17), the
Americas (5.0ó), Europe (4.48) and Oceanía (3.07). Asia hosts several distinct subregions, with
some countries experiencing long standing conflicts that help fuel markets, like arms and human
trafficking, while others are sites of drug production
and trade. Although Asia was the highest-scoring continent for criminality, a regional breakdown of
the results suggests that hotbeds of organized crime are not centralized within one region but
dispersed across the continents.

52 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Africa is host to the greatest number of countries of all continents,'^ and has experienced
unprecedented growth in terms of economies, infrastructure and technology over the last two
decades. While these developments have contributed to the continent's growing
prosperity, they have simultaneously created a conducive environment for organized crime. As
elsewhere in the world, the continent's success comes hand in hand with opportunities for criminal
actors to exploit. Criminal expansion is supported by areas on the continent where conflict and
instability are present and compounded in countries that host weak and corruptible state
institutions.

In some respects, Africa and Asia resemble each other. Just as both continents are geographically
vast, with regions that are distinct in history, cultura, ethnicity and language, both are also
host to a range oí pervasive criminal markets and actors. In particolsr, both Asia and Africa serve
as major source markets for the world in terms of environmental commodities such as hora, wildlife
and
non-renewable resources, including fuel, minerals, precious metals and gemstones. Indeed, the Index
results show that Africa and Asia were the only continents in the world to feature two
environmental markets (fauna and non-renewable resource crimes) in their top Ave criminal markets.

The Americas, like Asia, are abundant in natural hora and fauna, while also boasting among the
richest sources of non-renewable resources in the world, including precious metals and minerals.
Most notably, the Americas are home to some of the most prevalent drug source markets globally. Of
all the continente, the Americas was the only one to feature a drug market (cocaina) as the most
pervasive across all IO criminal markets. By comparison, Europe was identified bv experts
as being a major transit and destination point for a range of criminal markets and actors. A glance
at the cocaine, svnthetic drugs and heroin markets illustrates this: Europe was identifled as one
of the continents where these markets werethe most pervasive, second only to the Americas or Asia.
This suggests that whereas the markets in Asia and the Americas are widely known to be source
regions for such narcotics, their flows lead to Europe as a transit and destination market.

Like Europe, Oceanía also features three drug markets (synthetic drugs, cannabis and cocaine) in
its Top Ave most pervasive criminal markets, albeit on a far lower scale. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
Oceanía exhibits the lowest criminality in the world, which can be largely explained by its
geographic isolation and small population.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hotbeds of organized crime are not centralized within one region but dispersed across the
continents.

54 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

BOX 2
Natural geography - a determining factor for criminality?
Countries around the world come in all shapes and sizes, from transcontinental behemoths, suCh as
Russia, to micro-states like Monaco, and all manner of archipelagic, elongated and perforated
states in between. But does a country's natural geography
— be it an island, coastal or landlocked country — influence its levels of organized criminality,
and, if so, to what extent?

Of the 193 countries included in this Index, just over a fifth (39) are island states.*7There are
also 43 landlocked nations, but the most common geography type is coastal states, accounting for
over 57% (111) of countries.

FIGURE 5.2
Does geography determine criminality?

 

Island

 

 

Coastal

 

 

Landlocked

 

 

2 5 6
CRIMINALITY
8 J0

 

 

 

Looking at the average criminality scores, island states are found to be least afflicted by
organized crime by quite some margin, with an average score of 3.ó7; compare this with landlocked
states, which have a score of 4.78, and coastal states, with the highest criminality
score (5.33). Of the 20 lowest-scoring countries on the criminality metric, 11 are island states,
predominantly those in Oceania. At the other end of the spectrum, the overwhelming majority of the
highest-scoring countries are coastal states, which account for 80% of the top 20. Only one island
state features among the top 20: the archipelagic state of the Philippines.

What could account for these differences? Islands are, as a general rule, smaller in geographic
size and population. Assessing criminality therefore from the demand side of the equation, islands
represent a considerable smaller potential consumption market for most illicit products.'8 lsland
states are also lar less likely to face the risk of spillover of illicit economies or conflict,
which often indirectly fuels criminality.2*There is a converse factor, however, to this, namely
that islands are sometimes exploited precisely because of their geographic isolation. Consider the
role Cabo Verde plays in transnational drug flows, for example.

From the supply perspective, due to their size, most island states are also less likely to have an
abundance of natural resources to be exploited. However, there are exceptions. Madagascar is a
clear outlier in this respect, which is one of the planet's largest island nations and one of the
world's richest countries in terms of biodiversity and concentration of endemic species.
Madagascar's resources have meant that the country is perennially targeted for environmental
organized crime."* Furthermore, islands
provides ample opportunity for illegal fishing and the human exploitation that is a common
characteristic of the fishing sector.
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 55

 

 

Landlocked states do face spillover risk, of which the impact of Paraguay's contiguity with Brazil
is a good example. Both are countries with very high levels of criminality. Furthermore, due to
their lack of direct access to sea transport, landlocked countries have long been recognized as
being at an economic disadvantage,"1which may be one contributing factor to higher levels of
criminality.
However, like some islands, a number of landlocked nations are microstates, such as Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg and San Marino, and thus benefit from many of the same conditions that could potentially
insulate them from pervasive criminality. Of course, and this is valid for many island states too,
while these small countries may not have the natural resources to exploit, it is often for this
very reason that their economies rely instead on financial services, and why many of the world's
tax havens and money laundering hubs are microstates and small island nations. Money laundering and
illicit financial flows are not captured in the Index's criminality score as a standalone criminal
market, therefore island states’ and microstates’ levels of criminality are likely to be
underestimated.

Coastal states have the highest average criminality score and one of the most obvious potential
explanations is access to international maritime trade and infrastructure. Apart from the
Democratic Republic of Congo, whose coastline is very short, the next five countries with the
highest criminality scores (Colombia, Myanmar, Mexico, Nigeria and Iran) all have extensive
coastlines with advanced trade infrastructure. In 2019, maritime trade volumes reached in excess of
11 billion tonnes, and estimates suggest that more than 80% of global merchandise trade moves by
sea.^* As illicit trade uses the same supply routes and physical infrastructure as global licit
trade, coastal states are inherently vulnerable to numerous
illicit economies, from drug trafficking to human smuggling and illegal fishing.

 

 

 

Comparing criminal actor types also reveals some interesting continental results. State- embedded
actors were found to be the most pervasive criminal actors in Asia,Africa and the Americas, while
ranking third out the four typologies in Europe and Oceania. On these two continents, foreign
criminal actors were identified as the most influential, largely in reference to groups from
neighbouring countries with links to domestic actors.
Criminal networks ranked second among thefour criminal actor types across all five continents,
underscoring their ubiquity. Finally, as mentioned previously, mafia-style groups, consisting ola
range of different forms of groups, from militias to gangs, were identified as the least pervasive
criminal actor type
in four out ofthe five continents. Here the Americas are the exception, where there is a strong
influence ofdrug cartels and other gangs operating in the countries on the continent.

10 feFMS OK FüSiliünCü, if iS iM §OFtü Ot IO
approach the analysis of response frameworks as a function of the threat a particular country,
region, or continent faces. Europe was found to exhibit the highest levels of resilience (Ó.23),
followed by Oceania (5.4ó), the Americas (4.83), Asia (4.4ó) and Africa (3.80). While Oceania's
high global ranking may be surprising, the continent also features the lowest criminality
rates of the five. Furthermore, the continental average is somewhat skewed by the very
high resilience scores for Australia and New Zealand. (Nevertheless, excluding these two countries,
the continental average for
Oceania would be 3.00, still placing it second of the Ave continents.)

In all five continents, the resilience indicators 'international cooperation' and 'national
policies and laws’ scored the highest among the 12 resilience blocks, highlighting the
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 57

 

readiness of states to collaborate and integrate international standards into their national
frameworks on issues related
to organIZed crime. Likewise, ‘territorial integrity' scored in the top three resilience indicators
on all continents except for the Americas, where 'non-state actors ranked third, highlighting the
strength and resilience of civil societv and media actors working
on organized crime issues on the continent, in what are often extremely difficult and dangerous
environments.

Among the lower-scoring resilience blocks, ‘victim and witness support’ was the lowest in Africa,
the Americas and Oceania. Other commonly low-scoring resilience blocks around the world included
‘prevention’,
‘government transparency and accountability’, and ’judicial system and detention'. How
these indicator scores vary reveals that while countries overall are willing and able to cooperate
with one mother on broad
organized crime challenges, national priorities differ in the approach taken to counter orgaolzed
crime within their borders.

Although these results offer some broad— stroke insights into criminality and resilience dynamics,
continental comparisons may be too vague for nuanced analysis, as these land masses are home to
numerous countries, often verv different historically, culturally, geographically and economically.
When comparing large groupings of states, there
is therefore some risk that results may be misinterpreted, as subregions with the highest
criminality and lowest resilience scores skew the results for other countries on the same continent
that otherwise fare well. As such, it is necessarv to delve deeper into the regional groups for a
more accurate comparative analysis.

58 Global Organized Crime Index - 2024

 

 

Asia

 

 

Criminality

CRIMINALITY SCORES

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resilience

RESILIENCE SCORES

SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 59

 

Asia was thrust into the spotlight in early 2020 as the initial epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic
and the continent to first impose the severe restrictions and border closures that were soon to
sweep across the globe. But these measures didn't stop the illicit flows, the criminal economies or
the most pernicious criminal actors.

FIGURE 5.3
Index scores, Asia

 

 

 

 

#1
WESTERN ASIA

#2
SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA

#3
SOUTHERN ASIA

#4
EASTERN ASIA
#5
CENTRAL ASIA
AND THE CAUCASUS

 

REGION
WESTERN ASIA
SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA SOUTHERN ASIA EASTERN ASIA
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS
CRIMINALITY 5.78
5.45
5.50
4.85
4.51
CRIMINAL MARKETS
5.83
5.44
5.2ó
4.62
4.14
CRIMINAL ACTORS
5.74
5.47
5.34
508
4.88
RESILIENCE 4.44
4.58
4.03
5.50
4.13
ASIA AVERAGE 5.21 5.38 4.46

 

The Index results show Chat the Asian continent, comprising 4ó countries, features a range of crime
markets and actors. However, as a global hub for all different tvpes of exploitation,
from forced labour and online child sexual exploitation to domestic modern slavery and forced
recruitment for soldiers, Asia's most pervasive criminal market is human trafficking (Ó.33). With
the continent having witnessed bust alter bust of various synthetic drugs, from
Captagon to methamphetamine, it is little surprise that the svnthetic drug trade is Asia's second
most pervasive criminal market. There is also a

 

high incidente of human smuggling (5.ó7), non renewable resource crimes (3.35) and fauna crimes (5
32). Given the link between the wildlife trade and the pandemic, there appeared to be a shift in
attitudes toward the illegal wildlife trade and the consumption of wildlife products more
specifically. Overall, therefore, it is clear from the Index Results Chat Asia is more severelv
affected by organized crime than any other continent.
Indeed, Asia had the either the highest or second- highest average score for no fewer than seven of
the 10 criminal markets."

60 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

In line with global trends, state-embedded actors were identified as the most significant criminal
actor type in Asia, followed by criminal networks (S.ó2), foreign criminal actors (5.12) and mala-
style groups (4.34). Given the widespread criminality across the continent, and in particular the
involvement of state-embedded actors in much of it, it is perhaps not surprising therefore that
Asia was assessed as having low resilience to organized crime. As borders were closed and travel
restrictions imposed, territorial integrity (4.70) was among the higher scoring resilience
indicators, after international cooperation
(5.27) and national policies and laws (4.95).

 

FIGURE 5.4
Criminal market scores, Asia

 

 

 

Human trafficking

Human smuggling

Arms trafficking

Flora
crimes

Fauna crimes

Non-renewable resource crimes

Heroin trade

Cocaine trade

Cannabis
trade

Synthetic
drug trade
Nevertheless, government transparency and accountability, the lowest-scoring indicator (3.99), is
very poor, and in many ways the explosion at the Port of Beirut in August 2020 was the culmination
of years of corruption and mismanagement.
Elsewhere, necessary steps taken by Hong Kong authorities to stop the spread of COVID-19, driven in
part by their past experience with SARS, may in some cases be seen as a risk factor for broader
restrictions on civil society. In line with this, the ’non-state actors’ indicator was among the
lowest scoring across Asia, with a continental average ofjust4.10.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.67

 

 

432

5.32

5.35

5.29

 

 

5.08

6.02

5.21

 

 

However, although Asia was found to have the highest criminalitv score of al I continents, it is
important to break down the analysis into the subregions to accurately identifi crime trends and
where the greatest harms are being felt. I n lact, only one region on the continent — Western Asia
— scored among the top Ave regions in the world for criminality, with a regional average of 3.78. A
number of contextual factors can explain this, but, generally, countries in Western Asia, including
Syria (with a criminality score of ó.84), Lebanon (ó.7ó), Iraq (7 OK), Iran (7.10), Turkey (ó.89)
and Yemen (6.13), make up part of a notoriously fragile region and have experienced either conflict
or its immediate impact over the past decade. Against this tumultuous backdrop, the conditions for
criminality to thrive become apparent, as the mass movement of drugs, weapons, armed groups and
people across the entire region feed into illicit flows, fuelling source, transit and destination
markets, and emboldening criminal actors along the way. Five countries in Western Asia rank among
the top 10 countries in Asia for criminality.

By contrast, in South-eastern Asia (average 3.45), flora crimes (5.8ó), fauna crimes (709), human
trafficking(6.14) and synthetic drugs (6.82) led the region's criminal markets, while the region's
flora and fauna crimes were identified as highest
scoring criminal markets in the world. IlIegaI logging (primarily of indigenous hardwood) in source
countries like Laos and Cambodia (both with hora scores of 8), has had a devastating impact on
local ecosystems, with outward flows facilitated by corruption moving towards destination markets
in other parts ofthe continent. The svnthetic drug trade in the subregion was also found to be
particularly pervasive, with Myanmar featuring the highest score globally at 9.3 (on par with
Syria), along with Thailand and Laos (both an 8.0). The
three countries form the Golden Triangle, frequently described as the foremost methamphetamine
producing area in the world. Neighbouring Philippines is also a major methamphetamine hub, scoring
9.0, thejoint-second highest score globally.

One of the Asian regions to be home to a wide range of diverse illicit economies is Southern Asia.
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 61

 

The region's size and central location within the Asian continent makes the area a hotbed for
illicit flows. February of 2020 marked the beginning of the end of US troops in Afghanistan, as US
officials negotiated an agreement with the Taliban, a kev player in the heroin trade emanating from
the world's largest heroin producen. lt is no surprise then that Southern Asia has the
second-highest score for the heroin trade (5.94), alter Central Asia and the Caucasus, a region in
which almost all countries play an important role as transit points in transnational heroin flows
given its contiguity with Afghanistan. Southern Asia is also one of the
world's regions most affected by human trafficking (ó.88), with six out of the eight countries in
the region (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Maldives) as having significant or
severely pervasive human trafficking markets.

In Eastern Asia, the synthetic drug trade topped the list, with an average score of ó.30, followed
by human trafficking at ó.0. Countries like China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Mongolia and Japan were identified as having large destination markets for methamphetamine (largely
sourced from South-eastern Asia and beyond) and synthetic opioids such as Fentanyl.

62 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

FIGURE 5.5
Criminal actor scores, Asia

 

6.46

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unlike the case for criminal markets, criminal actor scores were more evenly distributed among
Asia's subregions. For example, all regions averaged ó.00 or above for ‘state-embedded actors’,
with the exception of Eastern Asia, which followed closely behind at a 3.80. While the
pervasiveness of this criminal actor-type varies from country to countrv, expert assessments tended
to attribute higher scores to countries either with authoritarian leanings and where human rights
standards were compromised or to those in which state actors either facilitate or take part in
environmental crimes. Criminal networks averaged above 5.0
Por all of Asia's subregions with the exception
of Central Asia and the Caucasus (4.38), underscoring the interconnectedness of the countries, with
a notablv higher score for Western Asia (ó.57). By contrast, no region scored above
a 3.0 for mafia-stvle groups, while South-eastern Asia led the continent in its average for foreign
criminal actors (ó.f8), where this actor type was
assessed by experts to have significant to severe influence in eight of the 11 countries.

In terms of resilience, no region in Asia was located in the Top five; Southern Asia was assessed
as being in the bottom five regions in the world for resilience to organized crime. Although
’international
cooperation’ toc Southern Asia was assessed at a 5 Oó (the highest in the region), the subregion
had among the lowest scores continentally for ‘victim and witness support’ (3.19),’judicial system
and detention’ and ‘prevention’ (both averaging at
3.50). Central Asia and the Caucasus was identified as having the second lowest resilience scores
on the continent, with no resilience indicator reaching as high as 5 0. Severe deficiencias in the
judiciary, and political leadership and government transparency were identifled as factors
contributing to this overall low resilience average.

SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 63

 

FIGURE 5.6
Resilience scores, Asia

Political leadership and governance
Government transparency
and accountability
International cooperation National policies and laws Judicial system and detention
Law enforcement Territorial integrity Anti-money laundering
Economic regulatory capacity Victim and witness support

Prevention Non-state actors

 

 

 

By contrast, Eastern Asia led the continent in overall resilience (with an average of 5.30),
featuring the highest averages across all 12 indicators.
Throughout 2020, South Korea was touted as one of the world's success stories in terms of its
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, acting swiftly to implement effective tracing systems, ensuring
the trust of the population and cushioning the negative impacts
of the disease on the economy. Other countries in the region, namely Japan, quickly closed their
borders. The region as a whole was able to maintain a degree of stability throughout the year that
was not experienced in other Asian regions. ‘Territorial integrity’ (ó.70),’international
cooperation' (ó.20) and ‘national policies and laws (ó.20) were among the subregion's top-scoring
resilience indicators.
In South-eastern Asia, the strength of the region's

 

4.46

 

 

‘economic regulatory capacity’ was noted (5.05), but again it was ‘international cooperation (5.41)
and 'national policias and laws’ (5.32) that scored highest.

Western Asia led the continent in overall criminality, and ranked third out of the Ave subregions
of Asia for resilience, with a regional average of 4.44. Consistent with continental
trends,'international cooperation’ (5.29), ‘national policies and laws’ and ‘territorial integrity’
(both at a 4.73) were the highest averaging indicators for this subregion, while government
transparency and accountabilitv' (3.79), ‘judicial system and detention’ (3.9ó) and ‘non-state
actors’ (4.f4) were the lowest. Experts cited state sanctioned crackdowns on civil society and the
media as reasons for these low indicator scores.

64 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

Africa

 

 

Criminality

CRIMINALITY SCORES

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resilience

RESILIENCE SCORES

1 0 NO DATA

 

 

Africa as a whole was lar le ss affected by the pandemic in terms of the rates of infections and
subsequent deaths than the rest of the world,
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 65

 

to severe restrictions on movement, as well as curfews and closure of borders.
for a number of reasons put forth by some However, these measures had negative knock-on health
experts, including warmer climates, which effects too. The continental economv shrunk by 3.4%
may have impeded the viral spread, a younger in 2020, the largest downturn on record and the
population and, at least in some countries, first time Africa's economy had contracted in
almost effective community health systems built up three decades."’ lnstitutional responses to
stop the over the vears in response to the numerous spread of the virus have had a profound
impact on communicable disease crises that have afflicted movement, trade and business, and also
affected the continent, most recently Ebola fever."° Most black markets and shadow economies. As
legitimate important, perhaps, in some African states’ businesses suffered extensive losses,
people success in curtailing the pandemic as much as they turned to illicit activities for
alternative sources of did was down to the alacrity and vigour with which livelihoods, and those
vulnerable to exploitation governments responded to the initial outbreak. become even more so
due to isolating restrictions Many citizens of the continent were subjected put in place in the
interesó of public health.

FIGURE 5.7
Index scores, Africa

 

 

 

#1
EAST AFRICA
#2
WEST AFRICA
#3
CENTRAL AFRICA

#4
NORTH AFRICA
#5
SOUTHERN AFRICA

 

REGION
EAST AFRICA WEST AFRICA CENTRAL AFRICA NORTH AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA
CRIMINALITY
5.óó
5.47
5.11

4.86
4.ó7
CRIMINAL MARKETS
5.19
5.39
4.80
4.81
4.43
CRIMINAL ACTORS
6.13
5.55
5.43
4.92
4.91
RESILIENCE 3.54
4.06
3.21
3.79
4.18
AFRICA AVERAGE 5.17 4.94 5.40 3.80
Beyond COVID 19, the continent continued to and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and an see
conflict, fragility and corruption in a number insurgency in Mozambique — the instability faced
of countries. From inter-ethnic violence and the bv a number of African countries in 2020 has
rise of jihadists in the Sahel, to the political crisis in been another enabling factor to the
expansion of Guinea-Bissau, conflicts in Ethiopia s Tigray re@IOF\ OF@dDIZCd crime activities.

66 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Alter Asia, Africa is the continent with the highest overall criminality score 5.17), a reflection
of
the high Iy pervasive and varied illicit economies that have taken root on the continent. Human
trafficking is the criminal market with the greatest infl uence in Africa, with a continental
average of 5.93. Of the 34 African countries, 30 were assessed as having a human trafficking market
whose influence is either significant or
severe, demonstrating the immense reach of this illicit economy, not least amid the pandemic when
economic devastation across the continent made people increasingly vulnerable to trafficking.

In 2019, there were 25 recorded ongoing conflicts in Africa,"^ and conflict and instability were
seemingly unimpeded by the pandemic throughout 2020, as countries continent- wide were hit by
persistent armed attacks, government offensives and insurgencies. The relationship between
organized crime and
conflict can be described as mutually reinforcing. Illicit economies play a role in all stages of
conflict, contributing to and sustaining it, and serving as an obstacle to sustainable peace.
Likewise, conflict settings create opportunities for criminality to expand and exploit, as the
trafficking of weapons, drugs and other commodities interweaves with emerging was
economies. Meanwhile, institutions are unable to respond to inequalities and deteriorating
political, health and socio-economic conditions, which also helps fuel criminality. These precise
dynamics have been observed in Ethiopia in 2020, with the Tigrav conflict curtailing the
government's abilitvto respond effectively to the threat of organized crime.

A perpetual negative cycle of conflict impairing resilience and inciting organized crime may lead
to high criminality and low resilience dynamics becoming entrenched. The Index findings
show that countries experiencing protracted conflicts, including Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and
the Central African Republic, and as well as

 

countries in other continents, have the lowest levels of resilience.

In this context, arms trafficking was found to be the second-most pervasive criminal market
across Africa as a whole (5.5ó), followed by non- renewable resource crimes (5.44) and fauna crimes
(3.39). Al ong with Asia, Africa features two environmental markets in the top live most pervasive
criminal markets, illustrating the prominence of these illicit activities, compared to drug
markets, for example. I ndeed, the criminal markets with the lowest continental averages were the
heroin trade (3.81), the cocaina trade (4.10) and the synthetic drug trade (4.34). I n line with
global trends, the most influential criminal actor types in Africa were state-embedded actors
(ó.89), followed by criminal networks (5 9ó), foreign actors (5.ó3), and finally, with a much lower
average score of 3.11, mafia-style groups.

Africa was identified by experts as having the least developed mechanisms and institutional
frameworks to counter organized crime, with an average resilience score of 3.80. Within the
continent, similar patterns to those visible globally emerge in terms of the highest- and
lowest-performing resilience indicators, with ’international cooperation' topping the list (4.79),
followed closely by ‘national policies
and laws' (4.óI) and ‘territorial integrity’ (4 24).
Notably, ‘non-state actors', although with a low score (3.95), outperformed most other resilience
indicators, reflecting at the same
time the high levels of repression of civil societv by governments across the continent and
the vibrancy of civil society itself. I n line with global trends, the social protection indicators
were the lowest-scoring indicators in Africa, with ’victim and witness support' (2.81) and
‘prevention' (3.08) scoring particularlv poorly, which, along with 'government transparency and
accountability' (3.30) made up the bottom three resilience indicators across the continent.

SENT!OL 5 | Continental overviews and results 67

 

FIGURE 5.8
Criminal market scores, Africa

 

 

 

Human trafficking

 

Human smuggling

Arms trafficking

Flora
crimes

Fauna crimes

Non-renewable resource crimes

Heroin trade

Cocaine trade

Cannabis
trade

Synthetic
drug trade

 

 

— 5.56

4.73

5.39

5.44

3.81

4.10

5.26

4.34

4.94

 

Although the scores for certain markets, actors and resilience indicators were fairly consistent
across the continent as a whole, some clear differences can be seen in the various regions. East
Africa was identified as the region with the highest levels of criminality (5.óó), driven not only
by a wide range of extremely pervasive markets in countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, but also by
the strength
of different types of criminal actors in conflict- affected states such as Sudan and South Sudan.
Human trafficking was by lar the mostfar-reaching illicit economy in this subregion, with an
average
of 7.39. Arms trafficking (7.11) was also noted as
particularly pervasive, driven predominantly bythe scores for conflict-torn Sudan, South Sudan and
Somalia, and the trafficking and circulation of small and light weapons. East Africa was one of
only two African regions (the other being North Africa), in which human smuggling featured in the
top three most prevalent criminal markets. Eritrea stands out as particularly affected by human
smuggling, scoring 9.5, the highest score in the world for this market. As one of the largest
refugee-producing countries in Africa, many Eritreans seek the help
of smuggling networks, who often have links to the country's political and military class.

68 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Similar patterns emerge in Central Africa, where most notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), the expansion of local and foreign rebel groups has increased demand for illicit arms and
ammunition trafficking. Moreover, Sahelian countries, including the Central African Republic and
Chad, were identified as driving the high arms trafficking score (ó.14) for the subregion.
Non-renewable-resource crimes were also among the most pervasive criminal markets in Central Africa
(ó.05), again driven primarily by the illicit gold trade in the DRC and the Central African
Republic, as well as by the extensive corruption and criminality entrenched in the oil and diamond
sectors in countries such as Angola. As with East Africa, drug markets were among the Iowest-
scoring criminal economies overall, although experts noted that a number of countries faced acute
problems in the form of Tramadol trafficking and the illicit cannabis trade.

Conversely, West Africa featured two drug markets in its top three highest-scoring criminal
economies- the only region in Africa to do so. While the illicit cannabis trade (3.87) plays a key
role in the region, the cocaine trade was identified as the most pervasive narcotics market in West
Africa. The regional average of ó.00 is driven not only by the major cocaine hub of Nigeria, but by
a number of smaller states such as Guinea-Bissau, where nearlv the entire economy was described as
revolving around the facilitation of international
trafficking of drugs, as well as Guinea, Cabo Verde, Senegal, Gambia and Ghana, who also score
above a ó.00 for the cocaine trade. A cluster of countries in the region have been described as
forming a ‘cocaine corridos’ for drugs in transit to consumen markets, with Guinea-Bissau having
long played
an instrumental role as a hub in the drug flows in and out of the region.^7 The environmental
criminal markets also featured heavily in the organized crime landscape of West Africa, with
non-renewable resource crimes (5.80), fauna crimes (5.ó7) and hora crimes (5.SO) all scoring
relatively high, due in large part to the high levels of natural resources, biodiversity and forest
cover, from countries on the west coast like Senegal and
Guinea-Bissau, to countries further east, such as Nigeria and Burkina Faso.
For Southern Africa, the region with the lowest
COi Mi Od lit/ SCOFC' OD thü COOti OC'Dt, fdU Od CKi MC'S
(5.35) were identified as posing a significant issue, not least due to the sheer number of
illegally traded endangered animals and their parts, from elephant ivory and rhino horns to lion
bones, pangolin scales and abalone (which has had profound social as well as environmental costs in
South Africa, one of the lew places in the world where the shellfish occurs naturally). Although
Coaching of rhinos generally declined across the region during the pandemic, population numbers Por
Kruger National Park in South Africa, which
is home to the largest number of rhinos in Africa, show, previously, that the white rhino
population had fallen by ó7% between 2OII and 2019, and the number of critically endangered black
rhino had decreased by 53%. Meanwhile, it is estimated in 2020 that 2 7 million pangolins are
killed by poachers every year in Africa, principally destined for end markets in Asia.

Southern Africa was also the region by lar the most affected by the heroin trade, the second most
pervasive criminal market in the region, with an average score of 5.I5. The heroin market was noted
as particularly significant in the
major trans-shipment and destination states of Mozambique and South Africa, where Afghan heroin is
increasingly imported in large quantities, as well as Mauritius and Seychelles, small island states
where heroin consumption is rising at
an alarming rate, as it is in other countries of the region. At the other end of the spectrum,
compared to certain other regions, such as East
Africa, the human smuggling industry in Southern Africa was rather limited (3.34).

At the other end of the continent, the picture is the polar opposite. Human smuggling was the
second- most pervasive criminal market in North Africa (ó.92), which has witnessed a significant
rise in the number of individuals seeking the help of smugglers to cross the Mediterranean in
recent years. Libya

 

 

remains a major transit hub from migrants being smuggled from all across Africa, but experts
identified Tunisia as an emerging significant source country (as well as continuing its
longstanding role as a transit hub) for irregular migration to Italv.
Furthermore, the increase in migration surges following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings has led to a
heavily securitized approach to people smuggling on the part ofthe Algerian government, which may
have strengthened the hand of smuggling networks operating in the southern part of the country.

FIGURE 5.9
Criminal actor scores, Africa

 

 

 

The Index data shows that, as with criminal markets, East Africa is home to the most influential
criminal actors on the continent, driven predominantly by state-embedded actors. Overall,
state-embedded actors scored 7 22 in the region and, as is the case with all five regions in
Africa, these are the most
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 69

 

Moreover, with Morocco identified as one of the major cannabis producing countries in the world,
almost every country in North Africa is significantly affected by the cannabis economy, which was
assessed to be the most-pervasive criminal market in the region, with an average score of ó.92.
Conversely, and in contrast to every other region in Africa, the flora crimes market in North
Africa was described as negligible (T.92). The region has
very little forest area, and therefore verv little illegal logging activity occurs.

 

 

5.40

 

 

 

 

 

criminal actor type across the continent, there are several countries in Africa where highly
organized gangs, armed groups and militias yield significant influence in the criminal landscape,
many of whom have even been strengthened by the COVID-19 pandemic, capitalizing on openings in
illicit markets

pervasive criminal actors in the continen-t with
and in doing so consolidating control over the

Central Africa (7.55) Reading the way, followed by North Africa (7.17), West Africa (ó.90) and
Southern Africa (ó 90). Criminal networks are also
prevalent across all regions in Africa, but none more so than in East Africa (ó.83) and West Africa
(ó.43). On the other hand, while Central Africa is home to countries with some ofthe highest levels
of state capture in the world, criminal networks in numerous countries in the region are fairly
weak. While mala-style groups are the lowest-scoring
communities in which they operate."8 Finally, foreign criminal actors are present throughout most
ofthe continent. Indeed, foreign actors
have a significant or severe influence in hall of the 54 African countries, and their influence is
not limited to any one particular region: foreign actors score fairly high in most regions in
Africa, but predominantly in West Africa (ó.30), East Africa (ó.00) and Southern Africa (5.34).

70 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

While other continents, most notably Oceania and the Americas, had a discernible peak in the
distribution of resilience scores, the resilience curve for Africa is lar flatter, reflecting the
fact that African countries score
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 71

 

The resilience indicator with the largest difference between the highest- and lowest-scoring
regional averages was ‘non-state actors'. The average for this indicator in East Africa was a mere
3.11, whereas civil

particularly varied levels of resilience. AL the same
societv in West Africa plav-s and crucially is allowed

time,however, it is clear that as a whole, African states have lar lower levels of resilience than
countries in other corners ofthe globe. In Africa, as for the rest of the world, 2020 was a
tumultuous year, witnessing the death ofthe president in Burundi, a military coup in Mali and the
beginning ofwhat has developed into an outright war as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched
a military offensive in the Tigray region.
Central Africa (3.21) was the lowest-scoring region for resilience, not only in Africa but
worldwide. In lact, Africa has three of the worst-performing regions in the world when it comes to
resilience, with North Africa scoring 3.79 and East Africa 3.54.
In terms of the best-performing resilience indicators, little variation was seen between the
African regions:’international cooperation'
to play —a much more influential role, scoring 4.87, driven predominantly by high scores in
countries such as Cabo Verde, Senegal and Ghana, which all score
7.0. Several countries in Southern Africa also boast a free media environment and an active civil
society, not least South Africa (7.0). Finally, there was also considerable variation in the scores
for’government transparency and accountability’ across Africa. In
East Africa, several countries — notably Eritrea, South Sudan and Somalia — received very poor
scores and even the best-performing country only scored 5.0; conversely, a number of West African
states received adequate scores for‘government transparency and accountab ncluding Cabo Verde,
Ghana and Nigeria.

Nevertheless, there is significant scope for improvement across Africa, not just with regard to

and 'national policias and laws’featured among
transparency and accounta t-y the lack ofwhich was

the highest-scoring indicators in all Ave regions. At the other end of the resilience scale, the
social protection indicators, ‘victim and witness
support’ and 'prevention’ were among the Iowest- performing indicators for all regions. In
addition, the variation in the regional averages for the aforementioned indicators is fairly small.
perhaps best epitomized by TdnZania's late president John Magufuli, a notorious coronavirus sceptic
who refused to publish data on the COVID-19 situation in the country and who cracked down on those
who sought to raise awareness of the virus — butfor all of the building blocks needed to establish
sustainable resilience to organized crime in Africa.

72 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

Americas

 

Criminality

CRIMINALITY SCORES

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resilience

RESILIENCE SCORES

 

 

For citizens of the Americas, 2020 was an extremely
dangerous year. Not only did almost a million people die from coronavirus throughout the year, but
violence against civilians, from human rights
defenders to environmental activists and journalists, was rife across the continent. AL the
outbreak of the pandemic, 28 activists were killed in the space ofjust a lew months in Colombia."
In the United States, omer a thousand civilians every year die at the hands of the police,°" but it
in 2020 it was the murder ofone man, George Floyd, that triggered mass protests across the country,
subsequently triggering the Black Lives Matter movement.^

FIGURE 5.11
Index scores, Americas
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 73

 

The impact of the pandemic was felt acutely not just in the US, but also in Latin America, where
Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Mexico were the five hardest-hit countries worldwide in terms
of excess mortality.“ Central American gangs, particularly in the Northern Triangle countries (El
Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala), that extort payments from the local communitv, business
and migrante, mav also have seen their activities temporarilv stymied by the pandemic, but it is
likely also to have provided other opportunities for criminal groups to exploit.

 

 

 

#1
CENTRAL AMERICA

#2
SOUTH AMERICA

NORTH AMERICA

#4
CARIBBEAN

 

REGION
CENTRAL AMERICA SOUTH AMERICA NORTH AMERICA CARIBBEAN
CRIMINALITY ó.16
5.51
4.58
4.05

CRIMINAL MARKETS
5.72
5.19
4.48
3.65

CRIMINAL ACTORS
ó.ó1
5.82
4.69
4.45
RESILIENCE 4.05
4.86
6.92
4.96
AMERICAS AVERAGE 5.06 4.70 5.43 4.83

Although it is not an issue occurring solelv in South America, corruption that is endemic in the
region carne to the fore amid the pandemic, not least in BFdZII where the Rio de Janeiro state
governor, Wilson Witzel, was impeached (and subsequently removed from office in 2021) following
accusations of embezzlement and other corrupt practicas
in the context of COVID-19-reIated public procurement.‘^ Meanwhile, the US Federal Trade Commission
reported that throughout 2020, American citizens lost over US$2I T million to
COVlD-related scams and fraud revolving around stimulus payments.“ Cvbercrime more generally was
arguably the criminal market to profit the most from the pandemic. Citizens across the Americas
fell victim to all manner of ransomware attacks and phishing scams, from sophisticated attacks such
as the Trickbot Trojan campaign in the US and the CovidLock app in Costa Rica, to rudimentary email
phishing scams in Mexico and Guatemala."

74 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Brazil also witnessed another year of episodes of deadly police excursions into the country's
[avelos, the public health crisis seemingly doing nothing to stern police violence. I ndeed, in the
first four months of 2020, police killings had increased significantly in the states of Rio de
Janeiro and Sáo Paolo, before the Supreme Court took the decision to ban police raids in the
(ovelos during the pandemic.“^

The pandemic precipitated the unusual phe-
nomenon of major regional migration corridors
— this time, however, flowing in reverse. Lack of economic opportunities, compounded by border
closures and stringent anti-migrant measures, led to migrants from countries such as Nicaragua and
Honduras seeking hel p from smugglers in order
to return home from destination countries such as the US.“ Organized crime is a phenomenon that has
plagued the continent for decades, and the results of the Index suggest that there are no signs of
the pervasive criminality afflicting the various regions of the Americas abating anv time soon.

The Americas is the only continent where the most pervasive markets are drugs. The cocaine trade
was identified as the continent's most prolific illicit market, with a continental average of 7 41
the highest average score of any continent, for any of the 10 criminal markets. Although the
cocaine market may have been disrupted by an initial pandemic-induced reduction in air and
container traffic, by the end of the year drug trafficking organizations in South America were
shipping as much cocaine as ever, perhaps even more. The cannabis trade is also widespread
in the Americas, albeit to a lar lesser extent,

 

scoring 5.81, with arms trafficking (5.40), human trafficking (3.19) and human smuggling (4.47)
following in lesser degrees. But the monopoly that the cocaine and cannabis trades hold over the
continent's criminal economies is such that there is comparably little room for the proliferation
of other criminal markets, as seen elsewhere. Indeed, the Americas rank last among the five
continents for the svnthetic drug trade, and fourth in heroin trafficking and fauna crimes.

This concentration of drug markets also has implications for the nature of the continent's criminal
actors. While state-embedded actors and criminal networks had the highest averages (in line with
global trends), the Americas is the only continent in which mafia-style groups were not rated as
the least pervasive actor type; this is most likely a result of the influence of drug cartels and
gang activity. But amid the extraordinary levels of cartel and gang violence in the Americas, there
are simultaneously hundreds of thousands of civil society activists and countless non- governmental
organiZationS that have been
built from the ground up. Indeed, the Americas are unique in being the onlv continent in the world
where non-state actors were identified as being among the top three strongest resilience indicators
(3.31), along with 'international
cooperation' (3.80) and ’national policies and laws' (5 37). Among the lowest-scoring indicators,
on the other hand, were ’victim and witness support' (4.30), ‘judicial system and detention’ (4.31)
and ’economic regulatory capacity’ (4.49).

SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 75

 

 

FIGURE 5.12
Criminal market scores, Americas

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Human trafficking

Human smuggling

Arms trafficking

Flora crimes

Fauna crimes

Non-renewable resource crimes

Heroin trade

Cocaine trade

Cannabis
trade

Synthetic drug trade

 

 

 

Two subregions ofthe Americas — Central and South America — were among the top five regions for
overall criminality in the world (with criminality averages of Ó.1ó and 5 51, respectivelv). As the
world'ssource market for cocaine, coca cultivation is almost exclusively concentrated in the
northern and western regions of South America, and this has been a driving force in the rise of
powerful drug cartels and regional violence. Before the pandemic, cocaine production across Latin
America was
at record highs, and although disruptions were recorded as the virus spread and governments took
restrictiva action, production quickly rebounded

5.19

4.47

5.40

3.94

4.21

4.37

2.97

7.14

5.81

3.46

 

 

 

stronger than ever.‘8 The cocaine market in South America (and in particular Colombia, which has
been identified as having the most pervasive cocaine market in the world, at 9.5) has become so
enduring that countries in neighbouring subregions have also been assessed as among the world's
major transit zones, including Mexico, Guatemala and Haití, through which the drug is moved to
destination markets in North America, Europe and beyond. In lact, seven out of the eight countries
in the Central America region were assessed to have cocaine markets that had significant to severe
influence, with scores of 7.00 or above.

76 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Besides narcotics, however, South America also hosts a range of other criminal markets, including
environmental crimes. The subregion scored the highest continentally for illicit trade in
non-renewable resource crimes, for example, at ó.38. As a region rich in natural resources, gold
trafficking was identified as a dominant illicit economy in Venezuela, Suriname and Peru. In July
2020, revelations that a govern- ment oflcial in Brazil had deliberately abandoned the issuing of
fines for illegal deforestation has been described as a ‘flashpoint’for Brazil's deforestation
crisis.“" Brazil consistently scored among the highest in the region for illicit trade in flora,
reflecting the illegal timber trade, which has resulted in deforestation of huge swathes of the
Amazon.
Similarly, trafficking of exotic wildlife has endangered the country's delicate ecosystems while
threatening extinction for a number of species.

In addition to its cocaine trade (7.44), Central America was identified as being in the top three
regions in the world for various criminal markets, including arms trafficking (with a regional
average of ó.25), flora crimes (5.75), fauna crimes (5.88) and the cannabis trade (ó.25). Central
America also had the highest scores of all four subregions in the continent for human trafficking
(ó.44) and human smuggling (ó.19).
Mexico and Panama consistently scored among the highest in all 10 criminal markets in the region.
Mexico has a well- consolidated weapons market and serves as a major conduit for arms flows to and
from the US and across Central America, which has had a devastating impact on levels of gun
violence and criminal armament. The country also
hosts a number of environmental crime markets, including the timber industry, wildlife trafficking
and fuel smuggling. Meanwhile, Panama scored the highest in the region for human trafficking
(8.00), where it has been described
as a transit and destination market for victims, including Venezuelan migrants, and children who
fall victim to sexual exploitation and forced labour.

By contrast, the Caribbean had the lowest criminality average on the continent at4.05, featuring
the lowest
sub-regional scores across the board, with the exception of arms trafficking (4.54), cocaine (ó.ó2)
and cannabis (ó.08), where North America had the lowest average. The islands of the Caribbean play
an integral role as a corridor for the illicit flow of drugs and arms from other subregions ofthe
continent. In a year marked by heightened gang violence and a political crisis following the slide
into rule by decree

 

 

in January, Haití was among the highest-scoring countries in the region, across all 10 markets.
Large numbers of migrants fleeing the country feed into the human smuggling and trafficking
markets. Moreover, despide years of arms embargo, flows of illegally obtained weapons pass through
Haití, aided by border control deficiencies and corruption. Jamaica also scores high for arms
trafficking and the cannabis trade. Arms fuel the countrv's devastatingly high homicida rafe and
drive other criminal markets. Similarly, despide the ambiguity surrounding the legality of the
country's cannabis trade, experts noted an intersection with an escalation of violence in the
country as well as

FIGURE 5.13
Criminal actor scores, Americas

 

 

 

I n terms of criminal actors, the Americas had the highest average in the world (5.43),
underscoring the strong influence and power of criminal
groups operating on the continent. As mentioned, state-embedded criminal actors averaged the
highest at 5.ó1, consistent with global trends.
Criminal markets scored 3.4ó, followed by mafia- stvle groups (5.40) and foreign criminal actors
(5.24). The pervasiveness of all four criminal actor types in a number of countries, along with a
Power continental criminal markets average, means that criminal groups are the driving force of
criminality on the continent. The example of
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 77

 

an overlap with other markets, including arms and human trafficking.

North America, the subregion comprising the US and Canada, averaged the third lowest in the
Americas in overall criminality, at 4.48. The sheer SIZO Of these countries means that while a wide
range of criminal markets exist, their overall impact on society remains limited to certain
communities. Nevertheless, the US represents a huge source, transit and destination market, with
experts identifying synthetic drugs, cocaine, heroin and arms trafficking as the most pervasive
markets in the country.

 

 

5.43

 

 

 

 

 

 

Honduras illustrates the potency of criminal actors. Groups such as Mara Salvatrucha 13 dominate
the countrv's criminal landscape, engaging in extortion, drug trafficking and distribution, and
money laundering. Alongside such groups, criminal networks such as the Tumbadores resemble
modern-day pirates, who steal and resell drug shipments, largely along human smuggling routes.
These criminal activities are facilitated by state-embedded actors as well as foreign criminal
organizations notably from Colombia and Mexico. Similar criminal actor dynamics appear across the
continent.

78 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

FIGURE 5.14
Resilience scores, Americas

Political leadership and governance

Government transparency
and accountability

International cooperation National policies and laws Judicial system and detention
Law enforcement Territorial integrity Anti-money laundering
Economic regulatory capacity Victim and witness support
Prevention

 

Non-state actors

 

 

 

Leodersh ip Prim inol justice Econom ic and governance and securi ty and finon

 

 

In terms of resilience, the Americas represents a spectrum of resilience capacities. For example,
North America was in the top Ave regions for resilience, scoring 6.92 on average, while Central
America scored the fifth lowest in the world, with an average resilience score of
4.OK. No resilience indicator scored lower than
6.00 in North America, reflecting the US and Canada's roles as global political and economic
leaders. Nevertheless, the US began the vear with a presidential impeachment trial, and the
instability was only exacerbated by COVID-19
and the nationwide mass protests in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. Moreover, the
indictment in August of a close advisor to Trump

 

'4.8]

 

Civil Society American resilience I and social protectfon average

 

 

for fraud- the latest in a long list of individuals close to the Trump administration to be
indicted, and subsequently convicted, in recent years — is an illustration of the declive in
transparencv at the highest levels of government. Indeed, the
leadership and governance indicators were among the lowest scoring for the US. Drug overdose deaths
reached a record high in the US in 2020, testimony to the 'deadIy impact of the coronavirus
pandemic's disruption to drug abuse treatment and prevention efforts',’" while the FinCEN
files leak exposed how systemic the use of the international banking system by criminals to move
their illicit proceeds really is.

SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 79

 

In the Caribbean and Central America, ‘international
cooperation’ and ‘national policies and laws’were the highest-scoring resilience indicators, while
C'COOOMÍC KC'@UldtOKÇ Cd§dCit$ dOd ‘VÍCtiM dOd
witness support’ had the lowest averages, indicating
the need to improve a number of economic and social deficiencies. I n South America,'con- state
actors'was the highest-scoring resilience
indicator (followed by international cooperation and national policies and laws), with countries
such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay assessed as having a highly effective resilience capacity.
Although the region is home to countless forces for good within civil society, they operate in what
are often deadly environments, and the threads to their safety —and ultimately their lives — must
not be overlooked. With the number of activista killed in 2020, it is no wonder Co ombia's UN envoy
told the Security Council in July that the killing of human rights and community defenders, as well
as of former combatants who have laid down their arms, continues to be the greatest threat to the
consolidation of peace in the country.^'

80 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

Europe

 

 

ExooeOvvaIxoe*o
Criminality

CRIMINALITY SCORES

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EvooeovvMIxoi*o
Resilience
ó.23
RESILIENCE SCORES

 

 

Although COVID-I9 originated in Asia, Europe quickly became the new epicentre of the outbreak, and
in the first hall of 2020 the continent was ravaged by the virus. By the end of the year, al most
ó00 000 deaths had been confirmed in Europe.
The health crisis was quickly followed by an economic crisis across many, if not most, European
states, not least in Italy where mafia groups
swiftly seized the opportunity to strengthen their hold over the communities in which they
operate, handing out food packages and providing loans to struggling families and businesses alike
— what has been dubbed 'mafia welfare’.^' Not all businesses suffered as the result of the
pandemic, however, as companies in Europe benefited
from the preferential treatment, cronyism and outright corruption exposed in countless scandals
pertaining to personal protective equipment procurement, public contracts for track-and-trace
systems and more.’"

As elsewhere, while border closures and harsh lockdown measures took their toll on the formal

FIGURE 5.15
Index scores, Europe
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 81

 

economy, the damaging impact on the continent's illicit economies was lar less prominent. And
although Europe is one of the better-performing continents under the Index, both in terms of
criminality, where it is the second-lowest-scoring continent (4.48) and resilience, where it is
assessed to be the continent Chat is most resilient to organized crime (ó.23), it is by no means
immune to the phenomenon. The dismantling
of the EncroChat encrypted phone network by European law enforcement agencies exposed the sheer
extent of criminal behaviour that permeates the continent, revealing a litanv
of illicit activity from drug deals and money laundering to arms trafficking and corruption within
police forces.’4 Malta is a prime example of how alleged corruption can destabilize a nation, as
2020 was the year in which farmer prime minister Joseph Muscat resigned and was officially
questioned in connection with the investigation into the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia, the
prominent anti-corruption investigative journalist murdered in 2017.

 

 

 

#1
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

#2
SOUTHERN EUROPE

#3
WESTERN EUROPE

#4
NORTHERN EUROPE

 

 

REGION

CENTRALAND EASTERN EUROPE SOUTHERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
NORTHERN EUROPE

CRIMINALITY

5.19
4.42
4.09
3.ó0
CRIMINAL MARKETS
4.88
3.73
4.06
3.46
CRIMINAL ACTORS
5.49

5.11
4.11
3.78
RESILIENCE
4.97
5.59
7.49
7.81
EUROPE AVERAGE 4.48 4.21 4.76 6.23

82 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Europe is a destination market for a number of illicit economies, and home to several countries of
origin or transit for various criminal markets. As with other parts ofthe world such as Africa and
Asia (albeit to a
lesser degree), human trafficking is the most pervasive criminal market in Europe, with an average
score of
4.94. A number of European countries play a role in the human trafficking industry, from source
countries to mal destinations, as well as those that experience signiflcant levels of internal
trafficking, which partially explains the prevalence ofthis market. The next highest-scoring
markets are cannabis (4.88), cocaine (4.83) and synthetic drugs (4.7ó), which clearly illustrates
the importance of drug markets in Europe. Just below the synthetic drug trade is human smuggling
(4.72), followed bythe heroin trade (4.3ó) and arms trafficking (4.23). While some European
countries do play a role in the transnational illegal wildlife trade, the three environmental crime
markets included in the Index rank at the bottom for Europe: non-renewable resource crimes (3.35),
fauna crimes (3.24) and flora crimes (2.75).

In contrast to many other continents, state-embedded actors in Europe are not the dominant criminal
actor type, registering an average score of4.58, ranking above only mafia-style groups, which were
identified by experts to be the least influential type of criminal actor across the four
typologies. In first and second place are foreign actors (5.38) and criminal networks (5.1ó),
which, given
the strong interaction and collaboration between the two actor types in Europe, is perhaps
expected.

In terms of resilience rankings, Europe was by a considerable margin the highest-scoring continent,
with an average resilience score of ó.23. As with every other continent, barring Oceania, the
highest-scoring resilience indicator was ‘international cooperation’ (7.02), followed by ‘national
policies and laws’ (ó.70). In fact, of the 12 building blocks of resilience covered by the Index,
no fewer than nine had an average score of ó.00 or higher in Europe, with ‘territorial integrity’,
‘law enforcement’, ‘non-state actors’,’judicial system
and detention’,’economic regulatory capacity’, ‘political leadership and governance’ and ‘victim
and witness support’ all scoring fairly well. The three indicators scoring below ó.00, and thus
illustrating more scope for improvement, were ‘prevention’ (5.98),’anti-money

SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 83

 

 

laundering' (5.78) and 'government transparency Europe's worst-performing, they are nevertheless
and accountability' (3.78). lt is noteworthy, higher than the averages for any of the other
four however, that although these latter indicators are continents across the globe.

FIGURE 5.16
Criminal market scores, Europe

 

 

 

 

 

 

Human trafficking

Human smuggling

Arms trafficking

Flora crimes

Fauna crimes

Non-renewable resource crimes

Heroin trade

Cocaine trade
Cannabis
trade
Synthetic drug trade

4.94
4.7 2 4.21 2.75 3.24

3.35

4.56

4.85

4.88

4.76

 

4.21

 

As elsewhere, it is important to delve into regional peripheral illicit economies, especially in
regard to nuances,giventhesign1cantvariationsof theenironmental markets.Ontheotherhand,
criminality and resilience scores across continents, there were a number of criminal markets that
were and this is no less true for Europe. Turning first to identified as having considerable
reach in Central the criminality component, for criminal markets, and Eastern Europe, namely
human trafficking there was considerable disparity between the (5.ó8) and human smuggling
(3.59), as well as regions in Europe. On the one hand, the Baltic several of the drug markets.
and Nordic states were assessed to have fairly

84 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

I n both Southern and Western Europe, the cocaine trade dominated, driven by the high scores
assigned to gateway states, such as Italy and
Spain, as well as a considerable number of major destination markets that make up the regions.
Several large seizures of cocaine at European ports throughout 2020 underline the importante of
maritime routes in the transnational cocaine trade, and the COVID-19 pandemic has precipitated a
shift toward the increasing infiltration of cocaine into large consignments of legal goods. As
Reitano and Shaw (2021) explain: ’// anything, the pondemic restrictions made it easier(or tro(
ckinggroups to

FIGURE 5.17
Criminal actor scores, Europe

 

 

 

As with criminal markets, there was a marked variation in the ranking of various criminal actor
types in Europe. Nowhere was this variation more pronounced than when comparing the strength of
state-embedded actors in Central and Eastern Europe, a subregion Chat had an average of Ó.7ó (the
second highest score of any region alter Western Asia), with Northern Europe, where
the score was just 2.23. Aside from the notable exceptions of Romania and Poland, the remaining 1ó
countries in the region registered scores of 3.5
¿et their product through points o(entry. There was o declive in the capacity to seorch oir (reight
and
contoiners ...] because o[social-distoncing measures, nick personnel or the üssignment o[sto((to
other duties rel0ted to mono¿ing the pondemic. The need to keep trade moving and (ood and medicines
supp/ied was olso prioritised, with the result that searching and intelligence-led enforcement were
reduced in tome se0ports. Some Outhorities created ¿reen l0nes’ at porte o(entry and ot border
crossin¿s to occelerote the processing o(cargo shipments and to ensure their swi(t movement otto
roods [or distribution. Chat kept drugs movin¿ too.”’

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

or above for state—embedded actors, with Belarus and Russia leading the way. Mafia-style groups
also had an unequal distribution across the continent, with powerful groups identified in several
countries in Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe, such as Italy, Spain, Montenegro,
Albania and Serbia, among others. At the same time, mafia-stvle groups were found to be either
non-existent or to have very limited influence in many countries across the continent, from small
microstates in Western Europe, such as Andorra,

 

 

Liechtenstein and Luxembourg, to larger states further east, including Hungary, for example.

The Index results illustrate the influence yielded by foreign actors hailing both from other
European neighbours as well as criminal actors from other continents. Economic powerhouses in
Europe such as Spain and Italy were deemed extremely attractive environments for foreign organized
criminal actors, due in part to their proximity to big players and as strategically important
transport vectors in the transnational illicit economy. The other side of the coin, however, is
that what
is driving the high foreign actors’ scores in a

FIGURE 5.18
Resilience scores, Europe

Political leadership and governance
Government transparency
and accountability
International cooperation National policies and laws Judicial system and detention
Law enforcement Territorial integrity Anti-money laundering
Economic regulatory capacity Victim and witness support
Prevention Non-state actors
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 85

 

number of other countries is the pervasiveness of the traditional Italian mala groups themselves,
most notably the ’Ndrangheta, either in terms
of their direct involvement in the trade of illicit commodities, or their infiltration of the
formal economy and banking sectors to launder their illicit proceeds, such as in the UK or Germany,
for example. This is a feature of the global illicit economy that has been particularly exacerbated
by the COVID-19 pandemic, as criminal groups
have preyed on vulnerable businesses crippled by coronavirus restrictions, extorting them or taking
them over outright to then use as vehicles for laundering their illicit proceeds.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.23

86 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

When it comes to resilience, Europe as a continent was assessed to be in the best position relativa
to the others. Not only was Europe the highest- scoring continent globally, but of all the regional
groupings worldwide under the Index, the four European regions of Northern Europe, Western Europe,
Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe ranked second, third, sixth and eighth,
respectively. With 14 of the 20 most resilient countries in the world hailing from Northern and
Western Europe, these two regions dominate the top of the Index rankings. In line with global
trends, the highest-scoring indicator for these subregions was ‘international cooperation’, scoring
8.50 and 7.93 respectively, perhaps best exemplified by the takedown in July 2020 of the EncroChat
encrypted phone network of choice
lar criminal actors across the continent as a result of collaboration between police forces in
several countries.’Territorial integrity’ and ‘national policies and laws’ also featured high on
the list of resilience indicators in both regions, in addition to ‘economic regulatory capacity’
(8.0ó) in Northern Europe and non-state actors’ (7.91) in Western Europe. The frameworks and
mechanisms in place to combat money laundering, on the other hand, were identified as a weak spot
in both Northern and Western Europe relativa to the other resilience building blocks, with
anti-money laundering’ being assessed as the lowest-scoring resilience indicator at 7.00 and ó.41,
respectively.

Southern Europe, while still outperforming the vast majority of the world's regions, nevertheless
had more countries with low resilience levels (as defined as below an average score of 5.3) than
with high resilience. The moderately high resilience
SCOF€'S óSSi@DCd IO §d|n (Ó. ÓÜ), DOOtU@d I (Ó.4Ó)
and Italy (ó.29) were counteracted by countries at the other end of the spectrum such as Cvprus
(4.42), San Marino (5.13) and Malta (5.17). I n this region, ‘international cooperation’ once again
took the number one spot (ó.88), driven first
and foremost by Italy's stellar engagement in cooperation with the international community,
including through cross border judicial and law
enforcement cooperation. ‘National policies and laws’ was the second-highest-scoring indicator at
ó.5ó, once more driven by the robust legislative frameworks in Spain and Italy. Furthermore,
Southern Europe was the only region on the continent where ‘law enforcement’ was among the top
three resilience indicators, scoring an average of ó.19. The variety and effectiveness
of specialized law enforcement units across the region, including the Centre for Intelligence
against Terrorism and Organized Crime in Spain, the Judicial Police in Portugal and the Direzione
Investigativa Antimafia, the Guardia di Finanza and the Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale’^ in
Italy, contributed to the region's high average for this indicator. Even in the best-performing
countries, however, organized crime finds its way into the heart of law enforcement. In July 2020,
an entire department of the \talian Carabinieri was dismantled alter 10 officers were arrested on
suspicion of a whole host of crimes, from drug
dealing and extortion to abuse of power and even
torture, which prosecutors said escalated during the country's first COVI D 19 Iockdown.’7

Aside from ‘prevention’, the worst-performing indicator in Southern Europe, ‘government
transparency and accountability’ was identified as a significant obstacle to an effective response
to organized crime in the region, scoring an average ofjust 4.88. While for most other indicators
there was a clear divide between the highest- and lowest-performing countries in the region, low
levels of transparency and mechanisms to ensure accountability appeared to be somewhat of an
equalizer in Southern Europe, with no country scoring higher than Ó. While the small states of San
Marino (4), Monaco (4) and Malla (4.5) had particularly low scores, other countries such as Italy,
Greece and Cyprus did not fare much better, each receiving a score of 5.

Finally, Central and Eastern Europe, while outperforming most regions around the world, received
the lowest average resilience score of the four European subregions, at 4.97. Several

SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 87

 

countries in the region did perform fairly well, with
/ZOch Republic (ó.25), Poland (ó.13) and Slovenia (ó.08) all scoring at or around the European
average. However, 12 of the 17 countries in the region were assessed as having low resilience,
scoring below 5.3. Moldova, Belarus, and Bosnia and HerZegovina all scored below 4.00, with Ukraine
and Russia scoring only marginally higher, at 4.00 and 4.04, respectively. Experts noted
Chat the relatively poor scores in this subregion were driven by a range of Iow-scoring indicators,
particularly those assessing governments’ ability and willingness to tackle organized crime in an
open, transparent and effective manner. I ndeed, ‘government transparency and accountabilitv’ was
the lowest-scoring resilience indicator in Central and Eastern Europe, at 4.2ó, with al most
two-thirds of the countries in the region scoring
4.5 or lower. Similarly, ’political leadership and governance’ also scored low across the region,
in particular in the Western Balkan states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, as well as
Belarus (where heavilv disputed elections led
to mass protests, arbitrary arrests and extreme violence), and Moldova and Ukraine. By contrast,
'international cooperation', which is recognized as a key pillar in the effective fight against
transnational organized crime, scored relatively high across
the region, with a regional average of 5.79, led by the Central European states of CZOch Republic,
Slovakia and Poland, which all scored 7.0 for the indicator. Overall, more than hall of the
countries in the region were assessed to have international cooperation frameworks that are
sufficiently effective, scoring ó.0 or higher.

The dynamics surrounding organized crime and resilience to counter it in Central and Eastern Europe
are by no means limited to oflcial UN member states, of course. The example of Kosovo serves well
to highlight the lact Chat organized crime can pervade all states, regardless of their political
status. Indeed, the results show that Kosovo consistently featured among the highest- scoring
criminal markets in Europe.’8

88 Global Organized Crime Index - 2024

 

 

Oceania

 

 

Criminality

CRIMINALITY SCORES

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resilience

RESILIENCE SCORES

 

 

What makes Oceania- a continent comprising Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia and
Polynesia — unique is that almost all states in the region bre small, and small states have
particular vulnerabilities. In Australia in June 2020, spurred bvthe Black Lives Matter movement,
thousands
of people took to the streets to protest against the disproportionate prison rates for indigenous
people, while the economic downturn caused bvthe pandemic, which decimated the tourism industry
upon which many states rely, risked provoking social unrest and political instability. As
bushfires raged throughout Australia, it wasn't just the security threat posed by cáimate change
Chat was highlighted in the region: the largest island

FIGURE 5.19
Index scores, Oceania
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 89

 

state in the world signed a security pact with Japan in the face of increasing shows of military
strength on the part of China.

While in absolute terms, by global comparisons, organized crime levels in this region may be lower,
the economic, political and societal impact of the phenomenon is significant. While Australasia and
the Pacific island countries mav not be as burdened by organized crime as the rest of the world, a
number of illicit economies have already taken hold, and others are seemingly on the rise. Papua
New Guinea's record drug bust of ZOO kilogramo of cocaine in 2020 following the crash-landing of a
plane outside Port Moresby is a clear illustration of Chat.^*

 

 

 

#1 f•1ELANESIA
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
#3
MICRONESIA
#5
POLYNESIA

 

REGION

MELANESIA
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
MICRONESIA POLYNESIA

CRIMINALITY
3.61

2.58
2.45
CRIMINAL MARKETS
3.44
3.50
2.50
2.48
CRIMINAL ACTORS
3.78
3.75
2.66
2.42
RESILIENCE
4.71
8.17
4.90
5.ó4
OCEANIA AVERAGE 8.07 2.98 3.16 5.46

 

Overall, however, Oceania's criminality is heavily skewed to lower scores because of the structure
of the Index, whereby countries that feature a diverse range of criminal markets score higher than
those that have fewer, but possibly more
pervasive, criminal markets. Broadly speaking, this is the case for Oceania, where countries
mostly feature only one or two prominent criminal markets. Thus, the continent scores the lowest
global lv in tecms of overall criminality.

 

Among the countries in the region, two 'groupings’ emerge when it comes to criminality, with
country averages clustered either between 1.5 and 3.0, or if they have a slightly more pervasive
criminality, between 3.0 and 4 O. No countrv in the region was identified as experiencing
signiflcant or extreme levels of criminality, although specific markets in particular countries
were noted as quite pervasive.

90 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

FIGURE 5.20
Criminal market scores, Oceania

 

 

Human taficking

Human smuggling

 

Arms trafficking

Flora crimes

Fauna
crimes

Non-renewable resource crimes

Heroin trade

Cocaine trade

Cannabis
trade

Synthetic drug trade

2.50

2.54

4.93

2.07

1.54

2.95

3.46

3.57

 

298

 

Papua New Guinea is a notable exception, however. The country has an overal\ criminalitv score of
5.44, 1.29 points above the next highest-scoring country in Oceania, the Solomon Islands. Unlike
other countries that either had no identifiable high-
criminality markets or featured only one, Papua New Guinea was found to have several pervasive
markets, including hora crimes (8.0), human trafficking(7.0), arms trafficking, non-renewable
resource crimes
and cannabis, all scoring at 5 30. This has the effect of raising the average scores for both
Oceania as a whole and the subregion of Melanesia. Criminality wise, two other countries in
Melanesia also appeared to be outliers in a regional context — the
significantly higher levels of criminality than countries further north in Micronesia and to the
east in Polynesia. One possible explanation for this would be the lact that island nations in
Melanesia are much closer to the large regional destination markets for orgaOlZCd crime, Australia
and New Zealand. As the last transit stages before reaching these large markets, organized crime
groups are increasingly using Melanisian islands as transit hubs for arms, cocaine and synthetic
drugs, which drives up overall crime levels. A clear illustration
to justify this is the lact that both Fiji and Papua New Guinea score high for cocaine, 4.5 and 4,
respectively, the second and third highest score in

Solomon lslands and Fi-ji both of which experience
Oceania, alter Australia.

 

 

Overal I, Oceania comes in last for eight of the 10 criminal markets in a continental comparison.
The illicit trade in fauna (4.93) and synthetic drugs (3.S7) were the two exceptions, where the
continent ranked third and fourth, respectivelv.
While there are a number of native species in Oceania that are traded illegally, the high
average score for the continent on fauna crimes is due almost entirely to I UU fishing. Countries
in the region have extensive economic zones, which, because of lack of capacity to patrol, are

FIGURE 5.21
Criminal actor scores, Oceania

 

 

With regard to criminal actors, foreign actors (4.14) were identified as having the most extensive
influence in Oceania, followed by criminal networks (3.82), state-embedded actors (3.14) and
mala-style groups (1.54). Experts noted that the higher score for foreign actors is mostly due to
their involvement in illegal fishing. I nterestingly, there were no mafia-style groups identified
in any of the subregions in Oceania, except for Australia and New Zealand, where outlaw motorcycle
groups and gangs were assessed to have a firm hold over crime markets. Melanesia was again
identified as somewhat of an outlier in the wider region, holding the highest average score for all
three remaining criminal actor types — criminal
networks, and state-embedded and foreign actors. The stark difference in the score Por foreign
groups in Melanesia compared to Oceania's other three subregions supports the premise that the
SECTION 5 | Continental overviews and results 91

 

vulnerable to I UU fishing. Moreover, I UU fishing makes the negative impact of the illegal
practice all the more felt across communities in Oceania. The synthetic drug trade score, on the
other hand, reflects the lact Chat the region hosts one of the world's major consumer countries,
namely Australia. Combined with the large demand for synthetic drugs in New Zealand, smaller island
nations were identified as important emerging transport hubs in the synthetic drug trade.

 

 

4.14

 

 

 

 

 

subregion serves as a transit hub for different crime markets. Notably, however, there has been
collaboration between foreign actors on the one hand and domestic groups on the other. This
has not only developed criminal markets that foreign groups engage in but created new criminal
opportunities for loose networks and state- embedded actors to exploit.

In terms of resilience, most countries in Oceania score around 3.00, with the notable exceptions of
Australia and New Zealand, which feature higher average resilience scores 7.9ó and 8 38,
respectively. Australia and New Zealand (8.17), and the Polynesia subregion (3.ó4) feature Iow-
criminality and high-resilience, while the other
two subregions have lower resilience to organized crime: Micronesia averages 4.90 on resilience,
while Melanesia scores 4.71.

92 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

FIGURE 5.22
Resilience scores, Oceania

Political leadership and governance
Government transparency
and accountability
International cooperation National policies and laws Judicial system and detention
Law enforcement Territorial integrity

Anti-money laundering Economic regulatory capacity Victim and witness support
Prevention Non-state actors

 

 

 

Although Melanesia ranks higher for criminality than other subregions in Oceania and lowest on
resilience within the continent, when compared to the global average countries in this continent
nevertheless scored fairly well, with the exception of Papua New Guinea (3.42), the least resilient
country in Oceania. Experts identified the biggest obstacle to a more coherent approach to tackling
organized crime in the subregion to be lack of effective victim and witness support mechanisms.
That indicator averaged a score of 3.30, followed by ‘prevention’ and ‘economic regulatory
capacitv’, both averaging 4.10.

Along with territorial integrity, anti-money laundering was also an area where experts noted that
Melanesia requires significant improvements. I n Vanuatu, for example, it was revealed onlv

 

 

 

5.46

 

iol and social protection average

 

in 2021 that the ‘golden passports’ scheme in operation in the countrv has allowed thousands of
foreign nationals, including alleged gang members, crvptocurrencv thieves and extortionists, to
obtain citizenship in the island nation, permitting them to exploit the island's lax tax laws and
launder illicit proceeds.^*

For Micronesia, indicators such as ‘victim and witness support’ (3.00) and ‘prevention’ (3.ó3)
scored lower, as did the ability of these island nations to adequately regulate and manage the
economy (4.NO). In Polvnesia, the same three indicators appeared last, but in a different order.
‘Economic regulatory capacity’ in the subregion averaged 4.ó7, followed by‘victim and witness
support’ (4 83), ‘prevention’ and ‘political leadership and governance’ (both averaging a score of
5.00).

 

ii
nerabiJ:tv
cJassifications
Ínterpreting the criminality—
resilience nexus

- Vulnerability classifications: interpreting the criminality—resilience nexus 95

 

 

 

FIGURE 6.1

 

 

CRIMINALITY H Agh

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

High Criminality Low Resilience

 

 

 

 

oganledcrmehvebeenimÇemented.

96 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

FIGURE 6.2
Vulnerability classifications map

.« =«•í>_ " -
”^*g4••“”^*«
”+" . '.
- . ””
” * "“‹-

 

The findings reveal a number of insights into criminal markets, criminal actors and
resilience dynamics within national borders and transnationally. While scores and conclusions might
be of most interest to some, the process itself of score interrogation and reflection contributes
to the broader dialogue about the nature of organized crime and resilience that the Index aims to
generate.

As previously mentioned, there is no 'one-size-fits- all' resilience framework against organized
crime.
The contextual differences between countries and regions mean that states must harmonize
responses with their economic, cultural, geographic and political situations if they are to address
the threads they face in an effective way. What may be a successful response in one country may
have little to no effect in another, and even in the same country, response measures that may have
worked in the past, may not fully address evolving criminal trends.

Whereas organized crime can be dynamic and fast-evolving, response measures, by contrast, are often
slow endeavours. In the end, to have a long-term reduction of organized crime, states must garner
the political will, engage in sustained debate, build the evidence base and provide room for
non-state actors to contribute to the development and strengthening of multifaceted resilience
frameworks that are proactive and address the root causes of organized crime.

 

 

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Looking at either criminality dynamics or resilience frameworks in isolation limits stakeholders'
understanding of the complexity of organized crime and the ability to determine whether responses
are successful in addressing criminality in a given context. Therefore, the implications based on
the analysis of where criminality and resilience meet may be the most relevant. Because the Index
acknowledges that countries may start

SEC*ION Ó | Vulnerability classifications: interpreting the criminality—resilience nexus 97

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

High Criminality - Low Resilience High Criminality - High Resilience

 

 

out on an unequal footing, their current positions on a quadrant of criminality and resilience (see
Figure ó.1) are perhaps less valuable than how they move over time, which will be captured
in future iterations of the Index. The Index is therefore designed to provide policymakers and
other stakeholders with more insight into
emerging and evolving trends in criminality, as it will build on information over time.
By analyzing the distinct characteristics of countries that fall into each criminality—resilience
quadrant and taking into account contextual specificities, policymakers can identifi where common
strengths and weaknesses lie, in order to develop tailor-made responses that address the
criminality challenges faced by countries in each quadrant.

98 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Low criminality-high resilience
FIGURE 6.3
Low criminality-high resilience

 

 

 

 

 

85
LI4W

 

8

 

7 5 LU 4N

 

 

 

65

 

 

LT&
DE fl
é# KR
NL

TVO

8N HR

2 5 5 5
CRIMINALITY

 

M A(rico M Americas M Asia M Europe M Oceanía

 

 

Of the 193 countries in the world, NO (about 2Ó%) currently fall within this quadrant. From each
continent, these 50 countries can arguably be described as being in the most ideal situation when
it comes to facing organized crime. While they differ in the kinds of vulnerabilities they
individually face, and their economic capacity, these countries all nevertheless demonstrate that
they have built effective resilience frameworks to respond to criminality within their borders, in
line with international standards.

SEC*ION | Vulnerability classifications: interpreting the criminality—resilience nexus 99

 

 

 

 

In Africa for example, Ave countries — Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Rwanda and Senegal
— represent different corners of the African continent, but have each taken serious and appropriate
steps to combat organized crime, including in the form of targeted organized crime strategies,
resourcing law enforcement bodies, and the building of institutional and economic
frameworks, among others. Although there is room for improvement in certain areas of resilience
in each country, overall resilience measures are well-rounded and comprehensive. Notably,
‘non-state actors’ score a ó.00 or above in four of these countries, underscoring the undeniable
importante of civil society, the media and the private sector in successfully building resilience
to organized crime.

As the continent with one of the lowest overall criminality averages, it is unsurprising that a
large proportion of countries (24) in Europe fall into this quadrant. What may be more telling are
countries elsewhere Chat exhibit low criminality
and high resilience, but that are located in regions that experience high criminality. For example,
Costa Rica stands out markedly as the only country in this quadrant in Central America,
the region with the highest criminality average worldwide. The issue of organized crime has been
identified as a political priority for Costa Rica, which has established strong legal institutional
frameworks, rooted in transparency. While
Costa Rica's lower economic resilience indicator scores suggest room for improvement, the country
offers stronger social protections than its neighbours, including a dedicated office for victim
support, three main crime prevention programmes and high levels of media freedom.

 

 

 

 

Other countries, including Jordan and Singapore, also appear in this quadrant — both positive
outliers in their respective high-criminality regions. Both are more stable than their neighbours
and have implemented institutional frameworks that allow for robust international cooperation
mechanisms, comprehensive organized crime legislation and prevention initiatives.

One important consideration to take into account is that the assessment of a countrv's resilience
is associated with the criminal threat it faces. A look at Oceania illustrates this. While Samoa
and Tuvalu
do not feature the institutional strengths that other countries in the same continent have
implemented to address a range of criminal activities, their dedication to curb I UU fishing, as
the primary threat facing the region, is prioritized and sound.

Overall, lessons of best practices can be learned from the example of countries situated in this
quadrant, and more efforts should be made
to document and broadcast these success stories, enabling more countries to move into this
quadrant. In the case of countries currently identified as having law criminalitv and high
resilience, their position affords them the opportunity to serve as examples and leaders in their
regions through bilateral and multilateral cooperation and engagement.

100 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Low criminality-low resilience
FIGURE 6.4
Low criminality-low resilience

 

BGi
MT
MK '
5
DO

 

BD€Ñ €# l iC '
I @ TL

 

 

 

 

 

 

S5 CRIMINALITY

 

 

 

About 40% of the world's countries (77) are located in the low criminality, low resilience
quadrant. While current organized crime threads in these countries may be comparably minimal,
building resilience efforts should be forward-thinking and directed towards prevention. The Index
results show that organized crime is a ubiquitous and fast-evolving phenomenon. Hence, it is
important that resilience measures are put in place Chat can adequately
address new criminality dynamics, should they emerge. This is particularly true for countries that
share borders with neighbours classified as having high crime

SEC*ION | Vulnerability classifications: interpreting the criminality—resilience nexus 101

 

 

 

 

and low resilience. Prime examples of this are Greece, Angola, Bolivia and Djibouti.

Building border controls and law enforcement alone, however, does not enhance a country's overall
capacity to respond to organized crime, particularly if criminality dynamics appear within a
country's borders. lt is therefore imperative that states take a holistic approach by reinforcing
other institutional frameworks, including those Chat promote transparency and good governance,
while providing the space for non-state actors
to bring their unique strengths to tackle the root causes of crime.

Bolivia, for example, has lower levels of criminality than most countries in South America. lt
received

 

 

 

 

notablv high scores only for levels of illegality in the timber industry, illegal mining and
natural gas smuggling, and the cocaine trade, but received particularlv low scores for the human
smuggling, svnthetdicrugs, heroin and cannabis trades. The country has considerablv lower levels of
criminality than its immediate neighbours, although it ranks only 95th in the world for resilience.
Bolivia was assessed as having effective resilience mechanisms in key areas such as national
policies and laws,
and prevention, but at the same time deflciencies in areas like the judiciary and detention system.
Perhaps by prioritizing the strengthening of institutional and non-state frameworks identified by
the Index as ineffective or moderately effective, Bolivia could become a regional powerhouse in the
fight against organized crime.

102 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

High criminality-high resilience
FIGURE 6.5
High criminality-high resilience

 

 

 

 

T@

 

Z.’.

 

0 5 7 7 5 s
CRIMINALITY

 

 

Perhaps the least intuitive vulnerability quadrant features countries with high levels of
criminality, but that have also developed robust frameworks and mechanisms to counter organized
crime. Only nine countries in the world, from all the continents, were found to have simultaneously
high criminality and high resilience: Colombia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, South
Africa, Spain and the United States. What is immediately striking about these countries is that the
majority are among the economic powerhouses in their respective regions. The United States is the
world's largest economy; France, Italv and Spain are among the wealthiest countries in Europe, as
are South Africa and Nigeria in Africa. In Latin America, Colombia and Ecuador both feature in the

SEC*ION | Vulnerability classifications: interpreting the criminality—resilience nexus 103

 

 

 

 

Top six countries with the largest gross domestic product (GDP). Malaysia also has a strong and
dynamic economy, although comparably lower than other countries in the continent, like Japan, South
Korea and Indonesia. Although the countries located in the high criminality—high resilience
quadrant account for only less than 5% of countries worldwide, cumulatively they account for over a
third of global GDP.

Although the profiles ofthe countries located in this quadrant differ somewhat, with different
criminal actor types dominating, they are alike in the sense that they all host a wide range of
pervasive criminal markets and influential criminal actor types. Whereas some of these countries
are notable source countries for a whole host of criminal markets — none more so than the cocaine
trade in Colombia- others, notably the wealthier European countries, are major destination
countries in the transnational illicit economy, primarily the drug trade but also for other illicit
industries, such as human trafficking and human smuggling.

But what clearlv differentiates these major economies from countries such as Brazil, Mexico, China,
Kenva and numerous others, is that they also have robust and effective mechanisms and institutions
in place to tackle organized crime, albeit to varying degrees. Italy is a particularly interesting
case, for various reasons. As the birthplace of the traditional mafia, ltalv is home to among the
most
powerful organized crime groups, both domestically and overseas, having established strong working
relationships with CFiminal organizations around
the world, and infiltrating the country's political and economic landscape. However, as one ofthe
first ever countries to take the fight against the mala
to the forefront of the political agenda since the

 

 

 

 

1980s, Italy's institutional and non state response mechanisms have developed into some ofthe most
sophisticated in the world.

While it may appear counterintuitive for a country to simultaneously have high levels of resilience
to organized crime and experience high levels of organized crime, there are several potential
explanations. Certain countries with large economies and highly developed trade infrastructure may
be inherently vulnerable to organized crime due to the opportunities they present to criminal
actors. In such countries, it is consequently very challenging to build up the
necessary frameworks to bring levels of organized crime down to the lowest levels. Furthermore,
pervasive criminality is a significant stressor on
a country's resilience measures, and this can be seen in countries such as Nigeria, for example,
which has extremely high levels of criminality and is constantly on the cusp of falling into a
downward spiral. In countries in which resilience is constantly being shaped in an ad hoc manner,
where resilience is not structural, or deeply rooted within state institutions, or where it is
inelastic, there is the constant risk of the resilience mechanisms being overwhelmed. Thus, even in
countries where resilience is at the higher end of the spectrum, complacencv must be avoided to
present the weight of the organlzed crime landscape from snapping the elastic band of resilience.

104 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

High criminality-low resilience
FIGURE 6.6
High criminality-low resilience

 

_ cu_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
AE
IN G

i @ AL

i @ TH

 

VN @
G BR

 

' T Z RU

UA
OP

 

TR 0
gg pp

gG HN

 

¡ TJ

 

 

SY

 

 

6.5
75 8 85
CRIMINALITY
95 10

 

K A(rico K Americas K Asin K Europe K Oceonio

 

 

Spanning Europe, Asia, the Americas and Africa, the 57 countries in this quadrant exhibit
significant vulnerabilities to organized crime. As they face potent criminality threads,
deficiencies in resilience capacity make these countries especially vulnerable to criminality
dynamics becoming further embedded, with long-term economic and social impacts.

SEC*ION | Vulnerability classifications: interpreting the criminality—resilience nexus 105

 

 

 

 

Although not exclusivelv, countries in this quadrant tend to fall into two categories. Many in this
quadrant, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mozambique, Syria and the Ukraine, to name but a lew, are experiencing
long-standing conflict and fragility,
while other countries, Albania, Brazil, Mexico and Russia, among others, are more stable but their
democratic values and upholding of the rule of law have been compromised, thereby reducing their
ability to address organized crime effectively.

There is an enormous amount of research and literature on the crime—cont ict nexus, and on how
crime and conflict are mutually reinforcing. Conflict weakens social, economic and security
institutions' abilitv to provide goods and services, al lowlng for crimins l actors to f l l these
voids. At the same time, profit-making criminal activities may intertwine with war economies,
facilitating the continuation of conflict. Therefore, in many ways, it is unsurprising that a
number of fragile states and those experiencing conflict fall into this quadrant.

What may be less intuitive are those countries that are characterized as strong and stable, but
nevertheless fail to adequately respond to the criminal threats they face. In some cases, law
resilience capacity may be a product of lack
of political will to prioritize organized crime issues, while, in others, responses to criminality
either do not meet international human rights principles or it is the state itself Chat is engaged

 

 

 

in criminality, undermining its primary role as a protection provider. For example, the Philippines
was assessed as falling into this latter category. The country faces a particularly pervasive
svnthetic drugs market, where the prevalence of methamphetamine use is estimated to be among the
highest in the world. While the country has
tó kC’n d StKOD@ SUOCC’ d@diOSt OK@ó 0 iz 'd CKi MM,
experts assessed the implementation of the country's anti drug policy (its 'war on drugs’, which
has included extra-judicial killings) as contrary to fundamental human rights principles.

There is a tendencv in many of these countries to Focus on traditional responses to criminalitv,
such as criminal justice and security measures, but these efforts are inevitable compromised if
there is a lack of adherence to the rule of law. Addressing resilience deflcits, particularly those
that centre on governance, would be a meaningful goal for such countries, but in many cases would
be unrealistic to achieve without political will. States in this quadrant may therefore benefit
from expanding the space in which civil society, the media and private sector can operate. I ndeed,
of the 37 countries in this quadrant, half were assessed to have the ’non-state actors’ resilience
indicator
as either non-existent or extremely ineffective. Establishing other forms of resilience outside of
institutional frameworks could therefore help counterbalance and, in some cases, encourage better
state engagement.

106Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

FIGURE 6.7
Criminality and resilience – country classifications

 

10

 

9

 

8

 

7

 

6

 

5

 

4

 

3

 

2

 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CRIMINALITY

 

Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Oceania

 

 

Low criminality - high resilience (50 countries)

 

AD ANDORRA AR ARGENTINA AM ARMENIA AU AUSTRALIA AT AUSTRIA
BH BAHRAIN BB BARBADOS BE BELGIUM BW BOTSWANA
CV CABO VERDE
CA CANADA
CL CHILE
CR COSTA RICA
HR CROATIA
CZ CZECH REPUBLIC
DK DENMARK
EE ESTONIA
FI FINLAND
GE GEORGIA
DE GERMANY
IS ICELAND
IE IRELAND
IL ISRAEL
JP JAPAN
JO JORDAN
KR KOREA, REP.
KW KUWAIT
LV LATVIA
LI LIECHTENSTEIN
LT LITHUANIA LU LUXEMBOURG MU MAURITIUS
NL NETHERLANDS NZ NEW ZEALAND NO NORWAY
PL POLAND PT PORTUGAL QA QATAR
RO ROMANIA
RW RWANDA
WS SAMOA
SN SENEGAL SG SINGAPORE SI SLOVENIA
LC ST. LUCIA
SE SWEDEN
CH SWITZERLAND
TV TUVALU
GB UNITED KINGDOM
UY URUGUAY

› | Vulnerability classifications: interpreting the criminality—resilience nexus 107
Low criminality - low resilience (77 countries)

 

G DZ
G AO

0 Az
0 BS
0 BD
## BY
4N BZ
## BJ
4N BT
0 BO
0 BN
0 BG
4N BF
¥ Bl
‹N KM
g cG
0 CU
0 CY
4W DJ

ALGERIA ANGOLA
ANTI GUA AND
BARBUDA
AZERBAI JAN BAHAI ÍAS BANGLADESH BEL ARUS BELIZE
BENIN BHUTAN BOLIVIA BRUNEI BULGARIA
BURKINA FASO BURUNDI COMOROS CONGO, REP. CUBA
CYPRUS
DJIBOUTI

0 DI I DOMINICA
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
0 EG EGYPT
EQUATORTAL
GUINEA
G ER ERITREA G SZ ESWATINI G ET ETH IOPIA
0 FJ FIJI
G GA GABON G GM GAMBIA G GR GREECE G GD GRENADA G GN GUINEA
G GW GUINEA-BISSAU G GY GUYANA
0 H U HUNG ARY
0 KZ K A Z AK HSTAN
0 KI KIRIBATI
G KP KOREA, DPR

G KG KYRGYZ STAN
G LS LESOTHO G LR LIBERIA G MW MALAWI
G I"IV MALDIVES G I IT MALTA
0 I IH MARSHALL ISLANDS
G NIR MAURITAN ÍA
MICRONESIA
(FEDERATED STATES OF)
G I ID MOLDOVA
0 I IC MONACO
0 NN MONGOLIA
0 I ÍA MOROCCO G NA NAMIBIA G NR NAURU
NORTH MACEDONIA
G OM OMAN G PW PALAU
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

M SM
Si ST

 

 

 

M SR
M TL
M TG
M TO
M TT
M TN
M TM
M UZ
M VU
M z M

SAN MARINO
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
SEYCHELLES SIERRA LEONE SLOVAKIA SOLOMON ISLANDS SRI LANKA
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
ST. VINCENT AND THEGRENADINES
SURINAME TIRIOR-LESTE TOGO TONGA
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TUNISIA TURKMENISTAN UZBEKISTAN VANUATU ZAMBIA

 

High criminality - high resilience (9 countries)

 

M CO
M EC
M FR
COLOf'1BIA ECUADOR FRANCE
0 IT ITALY
G MY MALAYSI A
G NG NIGERIA
SOUTH AFRICA
G ES SPAIN
G US UNITED STATES

 

High criminality - low resilience (57 countries)

 

M AF
M AL
W BA

 

M CF
G TD
0 CN
AFGHANISTAN
ALBANIA
BOSNIA AND HER ZEGOVINA
BRAZIL CAMBODIA CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRCAN REPUBLIC
CHAD CHINA
CONGO, DEM. REP. CÓTE D‘IVOIRE
EL SALVADOR GHANA
0 GT GUATEMALA G HT HAITI
G HN HONDURAS
G IN INDIA
G ID INDONESIA
G IR IRAN
0 IQ IRAQ
G J M JAMAICA
0 KE KENYA
G LA LAOS
G LB LEBANON
G LY LIBYA
G MG MADAGASCAR G ML MALI
G MX MEXICO
G ME f'1ONTENEGRO
0 MZ MOZAMBIQUE G MM MYANf•1AR
0 NP NEPAL
G NI NICARAGUA
G NE NIGER
0 PK PAKISTAN
0 PA PANAMA G PY PARAGUAY
0 PE PERU
G PH PHILIPPINES
G RU RUSSIA
G SA SAUDI ARABIA
0 RS SERBIA G SO SOMALIA
0 SS
€# SD
## SY
& TJ
## TZ
## TH
‹N TR
‹N UG
€N UA
M AE
SOUTH SUDAN SUDAN
SYRIA
TAJIK ISTAN TANZANIA THAILAND TURKEY UGANDA UKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
VENEZUELA VIETNAM YEMEN ZIf'1BABWE

 

 

 

Crimina
markets,
and

 

 

Understanding
the relationships

C*ION | Criminality, markets, actors and resilience: understanding the relationships 109

 

 

Complex relationship between
criminality and resilience
Levels of criminality and levels of resilience to organized crime move together in opposite
directions. In other words, they are negatively correlated. That
is what the results of this Index show, and that is what is to be expected. The higher a country's
resilience to organized crime, the lower the likelihood it will experience organized crime; the
less resilient a country is to organized crime, the more criminality it will be beset by.
But the relationship between criminality and resilience is not quite as simple,
or linear, as itfirst seems. Globally, there are many countries that do not fit the pattern that is
most intuitive. As mentioned in the quadrant analysis, Colombia, Italy, the United States — these
are just a few ofthe countries that despite having robust mechanisms to counter organized crime,
continue to be afflicted by pervasive illicit economies. There are even more countries in the
opposite camp, those with low levels of resilience to organized crime but that are nonetheless not
particularly affected by criminality broadlv speaking. And the statistical analysis backs this up:
the correlation between criminality and resilience is only -0.45.

FIGURE 7.1
Criminality vs resilience

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-0.45

 

CRIMINALITY
8 9 40

110 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

In Africa, there are many countries more than hall — that are less resilient, but do not exhibit
high levels of criminality. A lot of these are developing countries, which constrains the state's
ability to put in place effective measures, but at the same time it means Chat they offer fewer
incentives
Por organized crime to flourish. Alternatively, if we look at the issue from another perspective,
countries that have not historicallv had extensiva levels of criminality have not had the stimulus
to develop adequate mechanisms to counter organized crime. Although far less common, there are also
countries such as Nigeria and South Africa Chat are fairlv resilient to organized crime, vet
also suffer from significant levels of criminality. In Africa, therefore, the link between a
country's criminality score and resilience score is even less straightforward. Indeed, the
correlation is
weak, atjust —0.29. In Europe, on the other hand, the relationship conforms lar more to common
expectations: higher resilience, less criminality and vice versa. In lact, Europe is the continent
for which the correlation between criminality and resilience is highest (—0.3ó).

No better is this finding exemplified than by the drug markets. There appears to be no relationship
between the heroin trade and acera I I resilience, or between the heroin trade and any of the
individual resilience indicators. The cannabis trade
is also not correlated with overa\l resilience and has only a weak negative correlation with seven
of the 12 resilience indicators. In lact, the cocaine trade appears to be positively correlated to
a
number of resilience indicators, albeit very weakly. These counterintuitive results may suggest the
pervasiveness of the four drug markets is fairly independent of how resilient a countrv is to
organized crime. Countries with high levels of resilience are just as likely to have pervasive drug
markets as countries with low levels of resilience. One possible explanation is that the criminal
market scores consider each country‘s role as a source, transit and destination country. In the
context of drug markets, producer and consumen countries might fall into very different resilience
categorias. For example, producer countries
might have a low score on resilience to organized crime, while consumen countries might have a high
score on resilience, which could explain the ambiguous relationships.

International cooperation is mother area where the relationship with criminality is somewhat
ambiguous. Countries with high levels of international cooperation do not necessarily have less
pervasive criminal markets than countries with low levels of international cooperation.
Colombia, for example, which has the highest score for international cooperation (9.0), also has

C*ION | Criminality, markets, actors and resilience: understanding the relationships

 

the second highest criminal market score (7.20). In lact, the three countries with the worst
criminal market scores, Mexico, Colombia and Nigeria, all score
7.0 and above on ’international cooperation’. This, however, is not to say that international
cooperation is of no tangible value in tackling organized crime. In lact, while many countries with
robust international cooperation mechanisms are still affected by high levels of criminality, there
are very lew countries
with poor international cooperation scores that do not suffer from at least
moderate levels of organized crime. Of the 28 countries with international cooperation scores lower
than 4, no fewer than 15 have high criminality. This flnding, therefore, is rather an indication of
the discrepancy between political rhetoric and tangible results in countering organized crime.

lt is important to remember, however, that criminality comprises two separate subcomponents: not
only does it capture the scope and scale of criminal markets in a country, but it also assesses the
strength and influence of various tvpes of criminal actors. And the results of the Index show that
while the pervasiveness of illicit economies in a country is associated with resilience levels to a
certain degree, it is actuallv the power of criminal actors that is more stronglv related
to a country's resilience to organized crime. And the one type of criminal actor at the root of
that? State-embedded actors: countries in which state-embedded actors are less prominent are lar
more likely to have greater resilience to organized crime (the correlation is —0.74). This is
hardly surprising, given state
actorsroIeindeterminngacountvspoIiciesandIavvs,butitdoesre-emphasize once more that one of the most
significant impediments to an effective counter- organized crime strategy is the presence of
criminal actors in state institutions.

 

 

 

BOX 3
Criminal markets and criminal actors
As logic dictates, when criminal groups exert strong int uence over communities, criminal markets
are more likely to be widespread.
While this holds true for most countries, there are some exceptions. Jamaica and Somalia, for
instante, have smaller criminal markets but much more dominant criminal actors. Thus, one might
expect that the impact of criminal actors on society and the state would be lar greater in both
countries than that of the suite
" of markets considered by the Index. There

 

-

 

are two broad explanations here. First, the
structure of the Index is such that countries _
with a range of moderately prevalent markets ”
will come out worse than states with one or
two extremely pervasive ones. Second, it “
might boil down to the simple fact that the _ criminal actor scores reflect all criminality
in
which groups are involved, while the criminal ”- markets score stands only on 10 types of
criminality, excluding crime types that may be
quite pervasive in specific contexts. “

112 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Crime convergence
Broadly speaking, there are two types of criminal markets: those that are almost ubiquitous, albeit
to varying degrees of intensity, and what could be described as more 'niche' markets. Across
the world, it is these former markets that where pervasive, are indicative of the prevalence of a
broad range of illicit economies. Human trafficking in particular, but also human smuggling, arms
trafficking and non-renewable-resource crimes are such markets. Indeed, the correlations between
these four markets and the overall criminal market score are all high, ranking between 0.73 and
0.78.
By contrast, the cocaine trade, for example, is onlv weakly correlated to criminal markets (0.34),
which implies that the extent of the cocaine trade is independent of the existente or lack thereof
of other criminal markets. lt is entirely plausible that
countries with large cocaine consumption markets are economically developed nations where demand
for drugs is high, but resilience to other types of
CKi MiOd lÍt$ iS dISO StKOO@C’r.

There have been many studies exploring the phenomenon of crime convergence — the extent to which
there is an overlap between various forms of organized crime, as well as the networks involved in
them. The most obvious example
of an overlap in criminal markets is between human trafficking and human smuggling (see Figure
7.2). While these illegal industries are two separate and distinct types of organized crime, the
lines between them bre often blurred. There is considerable evidente to suggest that what may begin
as human smuggling very often transforms into various manifestations of human trafficking,
and Chat those travelling across borders irregularlv aided by smuggling networks are simultaneously
highly vulnerable to trafficking along the way.^' The Index results lend further credence to this,
as the correlation between the two is 0 77. Of course, not all countries follow the pattern, in
particular
in Africa. Guinea, for example, is a country where forced begging, child labour, trafficking for
the purposes of sexual exploitation and many other forms of trafficking are rife, but where the
human smuggling industry is fairly underdeveloped.

 

Another sphere in which there is considerable convergence is the environmental crimes sector, more
specifically between flora crimes and fauna crimes. Of the 13 countries scoring 8 or above for
flora crimes, almost 70% also had a score of 7 or higher for fauna crimes. In other words,
countries with pervasive illegal logging, for example, are also far likelier to play an important
role in the illegal wildlife trade, a fl nding backed up bv the strong correlation between these
two criminal
markets (0.71). A reason for the strong association between the two might be the geographic overlap
OK SOUFCC’ COU Ot FiCS. Si M §l'y' §Uf, COU nfMCS With
high biodiversity in hora might also have high diversity in fauna, thus, attracting illicit trade
in both. Set not all countries Tt the mould. Countries might score high for one but not the other
if there are destination markets on lv for one, for instante. While these two criminal markets are
strongly correlated with each other, their relationship to other criminal markets, with the
exceptúan of non- renewable resources, is weak or non-existent.
The moderate correlation between flora and non renewable resources (0.48), as well as fauna and
non-renewable resources (0.43), suggests that the exploitation of and illicit trade in different
types of natural resources tend to overlap geographicallv.

Another moderately strong relationship is found between arms trafficking, and human smuggling
(0.ó3) and human trafficking (0.óó). Looking at countries that score high across all three markets,
it is evident that armed conflict is the common denominator. This set of countries includes Libya,
Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan among others, where arms trafficking has a severe influence on nearly
all elements of society (8.3 and above), and human trafficking and smuggling are equally pervasive
(with scores between 8 0 and 9.3). Armed conflict forces people to lee and seek assistance from
human smugglers in the process, making them vulnerable to human trafficking. At the same time,
criminal actors might profit from and perpetuate all three illicit markets.

SECTION 7 | Criminality, markets, actors and resilience: understanding the relationships

 

FIGURE 7.2
Human trafficking vs human smuggling

 

0.77

9 - - -- -- - - - - - -'- - - - -- - - -"- --- - - -*'- - - -- -0 -

8

7

 

 

 

 

 

 

5 6 7 8 9 0
HUMAN SMUGGLING

M A(rico M Americas M Asia M Europe M Oceanía

 

What about the drug markets? The relationship between the four drugs markets and other criminal
markets is less straightforward. For the most part, whether a country plays a major role in the
context of any particular drug market does not tell us much about the propensity for other forms of
organized crime to proliferate in that country.
This is particularly true for cocaine. The weak — and in most instances non-existent — correlations
between the cocaine trade and other criminal markets are an indication of that.

Even between the drug markets, there isn't much evidence to suggest that there is a particularly
clear pattern of movement. There are no links at all between the cocaine trade and the heroin or
the synthetic drug trade, and the relationships between most ofthe other drug markets are
not much stronger. There are two pairs of drug markets, however, that stand out: cannabis and
cocaine, and heroin and synthetic drugs. Both these pairs have moderate positive correlations,
which could be explained by the lact that either the producen countries or destination markets for
these related drugs are similar, but it may lend also further support to the argument that there is
an increasing overlap in the routes and actors used for these pairs. The criminal actors involved
in trafficking heroin and synthetic drugs, for example, may be one and the same.^^ While the Index
offers no definitive reasons as to why countries with more pervasive cocaine markets are more
likely to have larger cannabis markets, or why significant heroin hotspots also tend to feature a
high degree of synthetic drug activity, they do raise some important questions.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Who is doing what?
Around the world, criminal networks are ubiquitous, from wildlife poachers in East Africa, to arms
traffickers in Western Asia and drug syndicates in Central America. These groups are the conduits
for moving goods illicitly, regardless of the commodity, on a global scale. lndeed, criminal
networks are the actor type that shows the strongest correlation with the overall criminal markets
score (0.75). In other words, criminal networks appear to be a common denominator across most
illicit economies.

There may also be certain types of organized crime that particular criminal actors are more easily
able to engage in. To take the non-renewable-resource sector, for instance, it is fairly logical
that state-embedded actors may play a key role in criminal activity surrounding the market, given
that a large proportion of oil companies and precious metal mines, for example, around the world
are state-owned. Arguably, therefore, when state entities are the only actor type to exert
oversight over the sector, it allows them more opportunity for misconduct, including corruption or
outright involvement in illegal extraction and smuggling of resources. lndeed, the correlation
between state- embedded actors and non-renewable-resource crimes is among the highest (0.ó3).

Foreign criminal actors are also an influential component of the organized crime landscape in many
countries, and arguably increasingly so since the new millennium. With the globalization of
criminal actors carne the globalization of crime. But the

C*ION | Criminality, markets, actors and resilience: understanding the relationships

 

relationship between the prevalence of foreign attracted to countries where criminal markets
are criminal actors in a country and particular illicit already firmly established. This is in
line with the economies is complex. Human trafficking may be weak to moderate relationships
between foreign controlled by domestic actors in one part of the actors and other criminal actor
tvpes included in world but bv syndicates operating transnationally the Index, especially
mala-style groups and state- in another; the illicit trade in synthetic drugs in embedded
actors, suggesting that foreign actors one border community may be dominated by do not
necessarily always complement other trafficking networks across the border, whereas criminal
actor types. One possible explanation
the drugs may be distributed at retail level by may be Chat foreign criminal actors are
influential street gangs in another countrv. The key point primarily in the early stages of the
development here is that there isn't any clear pattern with of a criminal market, when they
are needed to regard to the kinds of activities in which foreign break into the international
market. Over time, criminal actors are involved. Indeed, the data local criminal actors become
stronger and crowd shows that correlations between foreign actors out foreign criminal actor
groups, unless there are and most criminal markets are weak. This may certain conditions
present, such as a large number suggest that foreign actors are not necessarily of expatriates,
for example.

 

Multifaceted response required
Whether it is in the context of tackling cáimate are crucial elements in the success of both,
the change, poverty, conflict, radicalization or any of strong relationship between these two may
also the myriad social ills that plague the earth, experts indicate that a political leadership
stance against often agree that what is required is a multifaceted organized crime is considered
more effective response to ensure effectiveness. Combating in countries where government
transparency organized crime is no different. Although all is higher. 'Victim and witness
support', and countries perform better in some respects 'prevention' are also strongly
correlated (0.85). than in others in terms of combating organized Both indicators reflect
government taking the crime, a clearly identiflable pattern is Chat strong protection of its
citizens seriously, by providing performances in some resilience indicators are them with care
and protective services. This closely linked to better performances in other close relationship
suggests that governments areas, Reading to an overal I more robust resilience Chat focus on one
are likely to make an effort to to criminality. This is corroborated by the strong improve the
other as well.
correlations not only between the 12 resilience
indicators and a country's overall resilience score, In the case of 'non-state actors’, besides
the but among the resilience indicators themselves, space that authorities allow for the media
which lends support to the notion Chat building and NGOs to function freely, this indicator
effective resilience to organized crime requires a also takes into account the vibrancy of civil
multi-sectoral approach to ensure success. society and their ability to function despite
existing pressure from governments. There The strongest pairwise correlation is between are
numerous examples of countries with weak 'political leadership and governance', and state
structures, institutions and frameworks ‘government transparency and accountability’ that
nonetheless are home to dedicated social (0.87). Although there is a strong overlap activists,
community leaders and journalists, between these two indicators, in that the absence from Burkina
Faso and the DRC to Belarus,
of corruption and state involvement in criminality Mexico, Haití and Myanmar, to name but a lew.

 

 

 

?usceptibiJity
organized crime and driversof

SEC*ION 8 | Susceptibility to organized crime and drivers of resilience 117

 

 

Economic, geographic and political vulnerabilities
The Global Organized Crime Index is the first tool of its kind that allows us to examine the
pervasiveness of criminal markets and criminal actor tvpes per countrv, as well as the strength and
effectiveness of resilience mechanisms. However, the rich dataset allows us to go much further than
just assessing the scores — the lay ofthe land, so to speak —and actually probe further by
examining what may be the key factors associated with levels of criminalitv and resilience.
This section examines the relationship between the headline scores ofthe Index and several key
economic and geographic indicators. For example, are richer nations more likely to experience
higher levels of organized crime? Do poorer countries tend to have less robust institutional
frameworks to combat it? Do smaller and larger countries differ from one another in any meaningful
wav with regard to the pervasiveness of illicit economies?

What makes a country more vulnerable to organized crime?
One ofthe kev findings of this research is that nearly 80% of the world's population live in
countries with high levels of criminality while nearly 80% live in countries with low resilience to
organized crime. That is not to say, however, that population size is a determining factor of
criminality, but rather a matter of
impact. Populations that live in an environment with a high incidente of organized crime are
particularly vulnerable to criminal influence, which, if not addressed adequately, can permeate the
political, social, economic and security spheres of communities, becoming embedded in societies and
leaving little room for formal, legal and legitimate activities to gain traction.

The relationship between certain macroeconomía indicators, such as unemploy- ment or inequality,
and organized crime is fairly straightforward: tackle the former, and you are likely to see a
reduction in the Iatter.^° But the impact of other indicators on levels of criminality in a country
may be more ambiguous.
Do wealthier nations, for example, tend to attract more organized crime than their developing
counterparts? Rich countries are likely to have a number of characteristics that may make them more
susceptible to criminal exploitation, such as an abundante of natural resources, or highly
developed trade infrastruc- ture, for example. On the other hand, however, thev are also better
equipped to tackle organized crime, and have at their disposal the resources to present it in the
first place by reducing the incentives — or the need — to engage in organized crime. That said, the
types of crimes that often plague wealthy nations, such as economic crimes, are not yet
specificallv captured bythis Index. Their inclusion may, in turn, tip the scales of criminality.

118 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Looking at the global picture, the Index data suggests that there is no relationship between the
size of an economy and the level of criminality
that economy will experience.^^ In other words, on
Can a relationship between GDP per capita and criminality be detected? Is the prosperity of the
average person in a country somehow linked
to its levels of criminalitv? This time, there is a

average, richer nations are no more or less likelv
negative albeit weak (—0.35-) relationship

to have a high criminalitvscore than less wealthy states. However, examining each continent
separately, the picture looks somewhat varied.^^ Whereas for the Americas and Asia, the global
finding of no statistically significant relationship between GDP and criminality holds; within
Africa and Europe, however, the results suggest that there is a positive correlation between the
two indicators. In Africa and Europe, therefore,
larger economies tend to experience higher levels of organized crime. lndeed, of the 13 largest
economies in Africa, nine have a criminality score of above Ó, including the DRC, Nigeria, Kenva,
South Africa, and Libya, among others. Similarly,
a number of the largest European economies also have relatively pervasive illicit economies and
influential criminal actors, not least Russia, but also Italv, France and Spain, among others.
This notwithstanding, the correlation coefficients for Africa and Europe are fairly weak (0 33 and
0.31, respective!v), which suggests that higher GDP does not always necessarilv indicate higher
criminality, for which some of the opposing forces described above may be partial explanations.
Indeed, there are a number of exceptions, such as Montenegro and Central African Republic,
whose economies rank among the smallest in their continents, yet they experience among the highest
levels of criminality.
between the two, meaning Chat on average, higher levels of wealth per capita are associated with
lower levels of organized crime in a country. This may be explained bv the lact Chat citizens with
less disposable income mav be less able to access formal economic opportunities, leasing them with
little choice but to engage in the informal sector, which is often highly interlinked with
OrganiZed criminal activitv. Nevertheless, the weak correlation suggests there are other forces at
play. I ndividuals with higher earnings, for example, may have the funds to purchase expensive
illicit commodities, such as cocaine, heroin and exotic wildlife species. Moreover, as
with GDP, there is a degree of variation across the continents. In Europe, for example, the
strength of the relationship can be described as moderate, whereas in the Americas, there is in
lact no
Stdt ISIiCd ll Si@D ÍÉ Cd Ot COFA€'ldt iOS.

Geographic and demographic indicators were also assessed to examine the degree to which land and
population size could be factors
that influence levels of criminality. While the results End a positive relationship between these
indicators and criminality, the strength of the relationships is verv weak. Nevertheless, examining
the world's smallest countries does provide some interesting results.

SEC*ION 8 | Susceptibility to organized crime and drivers of resilience 119
BOX 4
Small states and low criminality

Small states, as measured by their land size, do appear to be less prone to organized crime.^7 Most
small states (93%) fall within the ’low criminality’ category, with an overall average score of
3.54, which is substantially lower than the global average of 4.87. This is driven bythe fact that
criminal markets and criminal actors are assessed to be far less pervasive in small states.
Countries like Liechtenstein (1.88), Luxembourg (2.3ó) and Monaco (2.43), for example, all have
very low criminality scores. But why do these microstates appear to be less vulnerable to organized
crime?

Firstly, small states may be less attractive to criminal groups in the first place. Due to their
limited land size, they may have fewer natural resources to exploit than larger countries (see page
54 for a related discussion on island states, which share many of the same characteristics, and
often in lact constitute, small states). Almost two-thirds of small states score either 1or 1.5 for
flora crimes, with only four countries scoring 4 or higher. The picture is similar with regard to
non-renewable resource crimes, where half of the countries score 1.5 or below. In other words, the
non-renewable resource market is non-existent
in half of the world's small states. lt is important to note, however, that where states have lew
natural resources to exploit, including arable land for example, their economies often rely almost
exclusively on service industries. Highly developed financial and banking sectors, in turn, are
facilitators of illicit financial flows, which are
not included as a standalone criminal market in the Index. As a result, the full extent of
criminality in small states, many of which, such as Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Malta and the
Seychelles, are among the world's largest money laundering hubs, is not captured under the Index.
In addition to the fact that smaller nations are less
likely to have natural resources to exploit, they
are also likely to have lar smaller consumption markets for illicit goods, by virtue of their
smaller populations. Moreover, the fact that these countries have smaller diasporas and smaller
communities as a whole means that it is generally more difficult to conceal criminal activity among
the legitimate. lt is for this reason, perhaps, that in those small states that are in fact prone
to organized crime, the criminality tends to follow
a top-down development path catalyzed by systematic clientelism and patronage networks, which often
develop into outright corrupt practices and other forms of criminality.

Together, these factors are considerable limitations in small countries on the profits available to
criminal actors. Furthermore, from an enforcement perspective, state surveillance may be stronger
in these tiny nations. Shooter land borders and coastlines, a smaller surface area, and a
potentially higher population density may mean that small states are simply easier to
monitor by security agencies than larger countries, constraining transnational organized crime
groups’ ability to penetrate them.

There are, however, a few exceptions. Lebanon and Jamaica, for example, are both small states that
experience considerable levels of organized criminality, scoring ó.7ó and 5.91 respectively. Some
countries, while limited in size, may be more vulnerable to organized crime due to their geographic
positioning, either because they
are surrounded by states heavily affected by organized crime, or because they are strategically
located along major illicit trade routes (as is the case with the two examples above). Furthermore,
the impact of criminality may be felt more acutely in small states, as the ramifications can
quickly spread across the entire country.

120 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Africa meanwhile appears to stand out as the only continent in which both greater land area and
larger populations are fairly strongly associated with higher criminality. In other words, while in
most regions around the world countries are no more or less likely to be afflicted bv organized
crime, regardless of their land size or population, in Africa, larger countries, and countries with
bigger populations are more
likely to score higher on the criminality component of the Index. One explanation may be that
biodiversity
in Africa is greater than in other continents, so it is only logical that bigger countries would
have a greater abundante of biodiversity and natural
resources, which means there is greater opportunity for criminal exploitation. Moreover, weaker
governance and heightened insecurity in parts of Africa, in addition to hostile natural geography,
may predispose larger countries on the continent to be more difficult to control, with territory
that makes them harder to patrol.

FIGURE 8.1
Correlation coefficients between criminality and selected indicators, by continent

M

lb*

 

 

 

 

 

 

CRIMINALITY

 

 

 

0.19

 

 

 

408

1 B

 

CRIMINALITY
-0.35 i
6

 

 

° ¿. 0.20
" e_ _ ’_

 

K K 400

 

CRIMINALITY

M A(rica M American M Asia M Europe
6
CRIMINALITY

M Oceanía

 

lote: Only stotistically signi(cont correlations are reported.

SEC*ION 8 | Susceptibility to organized crime and drivers of resilience 121

 

Are certain types of countries more resilient?

 

However, when looking at GDP per capita, the opposite is true. The overall correlation between the
latter and resilience is moderately strong,
Turning to the resilience component, the results of t 0 3 , and this relationship holds across
the the correlation analysis illustrate a slightly different AMC’FiCas, Asia and Europe. There
are various
picture. While the relationship between GDP r.d potential explanations for this finding. In
countries
criminality is negligible throughout most of the In which the provision of basic services, such
as world, there is a positive relationship between C 0 water, food, education and healthcare,
are GDP and resilience, albeit a very weak one (0.20). aranteed for the overwhelming majority
of This is driven primarily by the countries in Africa, the population, governments have greater
time however. In short, only in Africa are countries with and resources at their disposal to
dedicate to larger economies likely to have higher resilient.: the strengthening of
institutional and non-state in other continents, there is no such association. ”dmeworks that
counter organized crime. There Some of the world's largest economic powerhouses also be
indirect mechanisms Chat could
do have high levels of resilience to organized crime. 888tÍaIIy explain the strong link. For
example, that
The United States is one example. The country democracies tend to have higher GDP per capita,
wealth and role as a global leader have meant that dnd democracies on average have much higher it
has the resources to strengthen responses to ' Vels of resilience, could be one plausible thesis
organized crime, despide the range of illicit activities ( OO the following section for further
exploration of
occurring within its borders. Although this can help the links between the Index's headline scores
and explain the United States' higher resilience score, levels of democracy, as well as other
indicators). I n the same cannot be said for other global economic Africa, however, there is no
correlation between leaders, such as China and Russia, for example, h average wealth of
citizens and their countrv's which have low resilience as well as high criminalit, resilience to
organized crs me.
FIGURE 8.2
Resilience by income group

High income

 

Upper middle income

 

Lower middle income

 

Low income

 

RESILIENCE

122 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Finally, unlike for criminality, the results from the correlation analysis show that there is no
correlation between either land area or population size and resilience. Countries of all shapes and
sizes have managed to build up robust mechanisms to combat organized crime, from Singapore
and Iceland to Canada and Australia, just as countries with relatively low levels of resilience
have considerable differences in terms of size and population, such as the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example. The Americas, however, are somewhat of an outlier in
this respect, in that the results show a positive correlation, al beit a weak one, between
resilience and land area (0.37). That is to say, larger countries across the Americas tend to have
higher levels of resilience, with Canada, the United States and Argentina the obvious driving force
— although these are likely to have high resilience for reasons other than their size.

FIGURE 8.3
Correlation coefficients between resilience and selected indicators, by continent

 

 

 

 

 

 

RESILIENCE

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 3 5 6 7 8 9
RESILIENCE
RESILIENCE

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 3 5 6 7 8 9
RESILIENCE

 

M A(rico M Americas M Adio M Europe M Oceanía

Note: Only stotistica//y signi#cont
correlations are reported.

SEC*ION 8 | Susceptibility to organized crime and drivers of resilience 123

 

Democracy, development, fragility, corruption

The previous section outlined how the Index allows us to examine potential relationships between
criminality, resilience and a number of economic, geographic and demographic indicators.
Correlations between the Index's headline scores and other global índices were also tested to
explote any potentially interesting findings. These allow
us to examine whether organized crime links to issues such as corruption and fragility, and whether
democratic states are more resilient to organized crime than authoritarian states. For this
analysis, the following índices were assessed:
› Human Development Index 2019
› Democracy Index 2020
› Freedom in the World Index 2021
› Global Peace Index 2020
› Corruption Perceptions Index 2020
› Fragile States Index 2021

Crime thrives in all manner
of places
Looking first at the criminalitv component of the Index, a notable finding is Chat while there is a
levels of resilience than authoritarian states. The correlation with the Democracy Index, however,
is also weak (—0.38), suggesting that high levels of democracy are associated with lower levels of
criminalitv in a country, but that the relationship between the two is by no means unambiguous.
There are several Western democracias Chat also have high levels of criminality, including Spain,
France, the United States and Italy; and other nations around the world, notably Panama, which
scores a high 7.18 on the Democracy Index, but which also has a high criminality score of ó.68 on
the Index.
Finally, the strength of the relationship between criminalitv and the Freedom in the World Index is
also similar (-0.37). That index ranks countries and territorios on the basis of their political
rights and civil liberties. In other words, the greater the political rights and civil liberties of
citizens in a country, the less likely organized crime is to be pervasive.

Regarding the link between organized crime, conflict and fragility, the argument is often made that
organized crime is a key factor in creating the conditions for the onset of civil conflict, mass
§FOtCStS, ViOlCnCC dnd @COCFü llY fFáCtiOUS SOCiC’tiCS.*
Using the Index dataset, we can see that criminality is in fact moderately correlated with peace
and fragility (—0.ó3 and 0.57, respectively). Examining the criminality rankings, a signiflcant
proportion of

negativa correlation with the Human Development
countries scoring highes-t most notably countries

Index, the relationship is fairly weak (—0.35). This lends credence to the notion that organized
crime is a highly complex phenomenon Chat exploits a host of different conditions. Thus, while the
results suggest that less developed countries do tend to have somewhat higher levels of organized
crime, the variation between them is considerable. This
in part can be due to the substantial number of different factors, both on the supply and demand
side of illicit economies that make countries vulnerable to organized criminal activity.

Meanwhile, the Index results show that countries categorized as full democracies exhibit higher
in Africa and the Middle East —are those that are currently, or have been until very recently, in
conflict. The DRC, the countrv with the highest criminality score, has been mired in violence,
instability and conflict for the best part of the past 23 years.
Meanwhile, several other countries featuring in the top 20 for criminality, including Colombia,
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Central African Republic, Syria and Libya, are also experiencing or have
experienced conflict in recent times. Moreover, of the 20 worst performing countries in the Fragile
States Index,
16 are assessed to have high levels of criminality.
The reasons for which fragility has not translated
into diffuse criminal markets in the remaining four

124 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

countries in that index are not obvious and are likely to be different depending on the nation, but
possible explanations are the degree of authoritarianism,
or simply the small size of some of those countries. The Global Peace Index provides a similar
picture: Malaysia is the only country in the 20 best- performing countries to have a high
criminality score on the Index.

Lastly, corruption is perhaps one ofthe major enabling factors of organized crime. The analvsis
shows that there is a moderate positive correlation (0.57) between criminality and perceptions
of corruption, as captured by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Corruption and organized crime have
long been understood to go hand in hand,^*
so these results are to be expected. From Iow-IeveI corruption in law enforcement bodies, to
impunity within the judicial system resulting from bribery, all the way up to political elites'
direct involvement in illicit economies, corruption is often the lifeblood of organized criminal
activity. Therefore, that the correlation between the criminality score and the Corruption
Perceptions Index is only moderately positive may appear somewhat weaker than expected, for which
there may be several potential reasons. Firstly, the Corruption Perceptions
Index is, as the name suggests, a perceptions- based index, ranking countries according to how
pervasive corruption is perceived to be by experts and businesspeople, rather than measuring it
according to any objective measures. Furthermore, the index captures several aspects of corruption
that are covered not by the Global OF@aniZed Crime Index's criminalitv component, but by the
resilience component (which will be explored in
the subsequent section), such as the effective prosecution of corruption officials or effective
oversight mechanisms.’"Nevertheless, the positive correlation between the two indicators does
lend further evidente to the interconnectedness Of OFgdDÍZOd crime and corruption. Indeed, the
state-embedded actors indicator of the Index has a strong positive correlation with the Corruption
Perceptions Index, at0.82.

Although the correlations between criminality and the above mentioned índices are statistically
significant and moderately strong, they are bv no means indicative of an unambiguously direct
linear relationship. This is perhaps a reflection of the complexity ofthe phenomenon of organized
crime, which to a certain degree can take hold in
countries of all shapes and sizes, with all manner of political systems and varying degrees of
stability. For example the differing nature of countries as either origin, transit or destination
states (or a combination ofthe three) is likely to be an important factor in
the absence of a standout and clear-cut explanation for which conditions make a country more likely
to suffer from higher levels of organized crime.

Good governance and political stability are key to enhancing resilience
The relationships discernible between resilience and the selected índices listed above are much
stronger. A key finding ofthe analysis is Chat the (negativa) correlation between resilience and
organized crime and corruption is very strong (—0.90). Countries with high levels of perceived
corruption are therefore highly likely to also have low levels of resilience.
This is due in large part to the very wide gamut that corruption runs, from the highest levels of
government to the judiciary, prison systems, border control and other law enforcement agencies, as
it eroded the frameworks and mechanisms needed to combat organized crime effectivelv.

A similarly strong negative correlation is found between resilience and state fragility (—0 87).
Countries mired in conflict, or facing extreme
§OlitiCó I, SCCUFit$ dnd SOC|al §FCSSUr€'S, ó FC MUCh lCSS
likely to have high levels of resilience to organized crime for several possible reasons. At the
most basic level, if a country is engaged in a civil conflict, for example, the state's overriding
priority will in all likelihood be to tackle the immediate threat
of violence. Furthermore, if there is an ongoing struggle between the government and other armed
factions, effective control over territory as wellas social cohesion are likely to be weakened,
both of which are key in developing an effective

SEC*ION 8 | Susceptibility to organized crime and drivers of resilience 125

 

response to organized crime. These hvpotheses are also supported by the finding of a strong
positiva correlation between resilience and peace (0.ó9).

Resilience also has a strong relationship with human development, with a correlation of0 77. This
finding suggests Chat although OrganiZed crime can affect countries at all levels of human
development, countries at the bottom ofthe Human Development Index rankings are far less likelv to
be resilient to organized crime. Whether resilience to organized crime leads to a higher Human
Development Index score or vice versa is not clear, but what is apparent is the strong link between
the two.

Finallv, are democracies more resilient to organized crime than states with more authoritarian
tendencies?Are countries where, for example, political rights and civil liberties are plentiful
better equipped to tackle organized criminal activity?

FIGURE 8.4
Resilience by regime type

Full democracy (22 countries)

 

Flawed democracy (52 countries)

 

The correlation between the Democracy Index and the resilience score is strong, at0.79, suggesting
that the higher the levels of democracy, the better the resilience score. Likewise, with a
correlation coefficient of 0 75, it is clear that levels of freedom enjoyed by citizens is strongly
associated with resilience to organized crime. Perhaps the most obvious explanation for this strong
relationship
is the degree of transparency manifested by governments. Countries exhibiting lack of transparency
at the upper echelons of the political elite are inherently more susceptible to individuals
embedded within the state engaging in illicit activity. Furthermore, as the bastion of liberal
democracies, freedom ofthe press is likely to be an important driver of the strong relationship. A
free press that is able to robustly question, investigate, report on and hold to account political
and criminal elites (and the overlap between the two) is much more common in democratic states than
in authoritarian ones.

 

 

Hybrid regime
(54countries)

 

 

Authoritarian
(56 countries

y’’ yy

 

RESILIENCE

126 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Figure 8.4, which is a distribution of the Index resilience scores by regime type, il I ustrates
the clear pattern of democratic states having higher resilience than authoritarian ones. Of the top
20 countries in the resilience ranking, IS are classified as full democracies by the Economist
Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, two are not included in that index, and the remaining three
countries Chat are included Estonia, Singapore and Latvia- are considered flawed democracies.7'
At the other end of the resilience spectrum, 82% of countries with the 20 lowest resilience scores
are authoritarian states. However, there is a considerable degree of variation within the regime
types, in particular when one moves away from either extremity of the resilience scale. A number of
Gulf countries, for example, which are classified as authoritarian states, also receive a high
resilience score on the Index, as do other nations in Africa and the Middle East, such as Rwanda
and Jordan. Another country that appears to buck
the trend is Suriname which, while appearing in the Top 30% of the Democracy Index scores, has one
of the lowest resilience scores in the world. Similarly, compared to the other states around the
world classified as full democracies, Costa Rica has a relatively low resilience score.

A state's political and governance systems may have important structural consequences in terms of
its ability to mount an effective response to organized crime. One unique characteristic ofthe
United States, for example, is the independence and distribution of power among its governance
structures. Whereas in many other countries regional and local governance structures are tasked
with certain roles and duties, their powers are limited bythe purview of national government. By
contrast, the United States (as well as many other countries around the world) is founded on the
principles of federalism, whereby powers are
shared between the federal and state governments.
These dynamics create another duality that poses challenges to scoring under the Index.

For example, the US was assigned a state- embedded actors score of 5, capturing the
S@CCt FUM Of StátC C'n@d@CMCnf i n i ll ÍCiF áCt iVi f iC S,
fromisolated cases of corruption to direct engagement in illicit activities, from local
officials up to the highest echelons of the federal government. These dynamics have important
implications for a state s resilience. For example, the US scored 5.3 on 'government transparency
and accountabilitv'. This mid-point score
reflects both the strengths and deficiencies of the countrv's institutions at all levels. As the
Index captured the year 2020, during which much attention was focused on the previous
administration and allegations of corruption at the federal level, experts noted the importance and
value brought by officials at state and local levels.

The purpose of the analysis presented in this section is not to conclusively determine causal
mechanisms explaining levels of criminality and resilience in a country. However, the robust
dataset provided by the Index does allow users to start thinking in greater depth about what kinds
of factors may play a role in organized crime and
the state‘s ability to counter it. The results suggest that while there are certain country
characteristics
— economic, political and geographic — that may be associated with higher criminalitv, such as
lower GDP per capita or a larger population, the
phenomenon of organized crime is so complex and nuanced that there is no definitive explanation
for the different strengths and vulnerabilities
across the world. \/\/here certain f actors mcv be strongly associated with a particular Level of
criminality in one region, they muy have no
bearing on criminalitv in another. These results serve to emphasize the need for on-the-ground
analysis and tailored responses to the issue of illicit economies and OK@aniZed criminal actors.

. ' Susceptibilit y to orpanized crime and drivers of resilience 127

 

FIGURE 8.5
Correlation coefficients between Global Organized Crime Index resilience scores and selected
external índices

 

0.90

 

 

 

 

 

 

RESILIENCE

 

 

 

 

 

RESILIENCE
RESILIENCE

 

 

 

 

 

RESILIENCE

0.79

 

 

 

 

 

 

RESILIENCE RESILIENCE

128Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

SECTION 9
Implications

SEC*ION 9 Implications 129

 

 

The ubiquity and adaptability of organized crime have had a profound impact on societies all over
the world. Organized crime diverts funds that could be used to provide goods and services; it
exploits natural resources; threatens fragile ecosystems; preys on the vulnerabilities of local
populations; and
fuels violence and conflict. AL the same time, illicit activities may be a source of alternative
livelihoods for some in the face of limited legitimate economic opportunities and lack of service
provision. Although criminality dynamics
vary from country to country and region to region, it is clear that the effects of organized crime
are multidimensional and complex. These complex dynamics became even more pronounced amid the
impact of the COVI D-19 pandemic.

The findings of the Global OrganiZed Crime Index have several important implications, but it is the
degree to which the issues outlined in this report are taken on board by policymakers and the
entire international communitv that will be kev in determining the success or failure of the global
response to organized crime going forward.

 

 

The scale of the problem must be acknowledged before it can be effectively addressed.
With over 75% of the global population living in countries plagued with high levels of criminality,
it is irrefutable that the threat posed by organized crime is among the world's most pressing
security issues. Moreover, just as many people- over three-quarters of the world's citizens are
living in countries whose institutions, frameworks and mechanisms tasked with countering organized
crime are highly fragile. A better evidente base is of paramount importante in ensuring that the
scope of the global organized crime threat can no longer be ignored. Although an increasing number
of countries are
recognizing organized crime as a threat to national and international security, a major escalation
in the political will to prioritize transnational organized crime is still required, now more than
ever.

130 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Organized crime is a truly transnational phenomenon.
Several regions around the world are illegal fishing and so many more. Furthermore,
disproportionately affected bv illicit economies even those states somewhat spared from the and
the scourge of malas, criminal networks heightened levels of criminality and violence so and
state-embedded criminal actors. For a often seen in other countries, illicit economies number
of historical, geographic, economic and can quickly spread across borders. As such, no political
reasons, certain countries, regions and country should consider itself immune to the indeed
continents are home to lar greater levels threat, and preventive measures should be taken of
organized crime than others. AL the same as soon as possible to ensure countries are in a time,
it is clear that no country is immune to the position to mitigate the threat of organized crime
menace of organized crime, and in every comer should it materialize. A kev implication,
therefore,
ofthevvorldtherearenefariousactorsinvolved isthatsuchatransnationalthreatrequiresa
in any number of criminal markets, from human transnational response. No country is immune,
trafficking (the most pervasive criminal market and no country can fight organized crime alone
globally, according to the findings of this index), to either, and international cooperation
needs to be drug trafficking, cvbercrime, money laundering, scaled up across the globe.

 

 

Ending the impunity of state- embedded actors will enhance global resilience to criminality.
Criminal actors come in all forms, but the Index highest echelons of government, countries all
over shows statistically that those exerting the greatest the word still face the insidious
threat of Iow-Ievel influence on societies around the world are state- corrupt practices
permeating the state apparatus. embedded criminal actors, which has disastrous In such
instantes, even if top government implications for a country's ability to tackle to officials
ostensibly champion the fight against organized crime. Governments and state officials orgaDlZCd
crime, institutions and mechanisms
have very little incentive to inhibit the proliferation can still be fatally undermined at the
lower levels, of illicit economies if they are the same entities and from the judicial svstem to
regulatory bodies individuals not just benefiting from them, but in and law enforcement
agencies. This weakens many cases actually Controlling them. Even in cases the implementation of
resilience frameworks, where the criminality may not extend to the very especially if governance
structures are opaque.

SEC*ION 9 Implications 131

 

Continuing to bolster democracy, especially in fragile states, is a viable and useful response.

 

lt is an undeniable fact that countries that have put in place the most effective mechanisms to
tackle organized crime are democratic states. And the findings of this study corroborate this:
democracies have statistically higher levels
of resilience to crirninality than authoritarian states. Good governance, characterized as states
that are participatory, accountable, effective and founded on the rule of law, sets the foundation
on which to build and strengthen institutional and non-state frameworks to better society and
counter organized crime. Where
transparency and accountability are absent, a cloak of invisibility is draped over a nation,
allowing state-embedded actors to act with impunity, siphoning off public funds and profiting from
illicit economies at the expense ofthe well-being of their citizens. Removing the ability of
governments with authoritarian tendencias to operate under the radar, control or protect illicit
economies with the institutions of the state, reducing corrupt practices and allowing civil society
to operate are all important steps in enhancing a country's resilience to organized crime.

 

 

 

Working towards peace is crucial in reducing the opportunitiesfor criminality to thrive.
The pervasiveness of illicit economies is often a economic ‘solution' to shortages in goods and
driver of conflict, instability and state fragility, but services. Not only does organized crime
flourish in the relationship between the two can, and should, settings of civil war, territorial
disputes and other be viewed from the opposite perspective. Conflict forms of conflict, but the
resultant insecurity also settings, where often there is a power vacuum, are constrains a state's
ability to respond to organized acutely vulnerable environments for orgaDlZed crime. To break
the vicious cycle of heightened crime to take hold and thrive. The trafficking of
crime—weakened response, it is imperativo that illicit goods, for example, entwines with existing
solutions for long-term peace are prioritized.
and emerging war economies, providing a criminal

 

 

 

GJobaJ
Organized
Crime ndex
website

SEC*ION 0 | Global Organized Crime Index website 133

 

 

A dedicated website — ocindex.net — has been created to present the results of the Global Organized
Crime Index. The website has a home page featuring a criminality heatmap. The ’Heatmap Scores’
webpage allows users to visualice the scores map for the 10 criminal markets, four criminal actor
types and 12 resilience indicators included in the Index, in addition to the aggregate component
and subcomponent scores. Furthermore, the website allows for a side-by-side comparison of any of
the Index's scores, both aggregated and disaggregated.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Raa4lJgnca
4.88

 

 

 

 

 

388

 

 

5.58

 

 

4.S2

134 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Sort and compare
While responses differ from country to country, organized crime is nevertheless a global problem.
Under the criminality and resilience components of the Index, countries are ranked based on their
scores in order to offer users the option for comparative analysis across the globe. Above all,
country rankings are meant to start a conversation among policymakers and regional bodies,
encouraging them to delve deeper into how and why organized
crime affects their respective countries, and learn from one another in order to develop effective
resilience strategies.

SEC*ION 0 | Global Organized Crime Index website 155
Country summaries
In addition to the scores and rankings, the Global Organized Crime Index website allows users
access to country summaries that explain the context behind each country's scores. These summaries
provide the background informing each country's criminality and resilience, and the subcomponents
(i.e. criminal markets and criminal actors) and resilience indicators, while highlighting key
trends based on expert assessments.

 

Uruguay

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7.75

136 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Make your own comparisons
The Global OrganiZed Crime Index offers a holistic framework of a country's overall relationship to
organized crime. At the same time, its subcomponents and indicators allow users to disaggregate
such information and determine correlations with various impact areas in any given country and/or
region.
Policymakers and other users are able to compare data geographically, substantively and, with
future iterations of the Index, temporally, so that they can identifi key trends over time.

SECTION 10 | Global Organized Crime Index website 137

138 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

A**EN DII Results interpretation — Considerations 139

 

 

Information availability
As a data-driven tool, the Index aims to standardize the complex concepts of criminality and
resilience across 193 countries around the world. While standardization promotes comparative
analysis and easy interpretation, it does not come without challenges. The collection of data may
vary across
countries in terms of availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. These issues are
even more pronounced, given the inherently clandestine nature
of organized crime that the I ndex captures. While the Index endeavours to overcome such challenges
by expert cross-checks and triangulating sources, another challenge arises when there is abundant
information on a particular country or component.

Research and information promote greater understanding of the organized crime situation in a given
country and its resilience, informing better policvmaking and responses. Nevertheless, for
comparativo tools such as the I ndex, an information bias — where more information is published on
some areas rather than others — may risk skewing results and/or interpretation
of findings. In other words, an organized crime problem may appear to be more acute in countries
where more information, research and reporting have occurred. One of the main goals of the Index is
to highlight areas where information is lacking in an effort to promote further research. lt is
important for stakeholders to accept índices for what they are and the information they provide as
supplementary to other means of gathering information.

Similarly, instantes arise where published information and evidence are lacking but experts with in
depth knowledge of a specific context acknowledge Chat problems exist. In such cases, the Index as
an expert-led assessment heavily relies on expert knowledge in evaluating country contexts.

 

Diversity in the Index components
Countries that differ in their criminality and resilience may nevertheless be assigned the same
scores, while those that host a particularly acute organized crime problem may appear to score
lower than other countries.
These results can be explained by the structure of the Index. Because overall criminality and
resilience scores are assigned based on a simple average of their respective composite indicators,
countries that have a diverse range of criminal markets and criminal actors will score higher than
those that have fewer, albeit more pervasive, criminal characteristics. The same can be said to

140 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

describe resilience indicators. Overall resilience scores will be dependent on countries ability
to tackle the organized crime situation in their

 

Limitations
Recognizing the difficulties in creating a tool that studies a subject matter that is incredibly
varied and inherently clandestine, the Index, framed as an expert-led assessment, naturally comes
with limitations and potential biases. Nevertheless, the Global Organized Crime Index can be
described as a worthwhile exercise, although with certain limitations, Chat we hope will become a
catalyst Por further debate.

On a methodological note, there are considerations that must be taken into account when
interpreting the scores. First and foremost, the Index relies heavily on individual expert
knowledge and experience, which introduces the possibility for an implicit bias, where experts’
personal convictions might affect their judgement. The ramifications
in this case are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, experts might have been too critical,
given their knowledge of of a specific country's
deficiencies, and on the other, they might have been tempted to be too lenient. Although the latter
was presumed more probable prior to the evaluation rounds, it was observed that experts tended to
be more critical and often held countries, especiallv developed ones, to a higher standard.
Throughout the development of the tool, we have attempted to control that bias by providing
preliminary country profiles as a basis on which experts could make
their assessments as well as specifying scoring thresholds to guide the scoring process, as
outlined in the methodology section. In addition, all countries underwent a number of anonymous
verification rounds, comparing the scores across indicators and regions in an attempt to account
for the implicit bias.

Experts in the initial scoring round provided scores that were presented to experts in the
following geographic and thematic scoring rounds. This
country based on a holistic and multifaceted approach, rather than a criminal justice- or
economically-driven approach.

 

 

opened the possibility for a confirmation bias, where experts would confirm the scores assigned in
previous rounds. To address this, an additional score verification round was carried out, where
groups of representatives from numerous areas of expertise carne together in moderated regional
discussions to debate and scrutinize the scores and justifications for each countrv.

In addition, as one aspect of the Index tool is to help policymakers improve their approach to
organIZC’d crime, it is fundamental to understand where harms for different markets are coming
from. lt is undeniable that many of the harms associated with specific markets stern from existing
policies. One example for that is the cannabis trade. Policies related to the policing and use of
cannabis differ from country to country, and even within countries. Thus, evaluating the impact
associated with that market has been rather ambiguous. While an increasing number of states are
moving to decriminalize or legalize cannabis, there is some room for illegality, like trafficking
cannabis to countries with stricter policies, for instante. Thus, to be as consistent as possible,
the importante of capturing that aspect of illegality when evaluating the market was emphasized to
expert scorers. Still, consistency in that case has been difficult to achieve.

Another critical issue of concern during the scoring process was the debate on the harm and impact
of markets, namely whether harms are comparable across markets. Here lies another limitation of the
too-l the weighing of different components of the Index. Currently, as has been already specified,
indicators are weighed evenly. Nevertheless, four of the 10 markets are drug- related, which puts
implicit weight on the impact

 

 

of drugs, which, depending on the context, may pose issues. Environmental criminal markets in
Europe, for example, are almost non-existent. Yet they are weighted equally with more pervasive
markets, such as human trafficking and the synthetic drug trade. That has, on a number of
occasions, raised the obvious question among experts on European organized crime whether this
approach was justified. However, environmental crime has had a significant impact in Africa and
Oceania, for instante, where it has endangered entire ecosystems and even threatened the very
existente of coastal communities. Arguably, the impact of environmental crime markets has been more
severe there than human smuggling, for example, which is perceived as problematic in a European
context.

Thus, the current weighting of indicators might lead to some curious results. What often occurs is
that two countries that perhaps would not be expected to rank on the same level criminalitv- wise,
turn out to be verv similar to one another. This is where we advise caution and recommend readers
to look at the disaggregated scores, as we have stressed in the beginning of the report, because
countries might have similar or the same overall ranking but for different reasons.

The Index has been somewhat limited in its scope as well, currently covering only 10 criminal
markets. lt is therefore arguable that the criminality score does not paint a full picture
A**EN DII Results interpretation — Considerations

 

of the organized crime landscape in a particular country and across regions. lt is our hope that,
in due time, more criminal markets will be included in the Index and the tool will be able to
provide a more comprehensive account of the phenomenon across the globe.

Finally, the COVI D-19 pandemic has been the overarching theme of 2020, having an effect on all
aspects of life, including organized crime. Set, the dynamics brought about by the pandemic were
difficult to untangle, not least because of scarcity of information in the fi rst months of the
pandemic. As borders closed in early 2020 and air travel was restricted, it was thought that
organized crime would suffer significant financial los ses, similar to the legal economy, and
shrink. Criminal actors, however, quicklv adapted to the situation and while there was some
displacement in criminal activities, some illicit flows continued to operate rather well. A case in
point is the d rug trade, which, d riven by high demand, continued to function, facilitated by the
mostly unaffected maritime trade. Nevertheless, as the Index was developed as the pandemic
unfolded, we recognize that its full effects on organized crime would be properly evaluated at a
later stage. Therefore, we consider the COVID-19 pandemic as an obstacle that to
an extent impeded the proper data collection and analysis, and by extension the conclusions that
could be drawn.
141

142 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

A**ELDI 2 | Definitions 143

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ORGANIZED CRIME

Defining organized crime
An index is a composite measure of variables using various data points. In the context of measuring
organized crime, the parameters that this index relies on are informed by definitions of organized
crime, and related activities and concepts.

Organized crime, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to deme. Although there is an
awareness that the phenomenon exists everywhere, there are multiple forms of crime, enabled by
different actors that fluctuate and adapt
to various environments. In 2003, the United Nations Convention against Transnational OrganiZed
Crime (UNTOC), the principal international instrument against organized crime, carne into force,
compelling member states to consider defining organized crime. Unable to reach a consensus,
however, the UNTOC does not actually provide a definition of organized crime, but rather offers
clarity on two constants within the broad context of organized crime.

The terms ‘organized criminal group' and ’serious offence', outlined in the convention, offer the
basic conditions for an activitv to be deemed to be organized crime and the flexibility to address
the widest possible range of concerns. For example, an organized criminal group mav refer to a
broad range of criminal associations, from hierarchal structures to loosely
connected networks. Likewise, the convention's focus on the term ‘serious offence’ ensures a
distinction is maintained between Iow-IeveI criminality and organized criminal activity. Moreover,
the convention specifically speaks to activities that are proflt-driven, allowing for policias and
responses
to distinguish organized crime from solelv politicallv motivated actions, such as terrorism. Today
the consensus among the convention's member states is increasingly to refrain from definitional
debates surrounding the term 'organized crime' and accept that it is flexible, that it refers to a
broad spectrum of ever-changing activities and circumstances, and that there are many ways in which
the label ’organized crime can be understood and
conceptuaIiZed. NevertheIess,foranindextooffertrueinsightandvaue,
some form of definition is essential. While relying
(though not exclusively) on international instruments
to define various criminal

For the purpose of the Global Organized Crime Index, ’organized crime’ is defined as illegal
activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption
or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit.
Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.
markets, the I ndex considers both transnational organized crimes as well organized
Chi Mi id I dCtiVit ̀'S OCCU EKi O@
within state boundaries.

144 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

By deflning organized crime in this way, the Index allows for a wide range of activities and
perpetrators to be considered and measured. One key point to note in this definition is the issue
of legality. Activities that are not designated as illegal or that have been legalized in a country
fall outside of the scope of the assessment of that particular country, even if considered illegal
in another. At the same time, activities that are not illegal but that violate international human
rights standards are included under the Index.

 

Criminal market definitions

 

People
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Drawing from a range of sources, the I ndex covers human trafficking within a modern slavery
context and includes the trafficking of organs. I n line with common interpretations of human
trafficking, this criminal market does not require the movement of individuals, and includes men,
women and children. When movement is involved, it may include both cross-border and internal flows
(such as from rural to urban locations). For the purposes of the I ndex, human trafficking includes
activity, means and purpose, and reflects all stages of the illicit activity, from recruitment and
transfer, to harbouring and receipt of parsons. To distinguish this market from Chat of human
smuggling, trafficking in persons involves a form of coercion, deception, abduction or fraud, and
is carried out for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim's content.
I n line with the Protocol to Present, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UNTOC,
exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs.

HUMAN SMUGGLING
Under the Index, human smuggling requires
the criminalization of the illegal entry, transit or
residente of migrants (by land, sea or air) bv an organized criminal group for the purposes of a
financial or material benefit. Activity in this criminal economy reflects all stages of the illicit
activity, including producing, procuring, providing or possessing fraudulent travel or identity
documents when committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants. Although distinct
crimes, human smuggling may turn into trafficking when the element of exploitation is involved.

Trade
ARMS TRAFFICKING
The trafficking of arms involves the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or
Transfer of arms, their parts and components and ammunition across national borders, as well as
intentional diversion of firearms from legal to
illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across phvsical borders.'Firearms’ refers
to any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to
expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or
their replicas, as per the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UNTOC. ‘Small arms’ and
'light weapons refer to a range of specific weapons,
as outlined by the Small Arms Survey. Often the

A**ELDI 2 | Definitions 145

 

 

trafficking of arms facilitates the commission of other organized crime activities.

Environment
FLORA CRIMES
CrimesreIatedtoforainvoIvetheiWcittrade asvvelaspossessionofspeciescoveredbythe
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species ofWild Fauna and Flora (CITES), as well as other species protected under national law.

FAUNA CRIMES
Like hora crimes, crimes involving fauna species reflect the poaching, illicit trade in and
possession of species covered by CITES, as well as anv other species protected by national law. The
Index also
considers protected marine species, and IUU fishing falls under this category.

NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES
The I ndex includes the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural
resources.
If dISO COVCFS d n i ll iCit dCtiViti€'S FCldt€'d NO
the trade of such products, including price misinvoicing. The I ndex covers commodities including,
but not limited to, oil, gold, gas, gemstones, diamonds and precious metals.

Drugs
HEROIN TRADE
The Index covers the production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug, while
not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in determining the reach of the illicit
drug market. Synthetic opioids are considered under the synthetic drugs category (see below).

COCAINE TRADE
Like heroin, the production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives are covered by
the

 

Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crirne, was considered in
determining the reach of the illicit drug market.

CANNABISTRADE
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves are covered
by the I ndex. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was
considered in determining the reach of the illicit drug market. RecogniZIng the growing
legalization of cannabis production, sale and consumption across
countries, the Index focused solely on areas where an activity was criminalized and/or where
criminal groups were involved in the supply chain.

SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE
As with other illicit drug markets, the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs are
covered by the Index. Notably, synthetic opioids, such as Tramadol, as well as amphetamine-type
stimulants, methamphetamines and Fentanyl
are included in this criminal market, as well as any other narcotic included in the 1972
Protocol, Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Convention on Psychotropic
Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances of 1988.
Consumption of such drugs, while not in itself a form of organized crime, was considered in
determining the reach of the illicit drug market. Notably, ‘substandard and falsified medical
products', as outlined by the World Health Organization, have been excluded.

146 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Criminal actor definitions
MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS features of mafia-stvle groups. In essence, criminal Refers to clearly
defined, organized criminal groups. networks and entrepreneurs are deflned by their This typologv
also includes militia and guerrilla failure to meet the defining characteristics of groups that
are primarily funded by illicit activities. mala-style groups.
There are four defining features of a mafia-style

group: a known name, a defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.

CRIMINAL NETWORKS
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS
Refers to criminal actors that are embedded in,
and act from within, the state's apparatus.
Refers to a loose network of criminal dSSOCldtOS FOREIGN ACTORS
engaging in criminal activities. This also includes R«fers to state and/or non-state criminal
actors relatively small groups that do not control territory operating outside their home
country. This can and are not widely known by a name or with include not just foreign
nationals, but also various known leader. Criminal networks are involved in diaspora groups that
have created roots in the illicit trafficking of commodities but do not have country over
multiple generations.
territorial control or any of the other defining

Resilience indicator definitions
Leadership and governance in which anti-organized crime rhetoric is made
reflects to some degree the level of prioritlzation
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE of organized crime on the national agenda. Refers to the role
a state's government plays

in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness in doing so. Strong political leadership and
governance indicate higher state resilience to organized crime.
Governments orient citizens toward a state's stance on organized crime, championing its role in
combating the phenomenon by laying the foundation to implement action. The platform

 

RESILIENCE
Governance serves as a function of the
relationship between the state and its governed populations. Leaders send messages that are seen as
legitimate, and in turn unify societv.
People's confidente in those who govern them can be directly linked to conflict in a society. The
presence of organized crime can tangibly reduce the capacitv for governance and the legitimacy of
the government in the eyes of the population.
When there is no or little confidente in government, society can become unstable, creating
(further)

The Index defines 'resilience' as the ability to withstand and
disrupt organized criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets, through
political, economic, legal and social measures. Resilience refers to countries’ measures taken by
both the state and non-state actors.
opportunities for organized eri me to DII the void between the state and its populations.

A**ELDI 2 | Definitions 147

 

GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Refers to the degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state
collusion in illicit activities in other words, whether or not the state creates opportunities for
the reduction of state corruption and to obscure the illegitimate control over power or resources,
including resources linked to organized crime.
As representatives of their citizens, governments are entrusted with powers to oversee and maintain
the rule and order of societies. When this contrast is abused, it both undermines citizens' trust
in state institutions (which mav lead to vulnerabilities to organized crime) and can imply state
collusion in organized crime. Efforts to increase transparency, such as adequately resourcing
anti-corruption measures, work to close opportunities in which organized criminals may exert their
influence.
Thus, the more transparent governments are, the more resilient a state is to organized crime.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Refers to the structures and processes
of interaction, policvmaking and concrete implementation by countries beyond the national level in
order to respond to organized crime.
Strong international cooperation indicates high state resilience to orgaDlZCd crime.
As organized crime is increasingly a transnational phenomenon, with actors and supply chains able
to span national and continental boundaries, it
is essential that states work together on a global scale to combat the threat.
The ratification and (timeliness of ratification) of relevant international organized crime
treaties implies state willingness to effectuate responses to organized crime, in line with
international standards. These treaties are:
› The UNTOC and its three protocols
› The UN Convention against Corruption
› The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988

 

› The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961
› The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971
› The Arms Trade Treaty
› CITES

At the international level, for states parties, these instruments constitute sufficient legal
grounds to carry out res onse measures to or anized crime. Such responses include cooperation in
criminal
Mdtt 'KS, §ó KtiCUldr IV MUtUü I IC’@d I dssistd DCC’,
extradition, the Transfer of sentenced prisoners and transborder asset confiscation. The presence
of such structures and policies, and evidente of their effective use, implies higher state
resilience to organized crime.

NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS
International cooperation is an essential component to combating organized crime because it sets
the basis for national responses. Thus, national policies and laws refers to state legal action and
structures put in place to respond
to organized crime. National organized crime strategies and legislation are adapted to the needs of
the state, its legal tradition and social, economic cultural and geographic conditions. As such,
the presente of these reflects higher state resilience to organized crime.

Criminal justice and security
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION
Refers to a state's judiciary's power to effectively try to enforce judgments on organized crime-
related cases. The ability of a country s judicial system to do so depends on whether it is
adequately resourced and operates independently and effectively at all points along the juridical
chain.
Although passing judgment on cases is its primary function, the ability to enforce is also an
essential component of a judiciary's activities. Things such as evidente that key organized crime
criminals
are successfully prosecuted and, in particular,

148 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

the degree of organized crime influence from within the prison system, are factors to consider in
assessing a state's judicial capacity. Where the prison system is notably captured by organized
crime, this should significantly impact the score.
Thus, while having more resources and independence to pass judgment on organized crime cases
implies higher state resilience, high impunity implies lower state resilience.

LAW ENFORCEMENT
Refers to the state's ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to
its rules and procedures regarding organized crime. As the front line of a state's criminal justice
system, law enforcement and intelligence are often in direct
contact with organized criminal activities. I n order to bring criminal perpetrators to justice,
the capacity of a state's law enforcement to combat organized crime rests on things such as whether
it is adequately resourced, and whether the state has invested in
law enforcement mechanisms that are specificallv organized-crime-focused. lt can therefore be said
Chat higher law enforcement capacity makes a state more resilient to organized crime.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
Refers to the degree to which states are able to control their territory and infrastructure against
organized criminal activities, including border control personnel capacita.

A country's physical location and geography may increase the risk of exploitation by organized
criminal groups. As lengthy borders are less likely to be regulated, criminals are more likelv to
take advantage of the vast expanse by smuggling illicit commodities and people unnoticed. Moreover,
the level of a state's economic engagement internationally, marked by things such as its port and
airport infrastructure, can increase the feasibility with which to move goods and people (both
legitimately and illegally) between countries.

As such, the greater resources and structures put in place by states to manage their territorial
integrity against organized crime, the higher its resilience.
Economic and financial
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
Refers to a state's ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating
monev laundering and other related threads to the integrity of its financial system.

Profits that criminals make from organized crime are often concealed by being funnelled through
legitimate businesses. Through the development of anti money laundering mechanisms, states become
more resilient to the threat of money laundering, which potentially underlies all forms of
organized crime.

The Financial Action Task Force is a policymaking body that has developed a series of
recommendations that are recognized as the international standard for combating money laundering,
the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They form the basis
for a coordinated response to these threats to the financial system.

States are assessed through mutual countrv evaluations to determine their level of compliance with
these international standards. The higher compliance, the more resilient states are to organized
crime.

ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY
Refers to the ability to control and manage the economy, and to regulate financial and economic
transactions (both nationally and internationally) so that trade is able to flourish within the
confines of the rule of law. In other words, whether an actor has put into place and can
effectively oversee the mechanisms that ensure economic transactions and businesses operate in a
predictable, fair way, free from distortion, including criminal activities such as extortion and
illicit taxation.

When actors are able to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development, it allows for options and opportunities for legitimate,
regulated business to expand. This, in turn, reduces the

A**ELDI 2 | Definitions 149

 

incentive for informal, illegal business to arise, or Por criminal groups to unduly influence
economic forces, through alternative regulation, extortion or criminal practice.

States under protracted sanctions by the international community have been shown to develop illicit
means by which to circumvent or soften the impact of those sanctions.

The larger the number of sound economic regulations that are in place and the Power number of (and
duration of) sanctions placed on a state, the higher resilience a country has to organized crime.

Civil society and social protection
VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT
Refers to the existente of assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime (for
example, human trafficking, drug trafficking, extortion or fraud).

Support mechanisms, treatment programmes for victims, as well as resources allocated to these
initiatives create an environment in which citizens are able to recover more quickly from the
effects of organized criminal activities.

Moreover, initiatives such as witness protection programmes are essential, and often the onlv way
to successfully prosecute organized criminals. The more such support programmes are put in place,
the more resilient states are to organized crime.

PREVENTION
Refers to the existente of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that
are aimed to inhibit organized crime. While prevention considers mainly state initiatives, these
frameworks often use a holistic approach
NO §FCVCnt i VI' MM'OSUFC S \h FOU@h COMMU mtV
outreach, recognizing that citizens that are engaged in prevention to organized crime help make the
state more resilient.

 

Through prevention, states can build safeguards to protect against organized crime by effecting
behavioural change in vulnerable groups and reducing the demand for illicit activities. Thus, the
more robust a state's prevention scheme is, the more resilient it is to organized crime.

NON-STATE ACTORS
From a resilience perspective, non-state actors plav a role in responding to organized crime to
supplement government care and by ensuring ‘checks and balances’ against governments to ensure
resilience to organized crime. The con- state actors indicator is also a measure of the degree to
which civil society organizations are able and allowed to play a role in responding to organized
crime across the spectrum, from victim support to crime prevention.

Civil society organizations are engaged in local communities, where ownership of initiatives
against organized crime is formed, Reading to more sustainable response measures. Similarly, the
media is critical in the role it plays holding governments to account and provides a voice for
communities by mobilizing civil society against the
threat of organized crime among local populations. Thus, the more civil society capacity a state
has, the more resilient it is to organized crime.

150 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

A*PENDI X | Ranking tables 151

Crimina ity scores

COUNTRY SCORE COUNTRY SCORE

1. CONGO, DEM. REP. 7.75
2. COLOMBIA 7.66
3. MYANMAR 7.59
4. NEXICO 7.56
5. NIGERIA 7.15
6. IRAN 7.10
7. AFGHANISTAN 7.08
8. IRAQ 7.05
9. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 7.04
10. HONDURAS 6.98
11. KENYA 6.95
12. TURKEY 6.89

38. UGANDA 6.14
39. YEMEN 6.13
40. NICARAGUA 6.06
41. CHINA 6.01
41. GHANA 6.01
41. NIGER ó.01
41. SAUDI ARABIA 6.01
45. I1ONTENEGRO 6.00
46. EL SALVADOR 5.94
46. MALAYSIA 5.94
48. JAMAICA 5.91
49. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 5.89

1Z. PHILIPPINES 6.84
13. SYRIA 6.84
15. LEBANON ó.7ó
16. PARAGUAY 6.70
17. PANAMA 6.68
18. VENEZUELA 6.64
19. SOUTH AFRICA 6.63
20. LIBYA 6.55
21. MOZAMBIQUE 6.53
22. BRAZIL 6.50
23. GUATEMALA 6.48
24. SUDAN 6.46
25. INDONESIA 6.38
26. PERU 6.35
Z7. SOUTH SUDAN 6.34
28. CAMEROON 6.31
29. PAKISTAN 6.28
29. VIETNAN 6.28
31. ECUADOR 6.25
52. RUSSIA 6.24
33. SERBIA 6.21
34. UKRAINE 6.18
35. NEPAL ó.16
36. COTE D'IVOIRE 6.15
]6. TANZANIA 6.15
49. MALI
51. CHAD
52. CAMBODIA
53. ITALY
54. SOI IALIA
55. SPAIN
5ó. THAILAND
57. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
58. HAITI
59. FRANCE
59. ZIMBABWE
61. ALBANIA
62. TAJIKISTAN
63. MADAGASCAR
64. INDIA
65. LAOS
66. UNITED STATES
67. BURKINA FASO
68. GUINEA-BISSAU
69. PAPUA NEW GUINEA
70. BULGARIA
71. SIERRA LEONE
72. KYRGYZSTAN
72. TOGO
74. NORTH I MACEDONIA
5.89
5.86
5.83
5.81
5.79
5.78
5.76
5.75
5.73
5.66
5.66
5.63
5.61
5.59
5.53
5.51
5.50
5.49
5.45
5.44
5.43
5.40
5.33
5.33
5.31

152 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

COUNTRY
SCORE COUNTRY
SCORE

 

75. ANGOLA
76. BENIN

5.29
5.25

115. ROMANIA 11ó. SWEDEN
4.59
4.56

77. QATAR
5.21
117.
PORTUGAL
4.55

78. GUINEA
KOSOVO
79. EGYPT
80. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
81. KUWAIT
82. GUYANA
83. AZERBAIJAN
83. BELARUS
85. CROATIA
86. LIBERIA
87. CONGO, REP.
88. COSTA RICA
89. BANGLADESH
90. UZBEKISTAN
91. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
92. GREECE
92. ZAMBIA
94. KOREA, REP.
95. GABON
95. GERMAN Y
95. IRELAND
95. SURINAME
99. UNITED KINGDOM
100. BAHRAIN
100. GAMBIA
102. SENEGAL
103. ETHIOPIA
103. MOROCCO
105. KOREA, DPR
5.20
5G9
5.16
5.15
5.14
5.10
5.08
5.08
5.06
5.05
5.05
4.99
4.98
4.96
4.94
4.93
4.93
4.91
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.89
4.86
4.86
4.81
4.79
4.79
4.78
118. JAPAN
119. ALGERIA
119. BURUNDI
119. MAURITIUS
122. HUNGARY
123. MOLDOVA
124. ISRAEL
125. ARGENTINA
125. MAURITANIA
127. BELGIUM
127. ERITREA
127. SWITZERLAND
130. NAMIBIA
131. BOLIVIA
132. SLOVENIA
133. KAZAKHSTAN
134. CYPRUS
135. SOLOMON ISLANDS
136. OMAN
137. EQUATORIAL GUINEA
138. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
139. ST. LUCIA
140. MALDIVES
141. AUSTRIA
141. CABO VERDE
143. MONGOLIA
143. POLAND
145. AUSTRALIA
146. DJIBOUTI
4.53
4.51
4.51
4.51
4.50
4.45
4.41
4.38
4.38
4.34
4.34
4.34
4.33
4.30
4.29
4.26
4.19
4.15
4.14
4.11
4.10
4.09
4.06
4.04
4.04
4.01
4.01
4.00
3.99

106. JORDAN
4.71
147.
TIMOR-LESTE
3.96

107. NETHERLANDS
107. SLOVAKIA
109. MALTA
110. BELIZE
110. SRI LANKA
112. CZECH REPUBLIC
113. TURKMENISTAN
114. CHILE
4.69
4.69
4.65
4.64
4.64
4.63
4.61
4.60
148. FUI
148. LESOTHO
150. COMOROS
150. DENMARK
152. MALAWI
153. NORWAY
154. BAHAMAS
154. TUNISIA
3.90
3.90
3.8ó
3.86
3.83
3.81
3.79
3.79

Rank ing tables

 

 

 

COUNTRY

15ó. TONGA
157. BOTSWANA
158. BHUTAN
159. RWANDA
159. SEYCHELLES
161. CANADA 1ó2. ESWATINI 1ó3. ESTONIA 1ó4. LATVIA
165. CUBA 1ó6. ICELAND
167. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
1ó8. LITHUANIA
1ó9. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
169. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
171. ARMENIA
172. NEW ZEALAND
173. BARBADOS
174. SINGAPORE
175. GRENADA
176. SAN MARINO
177. ANDORRA
177. GEORGIA
179. PALAU
180. BRUNEI
181. FINLAND
182. URUGUAY
183. DOMINICA
184. MONACO
185. LUXEMBOURG
186. KIRIBATI
187. MARSHALL ISLANDS
188. VANUATU
189. SAMOA
190. LIECHTENSTEIN
191. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
192. NAURU
193. TUVALU
SCORE

6.78
6.71
3.69
3.68
3.68
3.66
3.63
].60
3.51
144
3.39
3.34
3.31

3.]0

3.30

3.26
3. 25

3.21
3.13
3.05
3.01
2.9ó
2.96

2.94
2.76
2.71
2.ó9

2.ó3
2.43

2.ió 2.35
2.31

220
2.04
1.88
1.78
1.76

1.54

154 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Criminal market scores

 

COUNTRY
CRIMINAL
MARKETS HUMAN HUMAN ARMS FLORA
(AVERAGE) TRAFFICKING SMUGGLING TRAFFICKING CRIMES

FAUNA CRIMES

 

1. MEXICO
2. COLOMBIA
3. NIGERIA
3. MYANMAR
5. IRAN
6. SAUDI ARABIA
6. AFGHANISTAN

8.00
7.20
7.05
7.05 ó.95 ó.90 ó.90

7.5
7.5
7.5
6.5
7.5
8.5
8.5

8.5
7.0
6.0
7.5
8.0
7.5
8.0

8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.5

7.5
6.0
6.0
7.0
4.5
5.0
6.0

7.0
7.0
6.5
8.0
4.0
7.0
4.0

8. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 6.75
9. KENYA ó.65
10. TANZANIA 6.55
11. BRAZIL 6.50
11. CONGO, DEM. REP. 6.50
13. THAILAND ó.40
13. TURKEY ó.40
15. PANAMA ó.35
15. IRAQ 6.35
17. INDIA 6.30
17. PHILIPPINES 6.30
8.5
7.5
6.5
5.0
7.0
ó.5
7.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
7.0
6.5
4.0
5.5
7.0
9.0
5.5
8.5
6.0
5.0
ó.5
7.5
5.5
8.0
9.0
5.5
9.0
ó.5
9.0
5.5
7.5
5.5
6.0
7.5
8.5
8.5
6.5
4.0
6.0
1.5
5.5
7.0
7.5
7.0
8.0
8.5
8.0
8.0
3.0
8.0
4.5
8.0
7.5

17. PAKISTAN
20. MALAYSIA
20. CAMEROON
22. PERU
23. KUWAIT
23. GHANA
23. CAMBODIA
23. MALI
27. RUSSIA
27. LIBYA
29. VIETNAM
29. CÓTE D'IVOIRE
29. MOZAMBIQUE
29. SYRIA
33. SOUTH AFRICA
33. ECUADOR
33. INDONESIA
36. GUATEMALA
6.30 ó.25 ó.25 6.20
6.15
6.15 ó.15 ó.15 6.10
6.10
6.05
6.05 ó.05 6.05 ó.00 6.00
6.00
5.95
8.0
ó.5
ó.5
7.0
8.0
6.5
7.5
7.0
ó.5
9.5
6.5
6.5
4.0
8.5
4.5
6.0
6.5
6.5
7.0
7.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
5.0
6.5
6.0
6.0
8.0
7.0
6.5
5.0
8.5
4.0
5.5
6.0
7.0
8.0
5.5
ó.5
5.5
6.5
5.0
5.0
8.0
4.5
9.5
4.0
7.0
5.5
9.0
8.0
7.5
4.5
7.0
4.5
6.0
7.0
7.0
5.5
6.5
8.0
5.0
7.5
1.0
6.5
6.0
8.0
1.5
5.5
6.0
7.5
4.0
5.0
8.0
7.5
5.5
6.0
6.0
8.0
5.5
7.5
3.5
8.5
6.5
8.0
3.5
7.5
6.0
8.0
4.0

A**ELDI X | Ranking tables 155

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

 

NON-
CRIMINAL RENEWABLE
MARKETS RESOURCE
(AVERAGE) CRIMES

 

 

 

 

 

 

HEROIN
TRADE

 

 

 

 

 

 

COCAINE TRADE

 

 

 

 

 

 

CANNABIS SYNTHETIC
TRADE DRUG TRADE

 

1. MEXICO
2. COLOMBIA
3. NIGERIA
3. MYANMAR
5. IRAN
6. SAUDI ARABIA
6. AFGHANISTAN

8.00
7.20
7.05
7.05
6.95
6.90
6.90

7.5
9.0
8.0
6.5
8.5
7.0
8.0

8.0
5.0
6.0
9.5
9.0
6.5
9.5
9.0
9.5
6.5
3.5
5.5
5.5
1.0

8.0
8.0
8.0
4.5
6.0
ó.5
7.0

9.0
5.0
8.0
9.5
8.5
7.5
8.5

8. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ó.75
9. KENYA ó.ó5
10. TANZANIA 6.55
11. BRAZIL 6.50
11. CONGO, DEM. REP. ó.50
13. THAILAND ó.40
13. TURKEY 6.40
ó.0
7.0
6.5
8.0
9.0
ó.0
9.5
7.0
7.5
7.5
2.0
4.0
7.5
8.0
ó.0
6.0
5.0
9.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
6.5
6.5
7.0
8.0
7.0
5.0
5.0
7.5
4.5
5.5
4.0
2.5
8.0
5.5

15. PANAMA
15. IRAQ
17. INDIA
17. PHILIPPINES
17. PAKISTAN
20. MALAYSIA
20. CAMEROON
22. PERU
23. KUWAIT
23. GHANA
23. CAMBODIA
23. MALI
27. RUSSIA
27. LIBYA
29. VIETNAM
29. CÓTE D'IVOIRE
29. MOZAMBIQUE
29. SYRIA
33. SOUTH AFRICA
33. ECUADOR
33. INDONESIA
36. GUATEMALA
6.35
6.35
6.30
6.30 ó.30 ó.25 ó.25 6.20
6.15
6.15
6.15
6.15 ó.10 6.10
6.05
6.05 ó.05 ó.05 6.00
6.00
6.00
5.95
ó.0
9.0
7.0
8.0
5.5
5.5
7.5
9.0
6.0
7.5
8.0
7.5
5.0
8.5
6.0
7.5
8.0
7.0
7.5
6.5
7.5
2.5
5.0
6.0
6.5
4.0
8.5
6.5
4.5
3.5
5.0
6.0
4.0
3.0
7.0
2.5
7.0
3.5
7.5
3.0
7.5
6.0
3.5
7.5
8.5
5.0
3.5
3.5
3.0
5.0
3.5
9.0
4.5
6.5
2.5
ó.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
5.0
3.5
2.5
5.5
7.0
4.0
8.5
5.0
6.0
7.5
4.5
7.0
5.0
7.0
5.5
6.5
5.5
4.5
7.0
5.0
7.5
4.5
6.0
4.0
7.5
3.5
4.0
6.5
6.5
5.0
6.0
6.5
9.0
ó.5
7.5
7.0
4.0
7.0
7.0
7.5
6.5
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
7.0
9.5
8.5
5.5
6.0
6.0

156 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

COUNTRY
CRIMINAL
MARKETS HUMAN HUMAN ARMS FLORA (AVERAGE) TRAFFICKING SMUGGLING TRAFFICKING CRIMES

FAUNA CRII1ES

37. CHINA
37. LEBANON
37. PARAGUAY
37. NIGER
41. QATAR
42. FRANCE
42. HONDURAS
42. NEPAL
42. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
46. BAHRAIN
46. UGANDA 4ó. LAOS
4ó. VENEZUELA
50. UKRAINE
51. SERBIA
51. SUDAN
53. UNITED STATES
53. NICARAGUA
55. HAlTl
56. BURKINA FASO
56. CHAD
58. SPAIN
58. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
58. MADAGASCAR
58. KOREA, DPR
58. SOUTH SUDAN
63. ITALY
63. ALBANIA
63. BENIN
66. ANGOLA
ZIMBABWE
68. GAMBIA
68. BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
68. GUINEA
71. BULGARIA
71. LIBERIA
71. TAJIKISTAN
74. BELGIUM
74. ROMANIA
5.90
5.90
5.90
5.90
5.80
5.70
5.70
5.70

5.70

5.65
5.65
5.ó5
5.ó5
5.60
5.55
5.55
5.50
5.50
5.45
5.35
5.35
5.30
5.30
5.30
5.30
5.30
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.20
5.20
5.15

5.15
5.15
5.10
5.10
5.10
5.05
5.05

6.5
8.5
7.0
7.0
8.0
6.0
6.5
7.0

7.5

7.5
7.0
ó.5
7.5
7.0
5.0
8.0
5.5
ó.0
ó.5
ó.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
6.0
8.0
8.5
7.0
5.0
6.0
6.0
5.5
7.0

5.5

7.0
6.0
6.0
6.5
5.0
6.5

6.0
6.5
6.0
7.0
6.0
6.5
6.5
6.5

4.5

5.5
5.0
6.5
7.5
6.5
6.5
7.5
4.5
5.5
6.5
4.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
3.0
6.5
5.5
6.5
6.5
4.0
4.0
3.5
5.0

7.0

5.0
5.0
3.0
6.0
5.5
5.5
2.5
7.5
8.5
8.0
ó.5
6.0
6.0
6.0

8.5

5.5
6.5
4.5
8.0
8.0
7.5
8.5
6.5
ó.0
5.5
8.0
8.0
4.0
4.0
4.5
9.0
8.0
5.5
4.5
5.5
6.0
4.0
2.5

6.0

ó.0
3.5
4.5
4.0
5.5
3.5

8.5
1.5
ó.0
2.0
5.0
4.0
7.0
7.0

6.5

4.0
6.0
8.0
2.5
6.5
4.0
1.5
2.5
6.0
6.5
4.0
1.5
3.5
4.5
7.5
1.0
7.5
2.5
4.5
6.0
7.0
5.5
7.0

4.5

4.5
5.5
5.5
2.5
Z.5
8.0

9.0
5.0
6.5
4.5
6.5
5.5
6.0
7.0

8.0

6.0
6.5
8.0
2.5
4.0
4.0
5.5
5.5
ó.0
4.0
ó.0
3.5
5.0
4.0
7.0
3.0
7.0
3.5
3.5
5.5
4.5
7.5
3.5

4.0

6.0
5.0
6.0
5.5
5.5
5.0

A**ELDI X | Ranking tables 157

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

NON-
CRIMINAL RENEWABLE
MARKETS RESOURCE
(AVERAGE) CRII1ES

 

 

 

HEROIN TRADE

 

 

 

COCAINE TRADE

 

 

CANNABIS SYNTHETIC
TRADE DRUG TRADE

37. CHINA
37. LEBANON
37. PARAGUAY
37. NIGER
41. QATAR
42. FRANCE
42. HONDURAS
42. NEPAL
42. CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
46. BAHRAIN
46. UGANDA 4ó. LAOS
4ó. VENEZUELA
50. UKRAINE
51. SERBIA
51. SUDAN
53. UNITED STATES
53. NICARAGUA
55. HAlTl
56. BURKINA FASO
56. CHAD
58. SPAIN
58. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
58. MADAGASCAR
58. KOREA, DPR
58. SOUTH SUDAN
63. ITALY
63. ALBANIA
63. BENIN
66. ANGOLA
6ó ZIMBABWE
68. GAMBIA
68. BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
68. GUINEA
71. BULGARIA
71. LIBERIA
71. TAJIKISTAN
74. BELGIUM
74. ROMANIA
5.90
5.90
5.90
5.90
5.80
5.70
5.70
5.70

5.70

5.65
5.65
5.65
5.65
5.ó0
5.55
5.55
5.50
5.50
5.45
5.35
5.35
5.30
5.30
5.30
5.30
5.30
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.20
5.20
5.15

5.15
5.15
5.10
5.10
5.10
5.05
5.05
4.5
5.0
3.5
7.5
5.0
4.5
5.0
6.5

9.0

6.5
7.0
1.5
9.0
7.0
4.0
7.5
4.5
ó.0
ó.0
8.5
7.0
2.0
4.5
7.5
7.0
8.0
5.5
5.5
5.0
8.5
8.0
4.5
5.0
6.5
5.0
6.5
7.0
5.0
4.0
6.5
4.0
1.0
3.0
4.5
6.0
2.0
4.5
1.5
5.0
5.0
7.0
2.0
5.0
7.0
2.0
6.5
2.5
2.0
4.0
2.0
6.5
6.5
7.0
3.5
2.0
4.5
6.0
4.5
3.0
4.0
4.5

6.0
2.5
6.0
5.0
8.5
4.0
5.5
3.5
6.0
7.0
ó.0
4.0
6.5
7.5
3.5
1.5
4.0
3.5
2.5
9.0
3.5
5.5
2.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
4.0
4.5
7.0
8.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
7.5
7.0
6.0
6.0
3.0
ó.5

4.5

7.0
4.0
5.5
2.0
7.5
5.5
4.0
9.0
9.0
7.0
6.0
6.5
7.5
5.0

].0

6.0
6.0
4.0
7.0
5.0
6.0
8.0
5.0
6.0
6.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
5.0
6.0
6.0
4.0
5.0
7.0
4.0
4.5
6.0
7.0

5.5

4.5
5.0
6.0
6.0
6.5
4.5

8.0
8.0
4.5
7.0
6.5
5.5
8.0
4.0

7.0

6.5
4.0
8.0
1.5
3.5
ó.0
4.5
7.5
3.5
3.5
ó.0
7.0
4.0
4.5
2.0
7.0
1.0
5.0
3.0
6.0
2.5
5.0
4.0

5.5

4.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
7.5
4.5

158 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

COUNTRY
CRIMINAL
MARKETS HUMAN HUMAN ARMS FLORA (AVERAGE) TRAFFICKING SMUGGLING TRAFFICKING
CRIMES

FAUNA CRII1ES

74. SIERRA LEONE
77. NETHERLANDS
77. SENEGAL
77. NORTH MACEDONIA
77. MONTENEGRO
77. EL SALVADOR
77. PAPUA NEW GUINEA
77. YEMEN
KOSOVO
84. ETHIOPIA
84. MOROCCO
84. BANGLADESH
84. EGYPT
88. OMAN
88. TOGO
88. GUINEA-BISSAU
91. COSTA RICA
92. GERMAN Y
92. CONGO, REP. 9Z. GABON
95. CZECH REPUBLIC
95. CROATIA
95. HUNGARY
98. GUYANA
99. ALGERIA
99. SRI LANKA
101. BOLIVIA
101. ZAMBIA
103. IRELAND
103. JORDAN
103. UZBEKISTAN
103. SURINAME
107. CHILE
107. SOMALIA
109. UNITED KINGDOM
109. POLAND
109. MAURITIUS
109. KYRGYZSTAN
109. BELARUS
109. BELIZE
5.05
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
4.95
4.95
4.95
4.95
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.85
4.80
4.80
4.80
4.75
4.75
4.75
4.70
4.65
4.65
4.60
4.60
4.55
4.55
4.55
4.55
4.45
4.45
4.40
4.40
4.40
4.40
4.40
4.40
5.0
5.5
5.0
5.5
4.5
7.0
7.0
8.5
ó.0
ó.0
5.5
8.0
5.5
6.0
6.0
5.5
5.0
5.5
6.5
5.5
5.0
4.5
ó.0
5.5
4.5
5.5
5.0
5.0
4.5
ó.5
7.5
4.0
4.0
8.0
ó.0
5.5
4.5
6.5
7.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
5.0
6.5
5.5
6.5
4.0
7.5
5 5
6.5
6.5
6.0
5.5
4.0
3.5
2.5
5.0
7.0
4.5
5.5
5.0
6.0
6.0
4.0
6.5
6.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.5
6.0
4.0
4.5
7.5
5.0
4.5
3.5
4.5
5.5
5.0
3.5
5.0
4.5
4.5
ó.0
7.0
5.5
9.0
5.5
7.0
3.0
5.0
7.0
5.0
4.0
5.5
5.0
ó.0
5.0
4.5
4.5
3.5
3.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
ó.5
3.0
5.5
5.5
8.5
3.5
3.5
2.0
3.0
6.5
4.5
6.5
3.0
7.5
4.0
3.0
5.0
8.0
2.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
4.0
1.0
5.0
5.0
8.5
5.0
1.5
8.0
8.5
3.0
5.0
3.5
4.5
2.0
3.0
7.0
8.0
2.0
3.5
3.0
5.0
4.0
ó.0
2.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
5.5
6.5
4.0
7.0
3.5
4.5
5.5
5.0
4.0
6.0
5.5
4.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
5.5
ó.0
3.5
7.0
7.0
5.5
2.5
4.5
3.5
4.5
4.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
4.5
4.5
4.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2.0
4.5

A**ELDI X | Ranking tables 159

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

NON-
CRIMINAL RENEWABLE
MARKETS RESOURCE
(AVERAGE) CRII1ES

 

 

 

HEROIN TRADE

 

 

 

COCAINE
TRADE

 

 

CANNABIS SYNTHETIC
TRADE DRUG TRADE

74. SIERRA LEONE
77. NETHERLANDS
77. SENEGAL
77. NORTH MACEDONIA
77. MONTENEGRO
77. EL SALVADOR
77. PAPUA NEW GUINEA
77. YEMEN
KOSOVO
84. ETHIOPIA
84. MOROCCO
84. BANGLADESH
84. EGYPT
88. OMAN
88. TOGO
88. GUINEA-BISSAU
91. COSTA RICA
92. GERMAN Y
92. CONGO, REP. 9Z. GABON
95. CZECH REPUBLIC
95. CROATIA
95. HUNGARY
98. GUYANA
99. ALGERIA
99. SRI LANKA
101. BOLIVIA
101. ZAMBIA
103. IRELAND
103. JORDAN
103. UZBEKISTAN
103. SURINAME
107. CHILE
107. SOMALIA
109. UNITED KINGDOM
109. POLAND
109. MAURITIUS
109. KYRGYZSTAN
109. BELARUS
109. BELIZE
5.05
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5 00
4.95
4.95
4.95
4.95
4.90
4.90
4.90
4.85
4.80
4.80
4.80
4.75
4.75
4.75
4.70
4.65
4.65
4.60
4.ó0
4.55
4.55
4.55
4.55
4.45
4.45
4.40
4.40
4.40
4.40
4.40
4.40

6.5
4.0
1.5
1.0
5.5
1.5
5.5
7.0
4.5
5.5
5.0
5.5
4.0
5.5
6.0
1.0
6.5
2.5
5.5
10
5.0
4.5
1.5
8.5
6.5
10
8.0
5.5
5.0
1.5
6.5
9.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
5.5
4.0
5.5
5.0
B.0
2.0
4.0
2.5
6.5
5.5
1.5
1.0
2.5
ó 5
3.0
3.0
4.5
5.5
5.0
3.0
5.0
1.0
4.5
2.5
2.5
4.5
5.0
4.5
2.5
2.0
6.0
2.0
4.0
5.5
3.5
6.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
4.5
4.0
8.0
7.0
4.0
3.5
4.5
7.0
ó.5
5.0
7.5
7.0
4.0
2.0
^.5
4.0
ó.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
5.0
8.0
7.0
ó.5
5.0
2.5
4.5
5.5
5.0
8.0
5.5
3.0
8.5
3.0
ó.5
3.0
1.5
8.5
7.0
2.0
ó.5
4.5
3.5
2.0
2.0
4.5
7.0
5.5
ó.0
6.0
5.5
7.0
5.5
3.0
5.5
5.5
9.0
4.0
7.0
4.5
6.5
5.5
4.5
5.0
4.0
4.0
6.0
5.5
5.5
3.0
6.5
5.5
2.5
5.0
5.0
ó.0
4.0
2.5
6.5
2.0
4.5
5.5
5.5
5.5
4.0
5.5
5.0
7.5
2.5
5.5
4.5
2.0
4.5
4.0
6.0
3.0
ó.0
ó.5
7.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
3.5
ó.0
2.0
5.0
6.5
5.5
5.5
2.5
5.5
5.0
2.0
4.0
5.0
ó.0
4.0
2.0
4.5
2.0
5.5
6.5
8.0
4.5
5.0
3.0

160 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

COUNTRY
CRIMINAL
MARKETS HUMAN HUMAN ARMS FLORA
(AVERAGE) TRAFFICKING SMUGGLING TRAFFICKING CRIMES

FAUNA CRII1ES

109.BURUNDI 4.40
116. TURKMENISTAN 4.35
117. SWITZERLAND 4.30
118. SWEDEN 4.25
118. SLOVAKIA 4.25
118. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 4.25
121. ISRAEL 4.20
121. JAMAICA 4.20
121. TUNISIA 4.20
124. KAZAKHSTAN 4.15
124. MALAWI 4.15
124. AZERBAIJAN 4.15
127. PORTUGAL 4.10
127. RWANDA 4.10
127. GREECE 4.10
130.JAPAN 4.05
130. MALTA 4.05
130. ERITREA 4.05
133. NORWAY 4.00
133. CUBA 4.00

8.5
8.5
5.0
4.5
5.5
ó.0
5.5
5.0
4.0
5.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
5.0
5.5
5.0
5.0
9.0
5.0
6.0

5.5
5.0
3.0
5.5
3.5
4.0
2.5
3.0
7.0
4.0
3.5
3.0
4.0
2.5
7.5
4.5
4.0
9.5
3.5
6.0

8.0
2.0
ó.5
ó.0
4.5
ó.0
5.5
8.5
5.0
2.0
4.5
3.0
4.0
5.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
ó.5
3.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
1.5
2.0
3.5
1.0
1.5
1.5
3.5
2.0
4.0
3.5
3.5
3.0
2.0
4.0
1.0
1.5
2.5
4.0

4.5
3.0
3.0
3.5
3.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.5
5.0
ó.0
3.5
3.5
5.0
2.5
ó.0
5.0
2.0
4.0
3.0

133. MAURITANIA 13ó. KOREA, REP. 13ó. AUSTRIA 13ó. SLOVENIA
136. BAHAMAS
140. MONGOLIA
140. NAMIBIA
140. MOLDOVA
143. DENMARK
143. COMOROS
143. EQUATORIAL GUINEA
146. BOTSWANA
146. FIJI
148. AUSTRALIA
148. ARGENTINA
148. BHUTAN
151. CABO VERDE
152. LATVIA
153. SEYCHELLES
153. DJIBOUTI
4.00
3.95
3.95
3.95
3.95
3.90
3.90
3.90
3.85
3.85
3.85
3.80
3.80
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.70
3.65
3.60
3.ó0
7.5
ó.0
4.5
4.0
4.5
4.5
3.5
7.5
4.0
5.0
4.5
4.5
5.0
3.5
4.0
5.0
4.5
4.5
4.0
ó.0
6.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
5.0
3.0
2.5
4.0
4.5
5.5
2.0
3.0
3.5
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.5
3.5
7.0
4.0
3.5
ó.5
3.5
4.5
3.5
3.0
5.0
4.0
3.5
5.0
3.0
2.0
3.5
3.0
2.0
2.5
3.5
3.5
ó.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
5.5
6.5
2.5
1.5
3.0
8.5
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
7.0
2.5
1.0
4.0
2.0
3.5
4.5
2.5
3.0
4.5
4.5
4.5
2.0
2.0
5.5
5.0
7.5
4.5
3.5
3.5
5.5
4.0
2.0
4.0
4.0

A**ELDI X | Ranking tables 161

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

NON-
CRIMINAL RENEWABLE
MARKETS RESOURCE
(AVERAGE) CRII1ES

 

 

 

HEROIN TRADE

 

 

 

COCAINE
TRADE

 

 

 

CANNABIS SYNTHETIC
TRADE DRUG TRADE

 

109. BURUNDI
116. TURKMENISTAN
117. SWITZERLAND
118. SWEDEN
118. SLOVAKIA

4.40
455
4B0
4.25
4.25

4.0
7.0
7.0
2.0
5.0

3.0
6.5
2.5
4.0
4.5

2.5
1.5
5.5
4.5
4.5

3.5
4.0
5.5
5.0
5.0

2.5
4.0
3.5
5.5
5.5

118. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 4.25
121. ISRAEL 4.20
121. JAMAICA 4.20
121. TUNISIA 4.20
124. KAZAKHSTAN 4.15
124. MALAWI 4.15
124. AZERBAIJAN 4.15
127. PORTUGAL 4.10
127. RWANDA 4.10
127. GREECE 4.10
130.JAPAN 4.05
130. MALTA 4.05
130. ERITREA 4.05
133. NORWAY 4.00
133. CUBA 4.00
133. MAURITANIA 4.00
13ó. KOREA, REP. 3.95
2.0
5.5
1.0
5.0
4.5
4.0
6.0
5.0
8.0
8.0
1.0
5.0
2.0
5.5
4.0
5.5
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
6.5
4.5
6.0
4.5
3.0
6.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
5.0
2.5
1.5
3.5
7.5
4.5
6.0
3.0
2.5
2.5
3.0
5.0
2.5
3.5
3.0
5.0
1.5
4.5
4.0
4.5
3.5
7.0
6.5
9.0
5.0
4.5
6.0
5.0
4.5
4.0
5.0
4.5
4.5
4.0
4.0
5.0
6.5
3.0
4.0
5.5
3.0
4.0
5.0
2.0
4.0
4.5
3.0
2.5
5.5
5.5
1.5
4.5
4.0
2.0
5.0

13ó. AUSTRIA
13ó. SLOVENIA
136. BAHAMAS
140. MONGOLIA
140. NAMIBIA
140. MOLDOVA
143. DENMARK
143. COMOROS
143. EQUATORIAL GUINEA
146. BOTSWANA
146. FIJI
148. AUSTRALIA
148. ARGENTINA
148. BHUTAN
151. CABO VERDE
152. LATVIA
153. SEYCHELLES
153. DJIBOUTI
3.95
3.95
3.95
3.90
3.90
3.90
3.85
3.85
3.85
3.80
3.80
3.75
3.75
3.75
3.70
3.65
3.60
3.ó0
2.0
2.5
2.0
4.0
4.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
6.0
5.5
2.0
2.0
1.0
4.5
1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
1.5
3.5
2.0
3.5
2.0
2.0
4.0
4.5
7.5
2.5
3.5
4.5
7.0
2.0
4.5
2.5
5.5
2.0
1.5
3.5
4.5
5.0
ó.5
1.5
7.0
5.0
3.0
1.5
4.5
5.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
4.5
5.0
3.0
3.5
4.0
5.0
3.5
ó.5
4.0
5.0
5.5
3.0
3.5
4.5
5.5
3.0
6.0
4.5
5.0
5.0
ó.0
1.0
3.5
6.5
7.0
3.0
3.0
4.5
5.0
2.5
1.5

162 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

COUNTRY
CRIMINAL
MARKETS HUMAN HUMAN ARMS FLORA
(AVERAGE) TRAFFICKING SMUGGLING TRAFFICKING CRIMES

FAUNA CRII1ES

 

155. SOLOMON ISLANDS
155. TIMOR-LESTE
155. LESOTHO
158. CYPRUS
158. MALDIVES 1ó0. ESTONIA
160. CANADA
162. ARMENIA
163. TONGA
1ó4. NEW ZEALAND
1ó4. SINGAPORE

3.55
3.55
3.55
3.50
3.50
3.45
3.45
3.40
3.30
3.25
3.25

4.0
4.0
4.0
5.5
ó.0
4.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
5.5

2.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
5.5
3.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
3.5
2.5

3.0
4.0
3.0
2.5
2.0
3.0
2.5
2.5
5.0
3.0
2.0
8.0
3.0
1.0
2.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
4.0
1.0
2.0
2.0

7.5
5.0
2.5
3.0
5.0
1.5
3.0
4.5
3.5
3.5
5.0

1ó4. ESWATINI 3.25
167. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 3.20
168.BRUNEI 3.15
169.GEORGIA 3.05
1ó9. ST. LUCIA 3.05
1ó9. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 3.05
4.0
3.0
4.5
3.5
4.0
4.0
3.0
2.5
4.0
2.0
1.5
2.0
4.0
5.0
2.5
2.0
5.0
3.0
2.0
1.5
3.0
3.5
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
3.5
1.0
3.5

172. LITHUANIA
172. PALAU
].00
5.00
3.5
4.0
2.5
3.0
2.5
1.5
1.0
1.0
2.0
6.5

174. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

2.5

1.0

4.0

1.0

2.0

174. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
174. GRENADA
177. FINLAND
178. URUGUAY
178. DOMINICA
180. ICELAND
181. ANDORRA
181. BARBADOS
183. MARSHALL ISLANDS
184. SAMOA
184. KIRIBATI
186. VANUATU
187. LUXEMBOURG
188. LIECHTENSTEIN

2.85

2.85
2.80
2.75
2.75
2.65
2.55
2.55
2.50
2.45
2.45
2.40
2.35
2.00

5.0

2.0
3.0
3.0
2.5
4.0
2.5
3.5
4.5
3.5
4.5
2.5
3.5
2.0
].0
1.0
2.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.5
2.0
1.5

1.5

3.0
2.5
2.5
5.0
1.5
3.0
4.0
1.5
3.0
2.0
1.5
2.0
2.5

1.0

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.0
3.0
1.0
1.5

6.5

2.5
1.5
3.5
1.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
ó.5
2.0
6.5
5.5
1.5
1.5

189. SAN MARINO 1.90
190. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 1.80
191. TUVALU 1.70
192. NAURU 1.65
193. MONACO 1.60
2.0
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.0
2.5
1.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.0
2.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
5.0
3.0
1.0

A**ELDI X | Ranking tables 163

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

NON-
CRIMINAL RENEWABLE
MARKETS RESOURCE
(AVERAGE) CRII1ES

 

 

HEROIN
TRADE

 

 

COCAINE
TRADE

 

 

CANNABIS SYNTHETIC
TRADE DRUG TRADE

 

155. SOLONON ISLANDS
155. TIMOR-LESTE
155. LESOTHO
158. CYPRUS
158. MALDIVES 1ó0. ESTONIA
160. CANADA
162. ARMENIA
163. TONGA
1ó4. NEW ZEALAND
1ó4. SINGAPORE
1ó4. ESWATINI
167. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 168.BRUNEI
169. GEORGIA 1ó9. ST. LUCIA
3.55
3.55
3.55
3.50
3.50
3.45
3.45
3.40
3.30
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.20
3.15
3.05
3.05
2.5
2.0
5.5
2.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
2.0
1.5
1.5
3.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
2.5
3.5
2.0
6.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
1.5
3.0
4.0
3.0
1.0
2.5
3.5
1.0
2.5
2.5
5.5
4.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
2.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
7.0
1.5
2.0
7.0
8.5
5.5
4.5
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
2.0
5.5
7.0
/›.5 5.5
7.0
1.5
4.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
ó.5
5.0
4.0
ó.5
5.5
5.0
3.0
1.0
4.0
4.0
1.0

1ó9. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 3.05
1.5
3.0
ó.0
5.0
1.5

172. LITHUANIA
172. PALAU
174. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
174. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
3.00
3.00

2.85

2.85
2.0
1.5

1.0

1.0
4.0
1.5

1.0

1.0
4.5
3.0

7.5

3.0
4.0
3.0

7.5

3.5
4.0
5.0

1.0

].0

174. GRENADA 2.85
177. FINLAND 2.80
178. URUGUAY 2.75
178. DOMINICA 2.75
180. ICELAND 2.65
181. ANDORRA 2.55
181.BARBADOS 2.55
183. MARSHALL ISLANDS 2.50
184.SAMOA 2.45
184. KIRIBATI 2.45
186. VANUATU 2.40
187. LUXEMBOURG 2.35
188. LIECHTENSTEIN 2.00
189. SAN MARINO 1.90
190. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 1.80
191. TUVALU 1.70
192. NAURU 1.65
193. MONACO 1.60
3.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.5
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.0
1.0
3.5
1.5
1.0
15
2.0
1.0
1.5
2.0
1.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
1.5
3.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
ó.5
4.0
5.0
6.0
4.5
3.5
5.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.5
3.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
2.0
7.0
3.5
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
4.5
2.5
4.5
2.0
5.0
2.5
1.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
1.0
2.5
1.5
4.5
3.5
2.5
4.5
1.5
1.0
2.5
2.5
1.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.0
2.0

164 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

Crimina actor scores

 

 

COUNTRY
CRII IINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)

MAFIA-STYLE
GROUPS

CRIMINAL STATE-EMBEDDED FOREIGN NETWORKS ACTORS ACTORS

 

1. CONGO, DEM. REP.
2. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
3. HONDURAS
4. COLONBIA
4. NYANNAR
6. IRAQ
7. SYRIA
7. LEBANON
7. VENEZUELA
7. JAMAICA
11. PARAGUAY
12. TURKEY
12. PHILIPPINES
12. SUDAN
12. SOUTH SUDAN
16. NIGERIA 1ó. IRAN
16. AFGHANISTAN
16. KENYA
16. SOUTH AFRICA
16. YEMEN
22. MEXICO
22. SOMALIA
24. PANAMA
24. LIBYA
24. NOZANBIQUE
24. GUATEMALA
24. MONTENEGRO
29. SERBIA
29. EL SALVADOR
31. INDONESIA
31. UKRAINE
33. NEPAL
33. UGANDA
33. NICARAGUA
33. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
9.00
8.58

8.25
8.13
8.13
7.75
7.63
7.63
7.63
7.63
7.50
7.38
7.38
7.38
7.38
7.25
7.25
7.25
7.25
7.25
7.25
7.13
7.13
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00 ó.88 6.88
6.75
6.75
6.63
6.63 ó.63
6.63

9.0

9.0

8.5
9.5
9.0
6.5
4.5
6.0
9.5
8.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
6.5
4.5
5.5
7.0
7.5
7.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
9.5
7.5
8.0
3.5
7.5
7.5
ó.0
9.5
6.0
6.0
4.5
5.0
5.0

4.0

9.0

8.0

8.0
9.0
7.5
7.5
9.0
7.0
5.0
7.5
7.5
7.5
6.0
7.5
8.0
9.0
7.5
8.5
7.5
7.0
7.0
9.0
7.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
6.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
7.5
7.0
6.5
7.0
6.5

6.5

9.0

8.5

8.5
7.0
8.5
8.0
10.0
9.5
9.0
8.0
8.0
9.0
8.0
8.0
9.0
7.5
9.5
9.0
8.0
7.5
6.0
7.0
7.0
7.5
8.5
9.0
7.0
7.5
8.0
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
7.5
9.0

8.0

9.0

8.0

8.0
7.0
7.5
9.0
7.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
8.5
5.0
7.5
7.5
8.0
7.0
5.0
4.0
6.5
7.5
8.0
3.5
4.5
6.0
4.0
7.5
7.5
6.0
6.5
4.5
6.0
6.0
7.0
7.0
ó.0

8.0

A*PENDI X | Ranking tables 165

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

 

 

CRII•IINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)

 

 

 

 

 

 

MAFIA-STYLE
GROUPS

 

 

 

 

 

CRII•IINAL STATE-EMBEDDED FOREIGN NETWORKS ACTORS ACTORS

37. BRAZIL
37. PERU
37. VIETNAM
37. ECUADOR
41. CAMEROON
41. RUSSIA
41. CHAD
41. ITALY
45. PAKISTAN
45. COTE D'IVOIRE
45. SPAIN
45. KYRGYZSTAN
49. CHINA
49. NIGER
49. ZII 1BABWE
49. TAJIKISTAN
53. HAlTl
53. ALBANIA
53. GUINEA-BISSAU
53. AZERBAIJAN
57. GHANA
57. NADAGASCAR
57. PAPUA NEW GUINEA
57. KOREA, REP.
61. TANZANIA
61. BULGARIA
61. SIERRA LEONE
61. TOGO
61. BELARUS
61. GREECE
67. MALAYSIA
67. MALI
67. FRANCE
67. BURKINA FASO
67. NORTH NACEDONIA
67. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
73. CAMBODIA
6.50
6.50
6.50
6.50 ó.38 6.38
6.38
6.38
6.25
6.25
6.25
6.25 ó.13 6.13
6.13
6.13
6.00
6.00 ó.00 6.00
5.88
5.88
5.88
5.88
5.75
5.75
5.75
5.75
5.75
5.75
5.63
5.63
5.63
5.63
5.63
5.63
5.50
7.5
6.0
6.0
6.5
4.0
4.5
5.5
9.0
6.0
3.0
6.0
5.5
7.0
4.0
3.5
5.5
8.0
7.0
1.0
5.5
3.0
4.0
1.0
6.5
3.0
4.5
3.5
1.0
4.0
3.0
4.5
3.0
ó.0
3.5
4.0
6.0
2.5
6.5
8.0
7.0
5.5
7.5
7.5
6.5
3.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.5
7.5
7.0
7.5
5.0
6.0
7.5
8.0
5.5
6.5
5.0
8.0
6.0
7.0
6.5
5.5
7.0
5.0
6.5
5.5
7.0
6.5
6.5
6.5
5.0
4.0
8.5
7.0
7.0
6.5
8.0
8.5
8.5
6.5
7.0
7.0
5.0
8.5
7.0
8.5
8.0
9.0
7.0
7.0
8.5
7.5
7.5
7.5
8.0
4.5
7.0
7.5
7.0
7.5
9.0
7.5
6.0
8.5
3.0
6.5
6.0
5.0
8.5
3.5
5.0
6.0
7.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
7.0
4.5
8.0
7.5
4.5
3.0
5.0
5.5
5.0
3.0
2.5
6.5
5.5
6.5
7.0
6.5
6.5
6.0
4.5
7.0
7.5
5.0
6.0
6.5
4.0
7.0
6.0
6.0
6.5
7.0

166 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

COUNTRY

CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)

 

MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS

 

CRIMINAL STATE-EMBEDDED FOREIGN
NETWORKS ACTORS ACTORS

73. UNITED STATES
73. GUYANA 7ó. LAOS 7ó. ANGOLA
76. EGYPT
76. CROATIA
76. UZBEKISTAN
76. UNITED KINGDOM KOSOVO
82. BENIN
82. GUINEA
82. CONGO, REP.
82. ZANBIA
82. IRELAND
82. SURINAME
82. MALTA
89. SAUDI ARABIA
89. THAILAND
89. COSTA RICA
89. SLOVAKIA
89. ST. LUCIA
94. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
94. LIBERIA
94. BANGLADESH
94. GERMANY
94. GABON
94. PORTUGAL
94. JAPAN
94. MOLDOVA
94. ARGENTINA
94. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
104. JORDAN 104.BELIZE
104. TURKMENISTAN
104. SWEDEN
104. CYPRUS
109. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
109. INDIA
109. CHILE
109. MAURITANIA

5.50
5.50
5.38
5.38
5.38
5.38
5.38
5.38
5.38
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.13
5.13
5.13
5.13
5.13
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
4.88
4.88
4.88
4.88
4.88
4.75
4.75
4.75
4.75

5.0
3.0
1.5
5.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
4.0

 

1.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
6.0
2.5
1.5
3.0
1.5
6.5
3.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
5.5
5.0
1.0
4.5
ó.5
4.0
4.0
1.0
1.5
6.5
3.0
5.5
3.5
1.0
3.5
4.0
2.5

6.5
5.0
ó.0
5.5
5.5
6.5
4.5
ó.5

 

ó.0
5.0
ó.0
5.0
5.5
5.0
7.0
ó.5
5.0
6.0
6.0
4.0
5.5
ó.0
5.5
ó.5
5.0
6.0
5.5
4.0
ó.0
ó.5
7.0
3.5
3.5
5.5
5.0
ó.0
ó.0
5.5
4.5

5.0
8.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
6.5
7.0
5.0

 

ó.0
8.0
8.0
6.0
3.0
8.0
7.5
8.0
ó.5
1.5
6.5
5.5
5.5
ó.0
7.0
2.0
8.0
4.5
3.0
7.0
5.0
ó.5
ó.5
4.5
8.5
2.5
4.0
ó.0
ó.0
4.5
7.0

5.5
ó.0
8.0
5.0
5.0
4.5
5.0
8.0
5.5
8.0
7.0
4.0
7.0
6.5
5.5
5.0
3.0
7.5
6.5
5.0
6.0
4.0
5.0
2.0
6.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
4.5
5.0
4.5
6.0
7.0
6.0
3.5
5.0
5.0

A**ELDI X | Ranking tables 167

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)

 

 

MAFIA-STYLE
GROUPS

 

 

CRIMINAL STATE-EMBEDDED FOREIGN NETWORKS ACTORS ACTORS

 

109. NAMIBIA
109. SOLOMON ISLANDS
115. QATAR
115. SENEGAL
115. ETHIOPIA
115. NOROCCO
115. SRI LANKA
115. MAURITIUS
115. BURUNDI
115. ISRAEL
115. ERITREA
115. SLOVENIA
115. NALDIVES
126. GAMBIA
126. CZECH REPUBLIC
128. NETHERLANDS
128. ALGERIA
128. SWITZERLAND
128. KAZAKHSTAN
128. EQUATORIAL GUINEA
128. CABO VERDE
128. DJIBOUTI
128. TIMOR-LESTE 13ó. KOREA, DPR
136. HUNGARY
136. AUSTRALIA
136. LESOTHO 13ó. TONGA
141. KUWAIT
141. ROMANIA
141. AUSTRIA
141. MONGOLIA
141. ICELAND
141. SAN MARINO
147. BAHRAIN
147. BOLIVIA
147. FUI
147. ESWATINI
151. DENMARK
151. COMOROS

4.75
4.75
4.65
4.65
4.63
4.65
4.68
4.65
4.63
4.65
4.65
4.65
4.68
4.50
4.50
4.58
4.58
4.58
4.58
4.38
4.38
4.58
4.58
4.25
4.25
4.25
4.25
4.25
4.13
4.15
4.15
4.15
4.18
4.13
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
6.88
3.88
3.0
1.0
1.0
2.5
2.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
5.5
1.0
3.0
5.0
1.0
3.0
4.5
1.0
4.5
3.5
1.0
2.5
1.5
5.0
1.0
1.0
5.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
4.5
2.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
1.5
5.0
1.0

5.0
4.5
6.0
5.5
6.5
6.5
5.0
6.0
4.5
4.0
5.5
4.5
5.0
6.5
5.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
2.5
4.0
5.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
5.0
4.5
6.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
5.0
4.0
6.0
2.0
6.5
5.5
4.0
4.5

5.0
7.0
ó.0
4.5
4.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
9.0
5.0
9.5
6.0
4.0
6.5
5.5
2.5
7.0
1.5
6.0
9.0
4.0
5.0
4.5
10.0
7.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
ó.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
2.0
4.5
4.0
ó.0
3.0
5.0
2.0
6.0

6.0
ó.5
5.5
ó.0
6.0
4.0
2.5
4.5
4.0
4.0
2.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
4.5
4.5
4.5
7.5
4.0
5.0
7.0
ó.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
ó.5
3.5
4.0
6.5
5.5
5.0
6.0
5.0
4.5
5.5
4.0
4.5
4.0

168 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

COUNTRY

CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)

 

MAFIA-STYLE
GROUPS

 

CRIMINAL STATE-EMBEDDED FOREIGN NETWORKS ACTORS ACTORS

 

151. CANADA
151. BARBADOS
155. SEYCHELLES
155. ESTONIA
155. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
155. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
159. BELGIUM
159. POLAND
159. NORWAY
159. BAHAMAS
159. BOTSWANA
159. BHUTAN
159. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
159. LITHUANIA 1ó7. MALAWI 1ó8. OMAN 1ó8. TUNISIA
168. LATVIA
168. ANDORRA
172. RWANDA
172. NEW ZEALAND
172. GRENADA
172. MONACO 17ó. ARMENIA
177. SINGAPORE
178. CUBA
178. GEORGIA
178. PALAU
181. FINLAND
181. URUGUAY
183. DOMINICA
184. BRUNEI
184. LUXEMBOURG 18ó. KIRIBATI
187. MARSHALL ISLANDS
188. VANUATU
189. NAURU
190. LIECHTENSTEIN
190. SAO TONE AND
PRINCIPE
192. SAMOA
193. TUVALU

3.88
3.88
3.75
3.75

3.75

3.75

3.63
3.63
3.63
3.ó3
3.63
3.63
Z.63 3.63
3.50
3.38
3.38
3.38
3.38
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.25
3.13
3.00
2.88
2.88
2.88
16]
2.63
2.50
2.38
2.38
2.25
2.13
2.00
1.88
1.75

1.75

1.ó3
1.38

5.0
5.0
2.0
5.0

Z.0

1.0

3.0
2.0
4.5
3.5
1.0
4.0
Z.0
3.5
2.0
1.0
1.0
3.5
1.0
1.0
4.5
4.0
1.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
2.5
1.0
3.0
1.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

1.0
1.0

4.0
4.5
4.5
5.0

5.0

5.5

4.5
5.5
4.0
2.0
5.5
3.5
3.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
3.0
3.5
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
2.5
3.0
4.0
3.0
4.5
5.0
2.5
2.0
4.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.5

Z.0

2.0
1.0

Z.0
4.0
4.5
2.0

Z.0

].0
20
3.5
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
5.5
2.0
1.5
5.0
1.5
3.0
3.5
3.5
1.5
4.0
30
2.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.5
1.5

2.0

1.5
1.5

4.5
2.0
4.0
5.0

6.0

5.5

5.0
3.5
4.0
ó.0
5.0
4.0
5.5
3.0
5.0
3.5
3.0
4.5
7.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
5.5
3.0
4.0
1.0
3.0
4.5
3.0
2.5
2.5
4.0
5.0
2.5
3.5
3.5
2.0
3.0

2.0
2.0
2.0

 

170 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

Resilience scores

 

 

COUNTRY
POLITICAL GOVERNMENT
LEADERSHIP TRANSPARENCY NATIONAL JUDICIAL
RESILIENCE AND AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES SYSTEM AND LAW (AVERAGE) GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY COOPERATION AND LAWS DETENTION ENFORCEMENT

 

1. FINLAND
1. LIECHTENSTEIN
3. NEW ZEALAND
4. DENMARK
5. ICELAND
O. AUSTRALIA
7. NORWAY
8. UNITED KINGDOM
9. ESTONIA
10. ANDORRA
10. URUGUAY
12. SINGAPORE
13. GERMANY
14. KOREA, REP.
15. LUXEMBOURG 1ó. SWEDEN
1ó. JAPAN
18. NETHERLANDS
18. AUSTRIA
18. LATVIA
21. IRELAND
22. CANADA
23. LITHUANIA
24. SWITZERLAND
25. BELGIUM
26. FRANCE
27. SPAIN
28. UNITED STATES
29. PORTUGAL
30. CHILE
31. ARGENTINA
31. CABO VERDE
33. ITALY
34. CZECH REPUBLIC
35. POLAND 3b. SLOVENIA
37. TUVALU

8.42
8.42
8.ó8 8.21 8.04 7.96 7.92 7.88 7.85 7.75 7.75 7.71 7.67 7.54 7.50 7.46 7.46 7.42 7.42 7.42 7.38 7.25
7.21 7.13 7.00 6.83 ó.63 ó.58
6.46
6.42
6.33 ó.33 6.29 ó.25
6.13
6.08
6.04
9.0
9.0
8.5
9.0
7.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
8.0
7.5
7.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
7.5
7.0
7.5
7.0
7.5
7.5
9.0
7.0
6.0
6.0
4.5
7.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
6.5
6.0
5.5
6.0
5.5

8.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
7.5
8.5
8.5
7.5
8.0
7.0
9.0
7.5
7.5
7.0
ó.5
9.0
7.5
8.0
ó.5
ó.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
7.0
7.0
ó.0
5.5
5.5
7.0
5.0
ó.0
5.0
5.5
4.0
5.0
5.5
9.0
7.5
8.5
8.5
8.5
9.0
9.0
8.0
8.5
8.0
9.0
9.0
8.0
8.0
9.0
8.5
9.0
8.0
7.0
8.5
8.0
8.0
7.5
7.5
8.0
8.5
8.0
7.0
7.5
8.0
6.0
8.5
8.5
7.0
7.0
6.5
5.0

8.0
9.0
8.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
8.5
8.5
8.0
8.0
7.0
8.5
8.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
7.5
7.5
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
6.5
7.0
6.0
7.0
7.0
8.0
6.5
7.0
6.5
6.5

8.0
9.0
8.0
7.5
8.5
8.0
8.0
8.5
8.0
8.0
7.0
9.0
7.5
8.5
7.5
7.0
8.0
7.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
7.0
7.5
7.0
6.0
ó.5
7.0
ó.0
5.5
6.0
6.0
7.0
5.0
ó.5
5.5
6.0
8.0

8.0
8.0
8.5
8.0
8.5
8.0
8.5
7.5
7.0
8.0
8.0
9.0
7.5
8.0
7.0
ó. 5
7.5
7.5
8.5
7.5
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.5
7.0
7.0
8.0
8.0
7.5
4.0
6.5
ó.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
7.0

Rank ing tables
171

 

 

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

ANTI- MONEY ECONOMIC VICTIM AND RESILIENCE TERRITORIAL LAUNDERING REGULATORY WITNESS
(AVERAGE) INTEGRITY SYSTEMS CAPACITY SUPPORT PREVENCION

 

NON-STATE
ACTORS

 

1. FINLAND
1. LIECHTENSTEIN
3. NEW ZEALAND
4. DENMARK
5. ICELAND
6. AUSTRALIA
7. NORWAY
8. UNITED KINGDOM
9. ESTONIA
10. ANDORRA
10. URUGUAY
12. SINGAPORE
13. GERMANY
14. KOREA, REP.
15. LUXEMBOURG
16. SWEDEN
16. JAPAN
18. NETHERLANDS
18. AUSTRIA
18. LATVIA
21. IRELAND
22. CANADA
23. LITHUANIA
24. SWITZERLAND
25. BELGIUM
2ó. FRANCE
27. SPAIN
28. UNITED STATEN
29. PORTUGAL
30. CHILE
31. ARGENTINA
31. CABO VERDE
33. ITALY
54. CZECH REPUBLIC
35. POLAND
SLOVENIA
37. TUVALU

8.42
8.42
8.58
8.21
8.04
7.96
7.92
7.88
7.83
7.75
7.75
7.71
7.67
7.54
7.50
7.46
7.46
7.42
7.42
7.42
7.38
7.25
7.21
7.13
7.00 ó.83 ó.63 ó. 58
6.46
6.42
6.33 ó.33 6.29 ó.25
6.13
6.08
6.04
9.0
9.5
8.5
8.5
8.5
9.0
8.0
8.5
8.0
8.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
7.0
8.0
8.0
8.5
6.0
8.0
8.5
8.0
ó.0
8.0
8.5
6.0
5.0
5.5
ó.5
6.0
4.0
6.0
7.5
ó.5
7.0
7.5
7.5
6.5

8.5
5.0
8.0
5.5
8.0
7.0
7.0
ó.5
7.5
6.0
7.0
7.0
6.5
7.0
ó.0
7.5
8.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
8.0
ó.5
6.5
5.0
7.0
8.0
ó.5
ó.5
6.5
6.5
7.0
5.0
5.5
ó.0
7.0
6.5
6.0
9.0
8.5
8.5
8.5
8.5
7.0
7.5
7.5
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
ó.5
8.0
7.5
8.0
6.5
7.0
8.0
8.0
7.5
7.5
6.0
7.0
8.0
ó.0
8.0
5.5
7.0
6.0
ó.0
5.0
ó.0
7.5
5.0
6.0

8.0
9.5
8.5
7.5
7.0
7.5
7.5
7.5
7.5
8.5
7.5
7.0
8.0
ó.5
7.0
6.0
5.5
8.0
8.0
7.5
7.0
8.5
7.0
8.0
7.5
5.0
6.5
7.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
55
5.5
5.5
5.0
6.0
4.5

8.0
9.5
8.0
8.5
7.5
7.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.0
7.0
9.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
7.5
5.5
ó.0
6.5
6.0
6.5
ó.5
5.0
ó.0
5.5
6.5
5.5
ó.0
5.5
ó.0
6.0
6.0
5.0

8.0
8.5
8.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
9.0
7.5
8.5
8.5
3.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.5
8.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
8.0
7.5
8.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
7.5
7.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
6.0
7.0

172 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY
POLITICAL GOVERNMENT
LEADERSHIP TRANSPARENCY NATIONAL JUDICIAL
RESILIENCE AND AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES SYSTEM AND LAW (AVERAGE) GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY COOPERATION AND LAWS DETENTION ENFORCEMENT

38. ISRAEL
39. JORDAN
40. COLOMBIA
40. MALAYSIA
42. SOUTH AFRICA
43. ECUADOR
43. ARMENIA
43. BARBADOS
43. GEORGIA
47. MAURITIUS
47. SAMOA
49. ST. LUCIA
49. BOTSWANA
51. QATAR
51. CROATIA
51. SENEGAL
51. ROMANIA
55. KUWAIT
55. BAHRAIN
57. NIGERIA
57. COSTA RICA
57. RWANDA
60. CHINA ó0. JAMAICA
6.00
5.92
5.83
5.83
5.79
5.71
5.71
5.71
5.71
5.67
5.ó7 5.ó5 5.ó5 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.58 5.54 5.54 5.50
5.50

5.50

5.4ó

5.4ó

6.0
7.0
7.0
4.5
6.0
5.0
6.0
5.5

5.0

6.0
4.5
7.5
6.0
5.0

5.0

5.5

5.5

5.0
6.0
5.5
7.0
5.5
6.0
5.0

5.0
5.0

5.5
5.5
5.5

5.5
6.0
7.0
6.5

6.0
5.0

ó.5

5.0
5.5

5.5
4.0
5.5

4.5

5.0

5.0
6.5
5.5
4.0
5.5

6.0
8.0
9.0
7.0
6.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.0

6.5
5.0

6.5
8.0
5.5

6.5
6.0
6.5
6.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
6.0
6.5

7.0
6.5
7.0

7.0

6.5
6.5
6.0
6.0
6.5
6.0
6.5
6.5
6.0
5.0
6.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
7.0

5.5

5.0
4.5

5.5

5.0
6.0
5.5
4.5
4.5

15
5.5
6.0
6.0
ó. 5
5.0

5.0

5.0
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5

5.0

5.0

5.0
4.0

5.5
7.0
6.0
5.5

5.0

6.0
6.0
6.5

6.5

5.5

6.5
4.5

5.0
5.5
6.0
6.0
5.5
6.0
5.0
4.5

5.0

7.0

5.5
6.0

ó0. ST. VINCENT AND THE 5.46
GRENADINES
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.5
6.0
4.5

83. GHANA b3. ETHIOPIA ó3. SLOVAKIA b3. CUBA
63. MONACO
5.38
5.38
5. 38
5.38
5.38
5.5

5.0

5.5
6.5
3.5
5.5
5.0

5.0

2.5
4.0
6.5
6.0
7.0
6.5
5.0
5.0
6.0
6.5
6.0
6.0
5.0

5.0

5.0
3.0
8.0
4.5
4.0

5.5
7.0

7.0

68. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 5.33
5.5
5.0
5.5
5.5
5.5
6.0

68. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
68. VANUATU
71. BULGARIA
72. INDIA
72. GREECE
72. OMAN
72. FIJI
76. KENYA

5.33

 

5.29
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.21

ó.5

5.0

4.5
4.0
5.5
4.5
6.0
5.0

5.0

6.0
5.0

5.5

5.0
4.5

5.5
4.5

5.5

6.0
6.5
7.5
6.5
6.5
5.0

7.0

5.5

6.5
6.0
4.5

6.0
6.5
5.5
6.0

5.5

7.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

5.5
4.5

5.5

6.0

6.5

5.5

5.5

5.0
7.5

5.0

4.5

Rank ing tables
17¥

 

 

 

COUNTRY
ANTI- MONEY ECONOMIC VICTIM AND RESILIENCE TERRITORIAL LAUNDERING REGULATORY WITNESS
(AVERAGE) INTEGRITY SYSTEMS CAPACITY SUPPORT PREVENCION

NON-STATE
ACTORS

 

38. ISRAEL
39. JORDAN
40. COLOMBIA
40. MALAYSIA
42. SOUTH AFRICA
43. ECUADOR
43. ARMENIA
43. BARBADOS
43. GEORGIA
47. MAURITIUS
47. SAMOA
49. ST. LUCIA
49. BOTSWANA
51. QATAR
51. CROATIA
51. SENEGAL
51. ROMANIA
55. KUWAIT
55. BAHRAIN
57. NIGERIA
57. COSTA RICA
57. RWANDA
60. CHINA
60. JAMAICA
6.00
5.92
5.83
5.83
5.79
5.71
5.71
5.71
5.71
5.67
5.ó7
5.65
5.63
5.58
5.58
5.58
5.58
5.54
5.54
5.50
5.50
5.50
5.4ó
5.4ó

3.5
6.0
4.5
5.5
6.0
4.5
5.5
6.0
5.0
5.5
7.5
5.5
5.0
7.0
6.5
6.5
6.5
5.5
6.5
4.5
5.0
6.0
7.0
65

7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
6.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
15
6.0
4.0
4.5
6.0
6.5
5.0
5.5
5.5
5.5
5.0
4.0
6.0
6.0
4.5

7.0
4.0
5.0
7.0
6.0
5.5
5.5
3.5
5.0
7.0
5.0
5.5
5.5
6.0
4.5
5.5
5.0
6.5
6.0
6.5
4.5
6.0
7.0
4.5

6.0
4.5
3.5
6.0
4.0
5.0
5.5
5.5
7.0
5.5
5.0
5.0
5.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
5.0
5.5
5.5
5.0
5.0
5.5
4.0
5.0

6.0
6.5
4.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
5.5
5.0
6.0
6.0
4.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.5
5.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
6.0

8.0
5.5
6.5
5.5
7.0
7.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
7.0
4.0
ó.0
4.5
5.0
7.0
5.0
5.5
4.0
6.5
6.5
3.5
2.0
ó.5

ó0. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

6.0

5.5

4.0

3.0

6.0

6.0

63. GHANA ó3. ETHIOPIA ó3. SLOVAKIA
CUBA
63. MONACO
5.38
5.38
5.38
5.38
5.38
6.0
6.0
6.0
8.0
6.0
6.0
7.0
5.0
5.5
4.5
6.0
6.0
4.5
5.5
4.0
3.5
4.5
4.5
4.0
8.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
7.0
4.5
7.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
4.0

68. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 5.33
68. MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)
5.5

6.0
4.0

4.0
5.5

4.0
6.5

4.5
6.5

5.5
5.0

6.0

68. VANUATU
71. BULGARIA
72. INDIA
72. GREECE
72. OMAN
72. FIJI
76. KENYA
5.33
5.29
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.21
5.0
6.5
ó.5
5.5
5.5
4.5
6.0
4.0
6.0
6.0
5.5
5.0
6.0
6.0
3.5
4.5
5.0
5.5
4.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
4.5
3.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
3.5
6.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
6.5

174 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

 

COUNTRY
POLITICAL GOVERNMENT
LEADERSHIP TRANSPARENCY NATIONAL JUDICIAL
RESILIENCE AND AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES SYSTEM AND LAW (AVERAGE) GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY COOPERATION AND LAWS DETENTION ENFORCEMENT

 

7ó. NORTH MACEDONIA 5.21
7ó. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 5.21
76. SOLOMON ISLANDS 5.21
76. BAHAMAS 5.21
76. TONGA 5.21
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
5.0
4.5
5.0
4.5
6.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
5.5
6.0
6.5
5.0
7.0
4.5
6.0
6.0
5.0
3.5
5.5
3.5
4.0
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.0
5.0

82. MALTA
83. SAN MARINO
84. HUNGARY
84. MONGOLIA
84. DOMINICA
87. BRAZIL
87. ALBANIA
5.17
5.13
5.08
5.08
5.08
5.04
5.04
4.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
3.5
5.0
5.5
4.5
4.0
3.5
5.0
4.0
4.5
4.5
7.5
5.5
5.0
6.0
6.0
7.5
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.5
6.5
5.0
4.5
6.0
4.5
6.5
5.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
5.0
5.5
5.0
5.5

87. MARSHALL ISLANDS 5.04
90. GAMBIA 5.00
90. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 5.00
92. NAMIBIA 4.96
93. SERBIA 4.92
5.5
5.0
6.0
5.0
4.5
4.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.5
6.0
7.0
6.0
6.0
5.0
6.5
6.5
5.0
6.5
5.0
7.0
4.5
5.0
4.0
5.5
4.5
4.5
5.0

93. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
95. BOLIVIA 9ó. PANAMA 9ó. TUNISIA
98. KAZAKHSTAN
99. VIETNAM
99. THAILAND

4.9Z

4.88
4.83
4.83
4.71
4.67
4.67

6.0

5.0
4.5
4.5
5.0
5.0
5.0

5.0

4.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
4.5

7.0

5.0
6.0
5.0
5.5
5.5
6.0

7.0

6.0
6.0
6.5
5.5
5.5
5.5

6.0

3.5
3.0
4.5
5.0
4.0
4.0

5.0

5.0
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
5.0

99. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 4.67
5.0
5.0
7.0
5.0
4.0
4.5

99. GRENADA
99. NAURU
104. MOROCCO
104. ALGERIA 10ó. PERU
106. BHUTAN
106. SEYCHELLES
106. BRUNEI
110. PALAU
111. DJIBOUTI
112. MEXICO
112. MONTENEGRO
114. GUATEMALA
114. CÓTE D'IVOIRE
4.ó7 4.ó7 4.63 4.63 4.58 4.58 4.58 4.58 4.54 4.50 4.46 4.46 4.42 4.42
5.0
5.0
4.5
4.5
3.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
6.5
4.5
3.0
3.5
3.5
4.5
5.0
4.5

 

4.0
5.5
6.0
5.0
4.0
5.5
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
4.5
6.0
4.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
5.5
5.5
6.0
5.0
6.5
6.0
6.0
6.0
4.5
5.5
4.5
5.5
5.5
6.0
5.0
5.5
4.5
5.0
6.0
4.0
4.0
6.0
5.5
6.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.5
4.0
5.5
6.0
5.5
5.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
3.5
5.0
5.0

Rank ing tables 175

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY

 

 

 

ANTI- MONEY ECONOMIC VICTIM AND RESILIENCE TERRITORIAL LAUNDERING REGULATORY WITNESS
(AVERAGE) INTEGRITY SYSTEMS CAPACITY SUPPORT PREVENCION

 

 

NON-STATE
ACTORS

 

76. NORTH MACEDONIA 5.21
76. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 5.21
76. SOLOMON ISLANDS 5.21
76. BAHAMAS 5.21
76. TONGA 5.21
6.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.5
5.5
6.0
5.0
4.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.5
6.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
6.5
5.0
4.0
6.0
5.0
5.5
4.0
6.0

82. MALTA
83. SAN MARINO
84. HUNGARY
84. MONGOLIA
84. DOMINICA
87. BRAZIL
87. ALBANIA
5.17
5.13
5.08
5.08
5.08
5.04
5.04
4.5
6.0
7.0
5.0
6.0
5.5
5.5
4.5
4.0
5.5
4.0
5.0
6.0
4.0
6.5
5.5
4.5
3.5
5.0
6.0
4.0
7.5
5.5
4.5
4.0
5.0
5.0
4.5
4.0
4.5
6.0
6.5
6.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
5.5
4.0
6.5
5.0
6.5
4.5

87. MARSHALL ISLANDS 5.04
90. GAMBIA 5.00
90. ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 5.00
92. NAMIBIA 4.96
93. SERBIA 4.92
5.5
6.5
6.0
15
6.0
4.0
5.5
5.5
4.5
5.5
6.0
5.5
Z.0
5.0
5.0

 

2.5
2.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
4.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
5.0
6.0
3.5

95. SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
95. BOLIVIA
96. PANAMA
9ó. TUNISIA
98. KAZAKHSTAN
99. VIETNAM
99. THAILAND

4.92

4.88
4.83
4.83
4.71
4.67
4.67

5.0

5.0
6.0
5.5
5.0
5.0
4.0

3.0

4.5
4.5
5.5
5.0
5.5
4.5

3.0

5.0
6.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
4.5

4.0

5.0
4.0
4.5
4.5
5.0
4.5

3.0

6.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
5.0

5.0

4.5
5.5
5.5

 

Z.0
3.5

99. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 4.67
5.5
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
5.0

99. GRENADA
99. NAURU
104. MOROCCO
104. ALGERIA 10ó. PERU
106. BHUTAN
106. SEYCHELLES 10ó. BRUNEI
110. PALAU
111. DJIBOUTI
112. MEXICO
112. MONTENEGRO
114. GUATEMALA
114. CÓTE D'IVOIRE
4.ó7
4.ó7
4.65
4.63
4. 58
4. 58
4.58
4. 58
4.54
4. 50
4.46
4.46
4.42
4.42
6.0
7.5
6.0
6.5
5.0
3.5
4.5
5.5
4.0
6.0
3.0
5.0
15
4.0
4.0
6.0

 

4.5
4.5
4.0
5.0
5.5
4.5
5.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
4.5
4.0
5.0
5.0
6.5
4.0
5.5
5.0
4.0
4.0
3.5
5.0
2.0
4.5
3.0
3.5
3.5
4.0
3.5
2.0
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
1.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
2.0

 

3.5
4.5
3.5
4.0
3.5
4.5
3.0
5.0
4.5
5.0
4.5

176 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

 

 

COUNTRY
POLITICAL GOVERNMENT
LEADERSHIP TRANSPARENCY NATIONAL JUDICIAL
RESILIENCE AND AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES SYSTEM AND LAW (AVERAGE) GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY COOPERATION AND LAWS DETENTION ENFORCEMENT

 

114. ANGOLA

114. CYPRUS

 

118. INDONESIA
118. ZAMBIA
118. ANTIGUAAND BARBUDA
118. KIRIBATI
122. SAUDI ARABIA
122. GUYANA
122. MALAWI
125. KYRGYZSTAN
126. PHILIPPINES
126. BANGLADESH
128. AZERBAIJAN
129. RUSSIA
129. TANZANIA
129. EGYPT
129. SRI LANKA
133. LEBANON
133. PAKISTAN
133. UKRAINE
133. TOGO
137. UGANDA
138. HONDURAS
138. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
138. CAMBODIA
141. MALDIVES
142. IRAQ
142. BELARUS
142. UZBEKISTAN
145. NEPAL
145. EL SALVADOR
145. MOLDOVA
148. TIMOR—LESTE
148. LESOTHO
150. BURKINA FASO
151. TURKEY
151. BENIN
153. IRAN
4.42
4.42

 

4.33
4.33

4.33

4.33
429
4.29
4.Z9
4.17
4.13
4.13
4.08
4.04
4.04

4.04

4.04

4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
196
3.92

3.92

3.92
5.88
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.71
3.71
3.71
3.67
3.67
3.63
5.54
3. 54

3.50
5.0
5.0

 

4.0
4.0

4.5

5.5
5.0
5.0
5.0

3.5
6.0
3.5

3.5
4.0

5.5

3.5
4.0
4.5

3.5

 

3.0
5.0

2.5

1.0

4.5

5.0

4.5

3.5

5.0
Z.5
2.5
3.5

5.0
4.0

 

3.0
4.0
8.0
4.5

5.0

 

3.5

8.0

5.0

5.5
3.5

5.0
4.5
3.0
6.0
4.0
5.5
5.0
Z.0
3.0
3.5

3.5

3.5

4.0
3.0
Z.0
3.5

4.0

3.5

5.0

5.0
2.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
3.5

5.0
3.5

4.0
3.0
4.5

2.5
5.0
6.5

 

5.5

5.0

5.0

5.5
5.0

5.0
4.5
4.5
5.0
5.5
5.5
4.5
4.0
4.5

5.5

6.5
5.0

5.5

5.5
5.0

5.5

5.0

5.0

5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.5

5.5
4.5
3.5
6.0
5.5

3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
6.0

 

5.0

6.5

5.0

6.0
4.5
3.0
5.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.5
5.5
4.5
5.5
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
5.0
4.0

4.0

4.5

5.0
4.0
4.0
4.0

 

5.0

5.0

4.5

5.5

5.0

4.5
3.0
4.0

 

4.0

 

3.5

5.0

3.0

4.0
B0
4.0
4.0
3.0
4.5
5.0
2.5
4.0
5.0

 

3.5

4.0

5.0
4.5

 

4.0
3.0

B.5

4.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
3.5
4.5

5.5

 

4.0
4.0

4.0

5.0
4.5
2.5

4.0

 

2.0
4.0
4.0
4.5
4.0
5.0

3.5

3.5
4.0

4.0
4.0

4.5

B.5

4.5

4.0

3.5

5.0

 

4.5
3.0
3.5

4.5

5.0
].0
3.0
4.0

Rank ing tables
177

 

 

 

COUNTRY
ANTI- MONEY ECONOMIC VICTIM AND RESILIENCE TERRITORIAL LAUNDERING REGULATORY WITNESS
(AVERAGE) INTEGRITY SYSTEMS CAPACITY SUPPORT PREVENCION

NON-STATE
ACTORS

 

114. ANGOLA
114. CYPRUS

 

118. INDONESIA
118. ZAMBIA
118. ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
118. KIRIBATI
122. SAUDI ARABIA
122. GUYANA
122. MALAWI
125. KYRGYZSTAN
126. PHILIPPINES
126. BANGLADESH
128. AZERBAIJAN
129. RUSSIA
129. TANZANIA
129. EGYPT
129. SRI LANKA
133. LEBANON
133. PAKISTAN
133. UKRAINE
133. TOGO
137. UGANDA
138. HONDURAS
138. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
138. CAMBODIA
141. MALDIVES
142. IRAQ
142. BELARUS
142. UZBEKISTAN
145. NEPAL
145. EL SALVADOR
145. MOLDOVA
148. TIMOR—LESTE
148. LESOTHO
150. BURKINA FASO
151. TURKEY
151. BENIN
153. IRAN
4.4Z
4.4Z

 

4.33
4.33

4.33

4.33
4.29
4.29
4.29
4.17
4.13
4.13
4.08
4.04
4.04
4.04
4.04
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.96
3.92

3.92
3.92
3.88
3.79
3.79
3.79
3.71
3.71
3.71
3.67
3.67
5.65
3.54
3.54
3.50
6.0
3.0

 

4.0
3.5

4.0

4.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
4.5
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.5
4.5
6.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
5.5
4.5

4.0

4.5
3.0
55
4.5
4.5
4.0
5.0
Z.0
5.0
2.5
5.0
6.5
3.5
5.5
5.0
3.0

 

4.5
5.0

2.5

4.0
5.5
4.0
6.0
3.0
5.0
4.5
4.5
4.0
5.5
6.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
4.0

4.0

4.0
3.5
4.0
4.5

 

5.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
5.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
2.5
4.0
3.5

 

4.5
5.0

5.0

5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
15
4.0
4.0
5.0
4.5
5.0
2.0
4.0
4.5
4.5
3.5
3.5

3.5

4.0
3.0
15
5.0
4.5
4.5
Z.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
4.0

 

5.0
5.0

4.0

1.0
4.5
5.0
Z.0
4.5
5.0
15
4.0
Z.5
3.0
3.0
3.0
5.0
3.5

 

4.5
Z.0
3.0

4.0

3.0
Z.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.5
4.0
5.0
3.5
2.5
2.5
4.0
3.0
4.0
15
3.5

 

4.5
5.0

4.5

5.0
5.0
5.0
3.5
5.0
4.0
4.0
5.0

 

3.0
2.5
2.5
3.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.5

4.0

3.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
5.0

 

4.5
3.0
3.5
2.0
2.0

 

Z.0
3.0
3.0
4.0

 

4.0
5.0

5.5

5.5
5.0
5.0
5.5
5.5
3.0
4.0
3.5

 

1.5
2.5
3.5
5.5
4.5
5.0
4.5
4.5
4.5

4.5

2.5
5.0
4.5
5.0

 

5.0
4.0
4.0
4.5
4.0
5.0

 

4.5
3.0

178 Global Crime Index - 2024

 

 

 

COUNTRY
POLITICAL GOVERNMENT
LEADERSHIP TRANSPARENCY NATIONAL JUDICIAL
RESILIENCE AND AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES SYSTEM AND LAW (AVERAGE) GOVERNANCE
ACCOUNTABILITY COOPERATION AND LAWS DETENTION ENFORCEMENT

 

154. SIERRA LEONE
155. MYANMAR
155. LAOS
146
3.42
3.42

 

3.0
6.0
5.5
3.0
2.5
4.0
5.0
3.5
2.5
4.5
4.0
2.0
3.5
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.0

155. PAPUA NEW GUINEA 3.42
158. PARAGUAY 3.38
158. MADAGASCAR 3.38
1ó0. MOZAMBIQUE 3.29
5.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
5.5
4.5
5.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
4.0
5.5
4.5
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
2.0

1ó1. CONGO, REP.
161. ESWATINI
163. NIGER
164. ZIMBABWE
1ó4. LIBERIA
164. GABON 1ó7. CAMEROON
167. BELIZE
169. MAURITANIA
170. SUDAN
171. GUINEA
172. AFGHANISTAN
172. HAITI
172. TAJIKISTAN
175. NICARAGUA
175. CHAD
177. GUINEA—BISSAU
178. MALI
178. COMOROS
180. ERITREA
181. CONGO, DEM. REP.
3.25
3.25
3.21
3.17
3.17
3.17
3.13
3.13
3.08
2.96
2.83
2.ó7
2.67
2.67
2.46
2.4ó
2.42
2.58
2.38
2.33
2.29
3.0
3.0
3.5
2.0

 

2.0
Z.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
2.0
5.0
Z.0
3.0
2.0
3.5
2.0
2.0
Z.0
1.0

1.0
1.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
5.0
2.0
1.5
2.5
3.5
2.0
3.0
2.5
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.5
2.5
5.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
5.0
5.0
5.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.5
5.0
B.0
4.0
3.0
Z.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
4.5
3.0
3.5
4.5
3.5
3.0
4.0
2.0
3.5
2.5
3.0
2.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
2.0
2.5
2.5
3.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
4.0
2.5
3.5
3.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
2.5
2.0
3.0
2.5
2.0
2.0
2.5
4.5
3.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
4.5
4.0
4.5
3.0
3.5
3.5
3.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
2.5
3.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
1.5

182. SURINAME 2.25
183. TURKMENISTAN 2.17
183. EQUATORIAL GUINEA 2.17
185. BURUNDI 2.08
18ó. YEMEN 2.00
5.0
2.0
1.5
Z.5
Z.0
2.0
1.5
1.0

1.0
2.0
5.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
3.0
2.0
2.5
5.5
Z.5
Z.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
2.0

187. KOREA, DPR
188. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
188. VENEZUELA
190. SYRIA
191. SOUTH SUDAN
192. SOMALIA
193. LIBYA
1.96

1.92

1.92
1.88
1.83
1.67
1.54
3.5

1.5

2.0

2.0
2.0
1.0
1.5
1.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0
1.0
1.5
Z.0

1.0

1.5

3.0

2.0

2.0
2.5
Z.0

2.5

Z.0
2.0
5.0
2.0
2.0
1.5

2.0

1.5

1.5

2.0

2.0
1.5
1.5

1.5

1.5

2.0

2.0
1.5
1.5

Overview: measuring the global illicit economy
179

 

 

 

COUNTRY
ANTI- MONEY ECONOMIC VICTIM AND RESILIENCE TERRITORIAL LAUNDERING REGULATORY WITNESS
(AVERAGE) INTEGRITY SYSTEMS CAPACITY SUPPORT PREVENCION

NON-STATE
ACTORS

 

154. SIERRA LEONE

155. MYANMAR
155. LAOS
3.46
3.42

3.42
4.0
3.0
2.5
3.5
3.0
3.5
3.0
3.0
4.0
2.5
2.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.5
5.0
4.0
3.5

155. PAPUA NEW GUINEA 3.42
158. PARAGUAY 3.38
158. MADAGASCAR 3.38
160. MOZAMBIQUE 3.29
161. CONGO, REP.
161. ESWATINI
5.0
5.0

5.0

 

3.0
3.5
4.5
2.5
5.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.5
3.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
2.5

1ó3. NIGER
1ó4. ZIMBABWE
1ó4. LIBERIA
164. GABON
167. CAMEROON
167. BELIZE
169. MAURITANIA
170. SUDAN
171. GUINEA
172. AFGHANISTAN
172. HAITI
172. TAJIKISTAN
175. NICARAGUA
175. CHAD
177. GUINEA—BISSAU
178. MALI
178. COMOROS
180. ERITREA
3.21
3.17
5.17 ó.17 3.13
3.13
3.08
2.9ó
2.83
2.ó7 2.67 2.67 2.46 2.46 2.42 2. 38 2. 38
4.0
5.0

4.0
4.5
Z.0
Z.0
4.5

2.5

5.0
5.0
Z.0
2.5

2.5

55
3.0
1.5
3.0
7.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
2.0
3.5
2.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
3.0
3.5
3.0
2.0
2.5
2.5
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
2.0
2.5
1.5
3.0
2.5
3.0
5.5
2.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
2.0
3.0
2.5
2.0
2.0

1.0
5.0
2.5
3.0
1.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.5
1.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
5.5
2.5
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
4.0
4.0
2.5
5.0
4.0
2.5
2.0
3.0
2.0
4.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
5.0
2.0
1.0

181. CONGO, DEM. REP. 229
182. SURINAME 2.25
183. TURKMENISTAN 2.17
183. EQUATORIAL GUINEA 2.17
185. BURUNDI 2.08
18ó. YEMEN 2.00
2.0
2.0
2.0
5.5
3.O
2.0
2.0
1.0
3.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.5

1.5
1.0
2.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2.5
2.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
2.5
2.0

187. KOREA, DPR
188. CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

188. VENEZUELA

190. SYRIA

191. SOUTH SUDAN
192. SOMALIA
193. LIBYA
1.96

1.92

1.92

1.88
1.83
1.ó7 1.54
6.0

1.5

3.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5
1.0

2.0

1.5
Z.0
1.5

2.5

1.0
1.5

1.5

1.0
2.5
2.5
1.5
2.0
1.0

3.0

1.0
Z.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

1.0

Z.0
Z.0
1.5

1.5

1.0
1.5

2.0

4.0
1.0
2.0
2.5
1.5

180 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

 

 

 

1. See, for example, INTERPOL, Global operation sees a rise in fake medical products related
to COVID-19, 19 March 2020, https://www. interpol.int/News and Events/News/2020/ Global-ope
ation-se es-a-rise-in-lake-medical- products-reIated-to-COVID-19;EUROPOL, How COVID-19-reIated
crime infected Europe during 2020, 12 November 2020, https://www.europol.
europa.eu/pubIications-documents/how-covid-19- reIated-crime-infected-europe-during-2020; Lyes
Tagziria, #CovidCrimeWatch — Autumn, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,
9 December 2020, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/ analysis/covidcrimewatch-autumn/; Rachel Bleetman,
The public sector battle against two pandemics: COVID-19 and public procurement corruption,
International Federation of Accountants, 13 January 2021, https://www.ifac.o^g/knowledge gateway/
contributing global economy/discussion/public sector battle against twO Dandemics covid I9
and public procurement corruption.
2. Alex Kimani, Oil piracy has spiked du ring COV1 D pandemic, Oil Price.com, 18 August 2020,
https:// oil price.com/Geopo1itics/International/Oi Piracy Has Spa ked D u ring COVID Pa odemic.
ht ml.
3. Frances d'Emilio, Police: Mafia ripped off EU for millions in farm aid, Associated Press, 13
January 2020, https://apnews.com/article/ siciIy-ita!y-organized-crime-europe-crime-
d0ebfe08983f8b9daód8a23c03b93a 22.
4. Walter Kemp and Mark Shaw, Police reform needed for local and transnational crime, The Global I
nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 18 June 2020,
https://gIobaIinitiative.net/analysis/ poliereorm/
5. Summer Walker, Reforming the response paradigm: What does Black Lives Matter tell us about
tackling organized crime?, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September
2020, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2020/09/Reforming-the-response-
paradigm-What-does- Black- Lives- Matter-tell-us- about-tack! int-organized-crime.pdf.
6. Isaac Norris and Chris Dalby, Why have political ass assinations more than doubled in Brazil’,
InSight Crime, 24 November 2020, https://insightcrime.org/ news/analysis/political assassinations
doubled in brazil/.
7. Nina Lakhani, Mexico world's deadliest country for journalists, new report finds, The Cuordian,
22 December 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/dec/22/mexico |ournaIists deadIy cDr
Dress freedom.
8. I bid.
9. Ian Tennant, John Collins and Jason Eligh, Smoke signals: The evolving status of cannabis under
the international drug-control regime, The Global
I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 23 December 2020,
https://gIobaIinitiative.net/analysis/ cannabis-status-d tug-control/.
10. The G lobat lnitiative Aga inst Transnational O rganized Crime, The global illicit economy:
Trajectories of organized exime, Marcó 2021, https://
globalinitiative.net/analysis/global-organized-crime/.
11. Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organised Crime; for more information, see
enactafrica.org/organised-crime-index.
12. Regional groupings are based on a combination of the geographic al regions used by the UN
Statistics Division (see https://unstats.un.org/ unsd/methodoIogy/m^9), African Union groupings
(https://au.int/en/member states/countryprofiles2) and EuroVoc (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/
eurovoc.htmI’Da ams'72,7206#a row 7206), but
some charges have been made by the GI -TOC where deemed appropriate.
13. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, The global illicit economy:
Trajectories of organized crime, March 202 1, https://
globalinitiative.net/analysis/global-organized-crime/.
14. Rachel Locke, Organized crime, conflict, and fragility: A new approach, International Peace
I nstitute, July 2012, https://www.ipinst.org/wp content/upIoads/DubIications/epub organized
crime conflict fragility.pdf.

Endnotes 181

 

 

 

 

15. The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, The global illicit economy:
Trajectories of organized crime, March 2021, https://
BIO ÓN I Í ÜiU ótiVü. Üüt/d Üó l'y'SÍS/BIO ÓN I OFgó Ü ÍZüd C SÍ T ü/.

16. I bid.
17. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World drug report 2021, Booklet 3 — Drug market
trends: Opioids, cannabis, June 2021, https://www.unodc. org/res/wdr2021/field/WDR21 Booklet
3.odf.
18. The Global I nitiative Against Transnational
Orga nized C rime, The global illicit economy: Trajectories of organized exime, Marcj 2021,
https:// glo balinitiative.net/a nalysis/glo bat-orga n ized -exime/;
M a rk S h aw, G lVC US OMC Ü H H S: Ü OW NO H ÍÉ Ó(FiCO’S
bangs were Armed, Jonathan BaII Publishers, 2021.
19. The Global I nitiative Against Transnational
Orga nized C rime, The global illicit economy: Trajectories of organized crime, March 2021,
https:// glo balinitiative.net/a nalysis/glo bat-orga n ized -exime/.
20. The Economist Intelligence U nit, Democracy
I ndex 2020: In sickness and in health*, 2021, httDs://
www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/. lote that South Sudan is not included in the
Democracy Index.
21. The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, The global illicit economy:
Trajectories of organized crime, March 2021, https://

22. See the ’Criminality, markets, actors and resilience: understanding the relationships’ section
(p.108) for an in-depth discussion on the relationships between the different index indicators.
23. This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UN Security
Council resolution 1244/1999 and the International Court of J ustice Opinion on the Kosovo
declaration of independence.
24. Rachel Locke, Organized crime, conflict, and fragility: A new approach, International Peace

 

 

 

 

I nstitute, July 2012, https://www.ipinst.org/wp content/upIoads/pubIications/epub organized
crime conflict fragility.pdf.
25. Danilo Mandic, Gangsters and Other Statesmen: Matías, Separotists, and Tom StoteS in a
Clobolized World. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2021.
2ó. Elizabeth Borneman, How many countries are there?, Geography Realm, 22 January 2020, httos://
www.geographyreaIm.com/how-many-countries-are- there/.
27. Only countries with no shared land borders
are classified as island states. Countries such as the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland,
as well as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Timor-Leste, among others, are classified as coastal
states. Archipelagic states, such as the Philippines, are classified as island states as they have
no shared land border.
28. Wal k Free, Global Slavery I ndex 2018, Fishing, https://www.globalslaveryindex.o
g/2018/findings/ importing-risk/fishing/.
29. Edalina Rodrigues Sanchez et al, African exceptions: democratic development in small island
states, Journal o( International Relations and
Development, 8 J une 2021, https://doi.o g/TO.I057/ s41268-021-00223-1.
30. Alastair Nelson and Jacqueline Cochrane, Trafficking Malagasy tortoises: Vulnerabilities and
illicit markets in the western Indian Ocean, The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized
Crime, October 2020, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/analysis/ trafficking-malagasy-tortoises/.
31. The World Bank, Land locked countries:
H igher transport costs, delays, le ss trade, 1ó J une 2008, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2008/06/16/IandIocked-countries-higher- transport-costs-delays-less-trade.
32. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of maritime transport 2020, 2020,
https://unctad.org/system/files/official document/rmt202O en.pdf.

182 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

 

33. Arms trafficking, the cocaine trade and the cannabis trade are the exceptions.
34. Anne Soy, Coronavirus in Africa: Five reasons why Covid-19 has been le ss deadly than
elsewhere, BBC, 8 October 2020, https://bmw. b be.co.u k/news/wo^1d- africa-54418ó13.
35. United Nations, World economic situation and prospects, 2021, https://www.un.org/development/
desa/dpad/wp-content/upIoads/sites/45/ WESP202 1 CH 3 AFR.pdf
36. The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, The global illicit economy:
Trajectories of organized crime, March 202 1, https://
globalinitiative.net/analysis/global-organized-crime/.
37. Lucia Bird, West Africa s cocaine corridos: Building a subregional response, The Global
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 2021, https://
globalinitiative.net/wp-content/upIoads/2021/04/
\/\/est-Africas-Cocaine-Corrido - G 1TOC.pdf.

38. Julia Standard, Gangs in lockdown: I mpact of COVI D 19 restrictions on gangs in east and
southern Africa, The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, October 2020,
https://
glObd I iÚitidtiVC. III/dÚd l'ySiS/gü ngS-i n- IOC kdOWP -ZA/.
39. The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Killings in the wake of COVID, 11
J une 2020, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/analysis/ kil!ings in the wake of covid/.
40. See https://mappingpoIicevioIence.org.
41. Summer Wal ker, Reforming the response paradigm: What does Black Lives Matter tell us about
tackling organized crime’, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September
2020, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/wp-content/ uploads/2020/09/Reforming-the-response-
paradigm-What-does- Black- Lives- Matter-tel!-us- about-tackIing-organiZed-crime.pdf.
42. Financial times, Coronavirus tracker: the latest figuras as countries light the Covid-I9
resurgence, https://www.ft.com/content/a290Tce8-5eb7-^ó33- b89c-cbdf3b38ó938.
43. Reuters, Rio de Janeiro governor impeachment confirmed over alleged COVID-19-reIated
graft, 1 May 2021, https://www. euters.com/
world/ame ricas/rio-de-ienei^o-gove^nor-
impeachment confi^med over aI!eged covid 19 related 2021 03 01/.
44. Megan Leonhardt, 5 common stimulus check scams experts are warning consumers to watch
for, CN BC, 29 December 2020, https://www.cnbc. com/2020/12/29/stimulus-check-scams-here-are-
red-fIags-to-watch-for.html.
45. Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Criminal Contagion: How Ma(ios, GongSters and Scommers Pro(it
(rom a Pandemic. London: Hurst, 2021.
4ó. Lyes Tagziria, #CovidCrimeWatch August, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized
Crime, 11 September 2020, https://g1oba in itiative. net/a na1ysis/covidcrimevvatch-august/.
47. Lyes Tagziria, #CovidCrimeWatch September, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational
Organized Crime, 14 October 2020, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/
analysis/covidcrimewatch-september/.
48. Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Criminal Contogion: How Momias, GongSters and Scommers Pro(it
(rom a Pandemic. London: Hurst, 2021.
49. Chris Dalby, Environmental fines become flashpoint for Brazil's deforestation crisis, I nsight
Crime, 8 July 2020, https://insightcrime.org/news/ brief/environmental bFáZil deforestation
crisis/.
50. Dan Goldberg, Pandemic fueled deadliest year for drug overdoses, CDC data shows, Político, 14
July 2020, httos://www.político.com/news/2021/07/14/ covid-pandemic-drug-overdoses-499ó13.
51. UN Verification Mission in Colombia, Statement by special representative of the
secretary-general Mr Carlos Ruiz Massieu for United Nations Security Council briefing on Colombia,
14 July 2020, httos:// colombia.unmissions.org/en/statement-special-
representativa-secretary-general-mr-carlos-ruiz- massieu-united-nations-security-3.
52. Sergio Nazzaro, Lyes Tagziria and Ruggero Scaturro, A parallel contagion: Is mafia
entrepreneurship exploiting the pandemic’, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized
Crime, 11 J une 2020, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/
anaysisp alelcontagon-maflacovd/.
53. Lyes Tagziria, #CovidCrimeWatch- Autumn, The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized
Crime, 9 December 2020, https://g!obaIinitiative.net/ analysis/covidcrimewatch-autumn/.

Endnotes 183

 

 

54. Jack Meegan-Vickers, Deep Dive: Exploring Organized Crime podcast, Episode 8: The Fall of
EncroChat, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,
https://pIayer.captivate.fm/ episode/297f98óa 8f1c ^6fb bf28 2ce39f2b31of.
55. Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, Criminal Contagion: How Ma(ios, Con$sters and Scommers Pro(it
from o Pondemic. London: Hurst, 2021, pp 72—73.
56. Italy s Anti- Mafia I nvestigation Directorate, financial crime investigative unit and the
special operations group of the Carabinieri.
57. Leonardo Bianchi, An entire police station has been arrested for dealing drugs and torturing
suspects, Vice, 23 d my 2020, https://www.vice.com/ en/artic1e/*ayq8m/ita1y-po1ice-station-a
rresteó -for- dea!ing-d rugs-torturing-suspects.
58 While not officially included in the I ndex, the decision was taken to undertake an assessment
of Kosovo to the same standards, and undergoing the same process, as the 193 UN member states, by
virtue of the country s importance to regional illicit flows.
59. Dick son Sorariba and Ben Doherty, PNG s biggest drug bust: the plane crash, the dead man and
the hall tonne of cocaine, the Guardián, 1 August 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/
aug/02/pngs-biggest-drug-bust-the-plane-crash-the- dead-man-and-the-hall-tonne-of-cocaine.
60. Euan Ward and Kate Lyons, Citizenship for sale: fugitives, politicians and disgraced
businesspeople buying Vanuatu passports, The Guardias, 13 July 2021,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/
|Ul/TÜ/CitiZünShiÇ-ION- SdII-fUgitiVüS- SOIitiCid PS-
and-disgraced-businesspeople-buying-vanuatu-
passports°C M P=Sla re OSApp Other.

61. Correlation coefficients for Oceania are not reported due to the small sample size.
62. Arezo Malakooti, The intersection of irregular migration and trafficking in West Africa and the
Sahel: Understanding the patterns of vulnerability, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational
Organized Crime and Clingendael I nstitute, February 2020,
https://gIobaIinitiative.net/analysis/smuggling trafficking westafrica sahel/.
63. Jason Eligh, A synthetic age: The evolution of methamphetamine markets in eastern and southern
Africa, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational

 

Organized Crime, March 2021, https://gIobaIinitiative. net/wp content/upIoads/202 1/03/GITOC A
Synthetic Age-The Evolution of Methamphetamine Markets in Eastern and Southern
Africa.Dd*.
64. Gaurav Khanna et al, Formal employment and organized crime: Regression discontinuity evidence
from Colombia, Harvard Business School, 2019, https://www.hbs.edu/ris/PubIication%20FiIes/19 099
40óae478 ó574 4ed3 aó21 f392a9821b*7.pdf.
65. Pearson s correlations were calculated in R, using a p-value of 0.03.
66. Oceania was excluded from the continental correlation analysis due to the small sample size.
67. For the purpose of this report, small states are defined as countries with a land area of no
more than 13 000 square kilometres. This includes 40 out of 193
countries included in the Global Organized Crime Index.
68. See, for example, The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, OrganiZed crime
and its role in contemporary conflict: An analysis of UN Security Council Resolutions, September
2018, https://gIobaIinitiative.net/wp content/ uploads/2018/09/TGIATOC U NSC Policy Note
1962-web.pdf; United Nations Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, DDR and Organized Crime, 3 February 2021,
https:// www.unddr.org/wp-content/upIoads/202 /02/
I DD RS-6.^0- DDR-and-Organized-Crime.pdf; The Global I nitiative Against Transnational Organized
Crime, Exploring the crime—conflict nexus, Ió May 2017, https://g
obalinitiative.net/ana1ysis/exploring-
hecrimeconTIictnexus/
69. Center for the Study of Democracy, Examining the links between organised crime and corruption,
2010, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication- detail/-/pubIication/ece55c86-4e39-4889-8d6f- ddc2
al9d3948.
70. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions I ndex 2020: Frequently Asked Questions,
httDs://images.transpa encycdn.org/ images/2020 CPI FAQs ENv2.pdf.
71. The two countries that make up the top 20 but that are not included in the Economist
Intelligence U nit's Democracy Index are Liechtenstein and Andorra, ranking 2nd and 11th,
respectively.

184 Global Organized Crime Index - 2021

 

Acknowledgements
The Global Organized Crime Index was developed by a core team at the Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime: Laura Adal, Lyes TagZlFia, Kosyo lvanov, Nina Kaysser, Tuesday
Reitano and Mark Shaw. Index development was also supported by Deborah Bonello, Josefina Salomon
and Susanna Deetlefs, as Regional Coordinators. Credit to the GI-TOC Publications team, and to
Claudio Landi and Café.art.br for the design, visualization and website.

In the process of developing this tool, the team drew on the support and expertise of almost 420
individuals and we would like to express our sincere gratitude to colleagues, experts, reviewers
and research assistants for their Wireless efforts to build a comprehensive and informative
knowledge-sharing and analytical tool.

Over a two-vear period, experiences and informed opinions were exchanged, and lessons learned in
order to develop the first global organized crime index of its kind. The Index itself, however, has
been seven years in the making, and its realization would not have been possible without the
foundational work under ENACT (Enhancing Africa s response to transnational organised crime)
supported bv INTERPOL and the Institute for Securitv Studies, and funded by the European Union and
funded in part bv the Government of Norway. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the
United States Department of State for funding the 2021 Global Organized Crime Index.

Photo credits: Cover Dennis Duane Lau via Unsplash; p. ó Rob Elliott/Afp via Getty I mages; p.9
Thomas de Luze via Unsplash; p. IO-IT Toshe 0 via Gety
I mages; p. 19 Joel Carillet via Getty I mages; p. 20 Raj K Raj/HindUstan Times via Getty I mages;
p. 2ó National Cancer Institute via Unsplash; p.30 -31 Andrik Langfield via Unsplash; p. 32
Deagostini via Getty I mages; p. 42-43 Vstock Lla via Getty I mages; p. NO Thomas Ashlock via
Unsplash; p. 33 Muhammed Said/ Anadolu Agency via Gettv I mages; p. ió Idrees Mohammed/Afp via
Getty
I mages; p.70 71 Fg Trade via Getty I mages; p.79 Luis Barron / Eyepix Group/ Barcroft Media via
Getty I mages; p. 87 Tim De Waele via Getty I mages; p.
93 Mario Tama/Getty I mages; p. 94 DO@anCdD ÓZtUrdn Vla Unsplash; p. 101 Westendól via Gettv I
mages; p. 108 Stefano Montesi Corbis via Getty
I mages; p. 110 Serg Zhukov via Unsplash; p. 11ó John Moore via Getty Images;
p. 128 Michael Robinson ChaveZ/the Washington Post via Getty I mages; p. 132 Lerone Pieters via
Unsplash; p. 137 Seth Doyle via Unsplash; p. 138 Matthias- Mullie via Unsplash; p. 142 Rvunosuke
Kikuno via Unsplash; p. t50 Vansep Awan via Unsplash; p. 1ó9 Bruno Thethe via Unsplash.

Layout, design and illustrations: Cafe.art.br

 

This report was funded in part by a grant from the United
States Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the
United States Department of State.

 

 

 

GLOBAL
INITIATIVE
AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME

 

ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE
The Global lnitiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a global network with over 500
Network Experts around the world. The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater
debate and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive global strategy against
organized crime.

www.gIobaIinitiative.net

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Funding provided by the United States Government
The Organized Crime Index design and development was supported by the ENACT programme.

 

Contributions also received from the Governments of Norway and the United Kingdom.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and
INTERPOL,
in affiliation with the Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized Crime.

https://ocindex.net/assets/downloads/global-ocindex-report.pdf